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Abstract 
This dissertation recreates the biography of several power holders in Wallachia and 
Moldavia to explore how local, imperial and inter-imperial politics interacted on this Ottoman 
borderland between the 1780s and 1850s and promoted European imperialist aims in the 
Ottoman Empire. For this purpose, it provides an analysis of Ottoman rule on a borderland 
inhabited by a Christian population and located near two Christian empires, the Habsburg and 
the Russian, the latter of which pursued an active expansionist policy against the Ottoman 
Empire. It also explores the interplay between the politics of local power holders who aimed to 
enhance their position and the forms of political intervention that the competing European 
empires deployed to exert control over the Ottoman Empire in contraction. It suggests that the 
major turning point in the history of Ottoman imperial rule over this borderland occurred after 
the European powers devised formal agreements in the 1830s to formally create the notions of 
European protection of the Ottoman Empire, of restricted Ottoman rule in the Christian Balkan 
dominions and of local “autonomous” governments, which accommodated the elites on site. 
The study is divided in four chapters that retrace the interaction of local and imperial 
interests on the borderland during the Russian-Habsburg-Ottoman wars of 1787-1791/1792, the 
Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), and the Russian-Ottoman war of 1828-1829. These chapters 
reveal the transformation of forms of European expansion against the Ottoman Empire, as tested 
on the Danube borderlands: from territorial annexation to diplomatic influence, imperial 
condominium and the creation of a body of international law pertaining to the Ottoman Empire. 
The analysis of the trade with land estates across the Ottoman-Habsburg-Russian borders 
between the 1780s and the 1810s, displays the complications that characterized territorial 
annexation as a form of European expansion against the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the 
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local power holders’ private businesses with land estates challenged the authority of the three 
empires on the borderland, prompting the imperial central administrations to acknowledge such 
businesses in order to substantiate their own territorial claims. A study of the information 
networks that the local power holders operated between the Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg 
Empires during a period of crisis for the Ottoman Empire, from the Napoleonic Wars until the 
Greek revolts, reveals how diplomacy on the borderland became an important instrument to 
promote and oppose European expansionism at the Porte. It also reveals how local elites used 
their role in the Ottoman diplomacy to survive the political changes that the Greek revolts 
triggered at Constantinople. The analysis of the local power holders’ involvement in the Russian-
sponsored administration of the borderland between 1829 and 1840 explores how European 
powers competing for control over an Ottoman Empire in turmoil began to promote formal 
agreements to legitimize their authority in imperial affairs, restrict Ottoman power and co-opt 
local leaders. The examination of successive European formal definitions of Ottoman, local and 
international control in Wallachia and Moldavia and of changing local political agendas (1830s-
1850s) explores the continuities between competing European imperial projects in the Ottoman 
Empire and the elites’ promotion of a unified nation-state on the borderland.  
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Introduction 
The village of Samurcăşeşti, also known as Ciorogârla, and its monastery in the 
immediate vicinity of Bucharest, Romania, are the last visible traces of the powerful family of 
officials in the Ottoman borderland of Wallachia, the Samurcas. The most prestigious member of 
the family and the founder of the church was Constantin Samurcas (?-1825),1 treasurer of 
Wallachia, representative of the Ottoman Christian hospodar appointed by the sultan to rule this 
province, and a collaborator of Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg officials in the region. 
Constantin was not buried near the church that he built. He died an exile in 1825 in the Habsburg 
city of Braşov, having fled Ottoman retaliation against the imperial Christian elites after the anti-
Ottoman Greek revolts and the local uprising in Wallachia in 1821. His nephew and heir was 
Alexandru (1805-1870), an official who served successively Ottoman and joint Ottoman-Russian 
administration in Wallachia. Alexandru was the forefather of the most well-known branch of the 
Samurcas in Romania, the state that succeeded to Wallachia and its neighbor Moldavia. He 
found his resting place near the church at Samurcăşeşti. 
Four hundred kilometers away from Ciorogârla, the imposing city hall of Iassy, which 
once was the administrative city in Ottoman tributary Moldavia, is one of the few remnants of 
the power and prestige of the two officials Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu (1746-1836) and his son, 
Nicolae.2 From the final years of the 18th century until the 1830s, Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu 
served as chancellor and treasurer of Moldavia and deployed a constant political campaign to 
obtain the support of other officials in Moldavia, and Ottoman and Russian approval to become 
hospodar. Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu was acquainted, at least by name, with Constantin 
                                                           
1 Damian Stanoiu, Mânastirea Samurcasesti (Ciorogârla), (Bucharest: Tipografia Cărţilor Bisericeşti, 1926) 
 
2 The ruins of the palace that Iordache built on his main estate at Stânca Roznovanu are engulfed by the surrounding 
forest. See Nicolae Stoicescu, Repertoriul bibliografic al localităţilor şi monumentelor medievale din Moldova, 
(Bucharest: Biblioteca Monumentelor Istorice din România, 1974) 
 
2 
 
Samurcas, his counterpart in Wallachia. A younger brother of Samurcas was a respected 
physician in Iassy and the care giver of Rosetti-Roznovanu’s family,3 while another, the father of 
Samurcas’s heir Alexandru, had served in the Moldavian hospodar’s retinue. Nicolae Rosetti-
Roznovanu (1794-1858) embraced the ambition of his father, Iordache, to take the rule of the 
province, but diversified his contacts and methods to attract Habsburg and French support for his 
project. 
The Samurcas and Rosetti-Roznovanus achieved the peak of their political activity 
between the 1780s and 1856, a time when Ottoman imperial contraction and European 
imperialism altered permanently the map of the Ottoman Balkan dominions. Russia, which 
constantly reiterated its privilege to intervene on behalf of the Ottoman Christians, including 
those of Wallachia and Moldavia,4 interceded with Ottoman administration in the Balkan 
borderlands. The Habsburg, British and French Empires repeatedly attempted to check Russian 
influence over the Ottoman Empire that threatened the Habsburgs’ ambitions at preeminence in 
Europe, the British passageways to colonies in the East and the French colonial ambitions in 
Egypt. All these instances of European expansion involved alliances and imperial projects in 
which the Danube borderlands figured prominently. How and why did local, imperial and inter-
imperial political dynamics become intertwined on these borderlands and how did the resulting 
power settlements shape each other in time?  
Using the biographies of the Samurcas and Rosetti-Roznovanus, I explore the 
connections and tensions between local officials who sought to maintain authority in the region, 
Constantinopolitan officials who endeavored to preserve this province and the Empire’s integrity 
                                                           
3 Vlad Zirra, “Medici din Moldova veacului trecut: Dimitrie Samurcaş şi descendenţa sa (I),” Arhiva Genealogică 
Ediţie Anastatică I-V (1989-1993): 723 
 
4 Valeriu Veliman, Relaţiile româno-otomane 1711-1821-Documente turceşti  (Bucharest: Direcţia Generală a 
Arhivelor Statului, R.S. România, 1984), 495-498 
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and European imperial agents trying to control Constantinople and the Straits. My argument is 
that between the 1780s and 1850s, Wallachia and Moldavia became the setting where local 
officials and representatives of rival empires tested various imperial projects, creating precedents 
for irreversible European intervention in the Ottoman Empire. After 1830 the European powers 
selected some of these precedents to devise a self-referencing body of international law that 
impinged on Ottoman imperial prerogatives by delineating Ottoman imperial authority and local 
government and by providing privileges of rule for the local agents and international arbiters. 
This was a major step for the European powers to restrict Ottoman imperial control through 
active intervention in the rule of Ottoman communities. When, after the 1850s, the “nation” 
became the main principle that local elites evoked to legitimize their political actions, the 
European powers moved to acknowledge the “popular sovereignty” of local governments and to 
place them under international scrutiny.   
Several recent studies in Habsburg and Russian imperial history addressed the 
involvement of the elites from the Wallachian and Moldavian borderlands in the division of the 
Habsburg-Russian spheres of influence in the 19th century, and the expansion of the Russian 
empire to the West.5 I aim to add to these studies by showing that the Danube borderlands and 
their elites can shed light on the agendas of different empires as well as on the intersections of 
different imperial projects and ideological movements.6 The attempts of Constantin and 
Alexandru Samurcas and of Iordache and Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu to improve their political 
                                                           
5 Miroslav Sedivy, “From Hostility to Cooperation? Austria, Russia and the Danubian Principalities, 1829-1840” 
The Slavonic and East European Review 89, no. 4 (2011); Victor Taki, “Russia on the Danube: Imperial Expansion 
and Political Reform in Moldavia and Wallachia, 1812-1834” (PhD diss., Central European University, 2007) 
  
6 In this respect, I suggest that local, imperial and inter-politics were the site for the interaction of imperial and 
conservative interests and liberal and radical political mobilization, which affected simultaneously the evolution of 
inter-imperial rivalry in the East as well as policies in Western Europe. About the concept of relative synchronicity 
in Europe, see Maria Todorova, “The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern 
European Nationalism,” Slavic Review 64, no. 1 (2005): 154-155 
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position in Wallachia and Moldavia are evocative of the inter-imperial transformations between 
the 1780s and the 1850s. These officials placed themselves, with or without Ottoman approval, 
in positions that allowed contact with the representatives of the other empires or helped 
European involvement in the affairs of these Ottoman dominions. However, the Samurcas and 
the Rosetti-Roznovanus were not indifferent to the imperial projects that they helped implement 
or to the ideological mobilization throughout Europe in the 19th century. The fact that they could 
serve simultaneously different imperial agendas and embrace particular ideologies despite their 
declared allegiances indicates skillful political calculation as well as continuities between 
imperial projects and overlaps between such projects and political ideologies, such as liberalism 
and nationalism, deemed to be at odds with empires.  
The analysis of borderland politics in Wallachia and Moldavia will also add to the current 
historiography about Ottoman borderlands by revealing how these provinces resembled and 
differed from other such Ottoman regions in the Balkans, especially concerning the relation 
between local power holders and Constantinople during a period of decentralization. A 
significant number of analyses approached the Balkan borderlands from the perspective of 
military history, focusing on how their role of military frontiers with Christian powers shaped 
inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations there and the relations between the military outposts 
and the adjacent areas.7 Other examinations addressed the politics of these frontiers, paying 
attention to how Muslim leaders in Christian-inhabited areas challenged the central government 
                                                           
7 See the studies of Gabor Agoston, “Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet: Rivers, Forests, Marshes and 
Forts along the Ottoman-Hapsburg Frontier in Hungary,” 57-79; Victor Ostapchuk and Svitlana Bilyayeva, “The 
Ottoman Northern Black Sea Frontier at Akkerman Fortress: The View from a Historical and Archaeological 
Project,” 137-170; Rossitsa Gradeva, “Between Hinterland and Frontier: Ottoman Vidin, Fifteenth to Eighteenth 
Centuries,” 331-351; Ibolya Gerelyes, “”Garrisons and the Local Population in Ottoman Hungary: The Testimony of 
the Archaeological Finds,” 385-401 in The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, edited by A.C. S. Peacock, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); Gabor Agoston, “Defending and administering the frontier: the case of Ottoman 
Hungary” in The Ottoman World edited by Christine Woodhead (New York: Routledge, 2012) 
 
5 
 
at a time of imperial decentralization in the 18th century, and demanded participation in the re-
organization of imperial authority.8 They also alluded to the complex connections between the 
Christian power holders of Moldavia and Wallachia and the neighboring Muslim commanders 
and notables.9 However, despite such indications of contacts between the elites from the two 
provinces and other Balkan power holders, Ottoman historiography refrains from discussing 
Wallachia and Moldavia within the frame of the empire. The fact that these borderlands were 
inhabited by Christian populations and ruled by Christian elites who enjoyed significant land 
ownership privileges and rule in exchange for the payment of a tribute transformed them into 
“special cases” that appeared analytically unaccountable in terms relative to Ottoman imperial 
history.  
On the other hand, Wallachia and Moldavia were considered “well-protected domains” of 
the sultan, participated in the collection of imperial taxes and, through the supply of the 
fortresses on the Danube, in the Ottoman defense system. Such attributions warrant an analysis 
of Wallachia and Moldavia that would place them within Ottoman imperial history. Studying the 
leadership of these borderlands exposes significant connections and tensions with other Ottoman 
elites in the Balkans and Constantinople, which can be understood in the frame of political 
factionalization and decentralization of power in the Ottoman Empire. Similarly to other 
Ottoman provincial elites, the boyars (officials and landowners who participated in the 
administration) and hospodars (rulers) of Wallachia and Moldavia used the devolution of tax-
collection to local elites to increase their own wealth and resources of power at the expense of 
the local population. Also similarly to other power holders in the Balkans, the elites of Wallachia 
                                                           
8 Frederick Anscombe “Continuities in Ottoman Centre-Periphery Relations 1787-1915” in The Frontiers of the 
Ottoman World, edited by A.C. S. Peacock, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 235-251 
 
9 Rossitsa Gradeva, “Osman Pasvantoğlu of Vidin: Between Old and New,” in The Ottoman Balkans 1750-1830, 
edited by Frederick F. Anscombe (Princeton University: Department of Near East Studies, 2006): 115-162 
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and Moldavia became involved in the political factions that disputed control over the central 
bureaucracy, the reinvention of imperial polity and the course to take in foreign affairs.  
At the same time, the leadership of Wallachia and Moldavia was also particular in terms 
of its composition and imperial role. Unlike the other power-holders in the Balkans, the elites in 
these provinces were tightly connected to the Christian elites involved in the Ottoman 
Constantinopolitan bureaucracy. Even more, by the end of the 18th century they became involved 
in activities that had become crucial to the Porte such as diplomacy and information networks 
with the neighboring empires. Furthermore, the fact that these elites were Christian caused the 
suspicion of their Muslim masters and ultimately, their downfall after the Greek revolts in 1821. 
Finally, the elites of Wallachia and Moldavia were also ethnically and socially heterogeneous. 
They recurrently used the distinction between “boyars from the land” and “Phanariot boyars” to 
distinguish between the officials who resided in the provinces and those who arrived from 
Constantinople, which could further suggest a distinction between the “local” and the “imperial” 
in their self-identifications and attributions. This dissertation examines how confession, 
ethnicity, social status and political interest underlay the relations among these Christian power-
holders and between them and the imperial central elites to explore how these Christian 
borderlands participated in two parallel imperial trends: decentralization and the safeguarding of 
the empire.  
I reconstructed the biographies of the Rosetti-Roznovanus and the Samurcas using 
primarily personal documents such as correspondence, property and business deeds, testaments 
and petitions. These documents have been preserved in family archives, such as the Rosetti-
Roznovanu collections at the Romanian National Archives in Bucharest and in Iassy, and in 
other collections at the Romanian National Archives and Library of the Academy, Bucharest and 
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at the Austrian State Archive in Vienna. Thus, I could identify who were the political allies and 
the enemies of the four individuals, and their connections among Ottoman central and 
neighboring elites, Russian, Habsburg and other European representatives. Using these 
individuals’ testimonies and recreating their patterns of action, I could explore how they used 
wealth and political intervention to consolidate their position in relation to other power holders 
on the borderland and its vicinity, and to attract the attention of various imperial agents. I also 
used published Ottoman decrees and published and unpublished Habsburg, Russian and French 
consular reports to evaluate to what extent the Porte and other imperial representatives 
considered the activities of the officials as acceptable behavior, or as useful to their agendas. 
Analyzing foreign correspondence, I could reconstruct shifting inter-imperial relations, the ways 
in which imperial agents interacted with members in the political networks in Wallachia and 
Moldavia and the impact of international intervention in these provinces after 1829.  
 
1. An Ottoman borderland in local and Ottoman historiographies 
Local studies referred to the Samurcas as “Phanariot” boyars and to the Rosetti-
Roznovanus as “Phanariot”10 or “Moldavian” boyars. The alternate use of the labels of 
“Phanariot” and “Wallachian/Moldavian” boyars is evocative of the complex nature of rule in 
the province in the 18th-19th centuries as well as of the diverging historical interpretations about 
whether Ottoman rule was effective on this borderland.  
In 1821, when Tudor Vladimirescu, a low-ranking boyar, took the lead of a local 
rebellion against the abuses of the elites in Wallachia, he referred to this leadership as the 
                                                           
10 Gheorghe Platon and Alexandru Florin Platon, Boierimea din Moldova în secolul al XIX-lea (Bucharest: Editura 
Academiei Române, 1995), 68 
 
8 
 
“boyar-Phanariot kin.”11 “Phanariot” was a derivative of the word “Phanar” that referred to a 
neighborhood of Constantinople inhabited by a tightly-knit community of wealthy, well-
educated and Hellenized Ottoman Orthodox Christians associated with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, who became influential in Ottoman bureaucracy and diplomacy at the end of the 
17th century. The “Greeks from the Phanar” was a phrase often used in Wallachia and Moldavia 
in reference to these individuals who arrived in the provinces to take offices. But unlike 
“Phanariot,” “Wallachian” and “Moldavian” were rarely used for the identification of the elites 
in the two provinces. Instead, these individuals called themselves and were called by the 
population and the hospodar as “boyars.” To distinguish themselves from the new comers from 
Constantinople the boyars referred to themselves as being “from the land,” instead of 
“Wallachian” or “Moldavian.” 
The historiography about these borderlands describes the elites as “boyars,” “Phanariot,” 
“Moldavian” and “Wallachian,” and “from the land,” using these markers to distinguish them 
from the rest of the inhabitants but also to convey immutable divisions between the “Phanariots” 
and the “Moldavians/Wallachians.” Thus, the former term denotes passing foreigners, agents of a 
fleeting and temporary imperial imposition, while the latter two - permanent residents and 
enduring “local” polities. Several studies in the national historiography of Romania, the modern 
state on the territory of Wallachia and Moldavia, questioned these distinctions. Andrei Pippidi 
avoided reifying the categories that described the elites on the borderlands and argued instead 
that the ascendance of individuals called “Phanariots” was indicative of a new political vision of 
rule. The Phanariots were members of an ethnically heterogeneous “bureaucracy” that promoted 
                                                           
11 Dumitru Bodin, “Tudor Vladimirescu şi Constantin Samurcas" in In amintirea lui Constantin Giurescu la 
douăzeci şi cinci ani de la moartea lui, edited by Constantin Marinescu, Alexandru Rosetti, Victor Papacostea and 
Constantin Grecescu, (Bucharest, 1944), 162 
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“social concord under the patronage of the sultan”12 and who profited from the position of 
intermediaries between the Ottoman government and the population in Wallachia and 
Moldavia.13 This political model prevailed through most of the 18th century, although it co-
existed and later combined with a rival model that claimed more power for the elites localized in 
Wallachia and Moldavia.14 Adopting Pippidi’s understanding of 18th century politics on the 
borderlands, I will refer to the networks of imperial intermediaries as the “Phanariot rules” and to 
their members, as Phanariot-Wallachian or Phanariot-Moldavian. 
The ethnic definitions of the “Phanariots” have been promoted in Romanian 
historiography of Wallachia and Moldavia to suit a particular version of these provinces’ past: as 
a single nation, preserving its medieval institutions untainted by “foreign” influences, including 
the Ottoman rule.15 Ever since the 19th century, local historians proceeded to demonstrate that a 
medieval Romanian state survived in Wallachia and Moldavia. To do so, they focused in 
particular on the essential role for the preservation of local “sovereignty” of the “privileges” that 
elites from these provinces presented to the Russian authorities in 1772 to argue for the 
restoration of alleged prerogatives usurped by the Porte.16 At the beginning of the 20th century, 
the Romanian historian Constantin Giurescu demonstrated that these “privileges” were in fact 
                                                           
12 Also see Florin Constantiniu, “ ‘Sărmanele raiale:’ factorul otoman in geneza politicii de reforma a domnilor 
fanarioti,” Caietele Laboratorului de Studii Otomane 1 (Bucharest: Universitatea Bucureşti, 1990), 189-199 
 
13 Andrei Pippidi, “Phanar, Phanariotes, Phanariotisme,” Revue des études sud-est européennes 13, no.2 (1975): 237 
 
14 Andrei Pippidi, “Phanar, Phanariotes, Phanariotisme,” 237-238 
 
15 Anca Dobre, “Points de vue de l’histoire grecque et roumaine sur la question des Phanariotes,” in Relations 
Gréco-Roumaines: Interculturalité et identité nationale, edited by Paschalis Kitromilides and Anna Tabaki, 
(Institute for Neohellenic Research, 2004), 192 
 
16 These apocryphal “privileges” also gained currency among 19th century European historians and specialists of 
international law who tried to document how Ottoman power could have been reconceptualized and limited as 
“suzerainty.” See Viorel Panaite, The Ottoman law of war and peace: the Ottoman Empire and tribute payers 
(Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000) 36-38 
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forgeries.17 However, the interest in finding documentary evidence of a “privileged status” for 
Wallachia and Moldavia and continuity of their “institutions” gained impetus when local 
historians began to study Ottoman history. 
 These historians detected documents in which the Porte acknowledged at various times 
from the 16th century onwards that Wallachia and Moldavia were registered separately at the 
imperial chancery and that their Christian inhabitants could own and bequeath properties.18 Such 
charters assigned Ottoman protection to the Christian lands situated between the territories under 
the rule of Islamic law and those of enemy Christian empires. But even though these historians 
nuanced the history of Wallachia and Moldavia to reveal the Ottoman legal categories ascribed 
to them, they also considered that such charters consecrated the two provinces’ “lands and own 
leadership, the state itself with its administration, laws, army, church, official language.”19  
A new, revisionist trend in Romanian historiography of Wallachia and Moldavia and in 
Romanian Ottomanist historiography began to question the assumptions of previous studies. 
Lucian Boia deconstructed the myths of Romanian history, including the minimization of 
Ottoman rule, and pointed out that historically, it would be “just as correct, and certainly more 
realistic, to observe that, beyond the Romanian-Ottoman […] antagonism, the Romanian lands 
were integrated for centuries in the Ottoman system.”20 Silvana Răchieru also criticized the 
                                                           
17 Constantin Giurescu, Capitulațiile Moldovei cu Poarta Otomană (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol 
Göbl, 1908)  
 
18 Mihai Maxim, “L’autonomie de la Moldovie et de la Valachie dans les actes officiels de la Porte au cours de la 
seconde moitié du XVIe siècle” in L’Empire Ottoman au Nord du Danube et l’autonomie des Principautés 
Roumaines au XVe siècle (Istanbul: Isis, 1999), 11-40; Ion Matei, “Quelques problèmes concernant le régime de la 
domination ottomane dans les pays roumains (concernant particulièrement la Valachie),” Revue des Etudes Sud-Est 
Européennes 10, no. 1 (1972): 73-75 
 
19 Mihai Maxim, L’Empire Ottoman au Nord du Danube et l’Autonomie des Principautés Roumaines au XVIe siècle 
(Istanbul: Les Editions Isis, 1999), 15 
 
20 Lucian Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), 
155 
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exclusive focus of local historians on reifying Romanian “institutions” and ethnicity and 
proposed instead the study of ambiguous historical issues, such as the political prominence and 
role of the “Phanariots.”21 Viorel Panaite, a Romanian Ottomanist scholar, revised previous 
interpretations about the juridical status of Wallachia and Moldavia in relation to the Porte. 
Panaite acknowledged that Wallachia and Moldavia occupied a distinctive position, as tribute 
paying, buffer protectorates, but he also explained that in these provinces, similarly to other 
dominions, imperial mandate was exerted in a customary fashion, which allowed continuous 
reinterpretations of their status by the Porte. In this fashion, Wallachia and Moldavia were 
included in the broader and heterogeneous imperial system of the pax ottomanica.22  
Apart from Viorel Panaite, who provided specialized analyses for Wallachia and 
Moldavia within the Ottoman Empire, non-Romanian Ottomanist historians referred to these 
provinces rather briefly, hinting at their numerous, particularly socio-economic ties, with the 
Porte. This approach is in part due to the fact that some non-Romanian Ottomanist historians 
adopted the argument about Wallachian and Moldavian “vassalage” from their Romanian 
counterparts23 and only few others emphasized the changing character of Ottoman rule in these 
provinces.24 In general surveys of Ottoman socio-economic history, however, Wallachia and 
Moldavia figure more prominently. While some of the sources are Romanian interpretations, this 
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section of Ottoman history also uses a great number of Balkan, non-Romanian studies, as well as 
Ottoman sources about the Ottoman supply and trade on the Danube borderland.25  
Another line of study in Ottoman history, which dealt with the Ottoman rule in the 
Balkans, suggested the complex connections with Wallachia and Moldavia. Deena Sadat 
juxtaposed the elites in Wallachia and Moldavia to the ayans in the Balkans to argue that the 
intensification of trade with neighboring empires in the 19th century increased the power of local 
elites and motivated them to exploit the local labor force.26 In a similar vein, Virginia Aksan 
explored the competition for resources, and particularly for land and labor force, between elites 
in Wallachia and Moldavia and military commanders in the neighboring areas at the beginning of 
the 18th century.27 These studies alluded to the similarities between the ways in which the elites 
in the provinces and those in the neighboring regions consolidated their power using local 
resources. They also hinted at the integration of the boyars from Wallachia and Moldavia in the 
system of Ottoman governance in which their role was, according to Pippidi, to implement a 
political vision according to which social order and equity were ruled through the sultan’s will 
but local decision-making belonged to them. But how did these Christian elites become involved 
in power networks with Muslim and non-Muslim elites from various regions or the capital and 
how did these networks evolve?   
As a borderland inhabited by a predominantly Orthodox Christian population, and where 
bureaucratic elites enjoyed property of most resources, Wallachia and Moldavia were indeed 
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distinctive from other Ottoman dominions in the Balkans and elsewhere where the elites were 
Muslim, held military power and enjoyed conditional property rights. For most of the period 
after the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, the elites of Wallachia and Moldavia competed for 
the position of ruler (the hospodar), for which they needed Ottoman confirmation. This position 
allowed them and their relatives to monopolize the most rewarding administrative offices (the 
boierii) that carried tax-exemptions and the privilege to farm out sources of public income, or 
monopolies, such as those on the salt mines, the trade with cattle or wine.  
Romanian historians emphasized the Romanian ethnic character of these elites, an 
assertion that needs careful evaluation. Indeed, these individuals spoke mostly the vernacular, 
intermarried and regularly referred to each other as being “of the land,” locals. However, they 
rarely extended the designation of “being from the land” to the other inhabitants of the provinces 
with whom they shared the language and confession. The boyars also participated in the 
Hellenized culture common to most Orthodox Christian elites and entertained by the Orthodox 
Patriarchate in Constantinople,28 the institution to which the Ottoman sultan acknowledged 
religious patronage over his Orthodox subjects and certain political influence over this 
community.29 In addition, the elites of the borderlands also developed kinship relations with 
wealthy Orthodox Christian families in Constantinople, which claimed Byzantine heritage,30 as 
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well as with prominent families from neighboring Hungary and Poland.31 Such newcomers took 
offices in the provinces, purchased properties or received them as dowries and most of them 
settled there. This was also the case of the Rosetti-Roznovanus’ ancestor, Iordache Rosetti, heir 
of a layman administrator at the Patriarchate who arrived in Moldavia at the end of the 17th 
century.32  
Until the 18th century, the Porte did not scrutinize politics in Wallachia and Moldavia 
closely, although the sultan confirmed the ruler entrusted with the delivery of the tribute and of 
supplies to the capital and to campaigning armies, when needed. However, at the beginning of 
the century, the sultan began to appoint the hospodars from among the Orthodox Christian elites 
at Constantinople, rather than confirm boyars who had been elected by their peers to rule the 
borderlands. The newly-appointed individuals, who had enjoyed before a prominent position due 
to their wealth and connections at the Patriarchate, climbed the ranks of the Ottoman 
bureaucracy as interpreters and mediators as the Porte began to engage in diplomacy with its 
European enemies.33 The change in the manner of appointment of the hospodars, which would 
trigger important changes at the level of the Orthodox elites in Wallachia and Moldavia and at 
Constantinople, was unprecedented but not surprising within broader transformations in the 
Ottoman Empire.  
The new Phanariot hospodars acted as imperial tax-farmers34 in the context where the 
Porte implemented an empire-wide system of revenue contracting or tax farming (malikane). 
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Through this system, private individuals purchased in advance the privilege to exploit and to 
administer territories that formally belonged to the sultan,35 a status that belonged to Wallachia 
and Moldavia too, as “well-protected domains.” To the Porte, the tax-farming of these 
borderlands to Orthodox Christian officials from Constantinople entailed a more efficient 
collection of the tribute and the increase of the sums that these provinces paid to the Porte. 
Furthermore, some of the local revenues were also directed to the upkeep of Ottoman troops and 
officials in the provinces and at Constantinople,36 helping to finance defense on the Danube, and 
of officials in the imperial government in the capital. The nomination of Constantinopolitan 
Orthodox bureaucrats as hospodars was also compatible with the custom that these lands could 
only be ruled by Christians and with the pre-existing political and cultural ties between the 
Christian elites there and those in the capital.  
But the auctioning of Wallachia and Moldavia to the Phanariot officials also had 
particular features that distinguished tax-farming of the borderlands from the farming of 
revenues in other imperial areas. Thus, the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia held a title that 
was formally associated both with leading the administration of a province and with collecting 
the taxes there, tasks that in other Ottoman areas were supposed to be divided between governors 
and tax-collectors or tax-farmers.37 Moreover, these tax-farmers were Christian and deeply 
involved in the bureaucratic apparatus at Constantinople. Their ascension in the Ottoman 
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bureaucracy combined with the rule of Christian provinces Wallachia and Moldavia set them 
apart from other Ottoman elites at Constantinople and in the Empire.  
In addition, the Phanariot hospodars collaborated with the boyars in Wallachia and 
Moldavia: they needed the participation of these elites to improve tax-farming and to govern. 
Connections in Constantinople helped, but the new rulers tried to consolidate their position by 
offering offices to individuals who enjoyed most power locally and to associates and creditors 
from Constantinople. Such was also the venue through which Constantin Samurcas, a member in 
the retinue of Alexandru Ipsilanti took office in Wallachia in 1796. Throughout the 18th century 
the Phanariots and the elites on the borderland developed political alliances as well as business 
ventures and credit relations. The hospodars who, like other Ottoman officials in the capital, 
were liable of having their wealth confiscated if accused of treason, began purchasing land 
estates on the borderland where the Porte did not encroach on property rights. The elites from 
Wallachia and Moldavia became acquainted with the members in the Phanariots’ retinues and 
engaged in business transactions with their creditors. Telling of the tight associations between 
the newly-appointed hospodars and their boyars in governing Wallachia and Moldavia is the fact 
that at Constantinople, when they received various tasks, they were mentioned together, as 
Christian elites.38  
 But Christian officials from Constantinople and Christian elites in Wallachia and 
Moldavia also upheld various distinctions between each other. The adhesion to a political party 
at the Porte or to a particular notable in the neighboring regions was a source of dissension 
among these elites, leading to long-lasting enmities. Social status was also a source of divisions 
and hierarchies, as lower rank officials had to obey and buy the protection of their stronger peers. 
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Finally, “Phanariot boyars” - “boyars from the land” was one of the most currently evoked and 
most apparent divisions, reinforced by linguistic differences. However, I suggest that this 
division was circumstantial and that it depended on momentary rivalry for office and position. 
Intermarriage and the fact that most of the officials on the borderland spoke the vernacular, some 
of them in addition to Greek, is indicative of the fact that “being from Phanar” could easily segue 
into “being from the land.”  
At the beginning of the 19th century, these distinctions acquired a more permanent 
character due to two parallel dynamics. From the end of the 18th century onwards, Balkan 
intellectuals who were trained or acted in the retinues of Phanariot hospodars and who adopted 
the Enlightenment imperative for social progress began to promote divisions between the Balkan 
Ottoman Christians, based on language and distinctive past, as a first step for local societies to 
reform.39 The intellectuals’ distinctions, which resonated with the European Enlightenment 
appeal to political mobilization and denunciation of monarchical despotism, were aimed at 
preparing the Ottoman Christian subjects to claim and exert rule against Ottoman autocracy by 
cooperating across linguistic and ethnic divides. Such opinions were known to Christian elites in 
Wallachia and Moldavia, including the newly-arrived from Constantinople, but they did not lead 
to political action.40 Yet, after 1821 these distinctions were reiterated, and with graver 
consequences. Successive rebellions in the Greek-speaking Balkan regions, after the failed 
campaign in Moldavia and Wallachia of a group of Odessa-based anti-Ottoman militants and a 
peasant revolt in Wallachia, led to a major Ottoman crisis and ultimately to the intervention of 
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the Great Powers. The crisis ended in 1830 with an arrangement whereby the Great Powers 
acknowledged self-rule in the Greek-speaking regions in turmoil, which reinforced the 
distinctions in the ranks of the Ottoman Christians and brought the concept of “sovereignty” of 
Ottoman subjects and the exercise of Ottoman rule to international attention. These 
transformations spelled the end of the appointment of Constantinopolitan Christians to rule in 
Wallachia and Moldavia and motivated the elites there to denounce the “Greek” Phanariots as 
collaborators of the rebels in Greece, an opinion that was also shared by the Porte. However, 
although the elites on the borderland reiterated old divisions, they were only beginning to 
reinvent themselves as leaders and members of a local community.  
Before this period of major political change, the hospodars and the boyars developed 
complex administrative and political relations with each other, while they were also involved in 
complex networks with the Ottoman Muslim elites in Constantinople and the neighboring areas. 
The hospodars’ connections with the Muslim elites at the Porte are more apparent: as dragomans 
and bureaucrats, they worked together with their Muslim colleagues. These networks included, 
but were not limited to, cooperation within the administrative hierarchies. They involved credit 
relations, patronage and political support between Muslims and Christians. These connections 
complicated the confessional hierarchy between representatives of the two millets and, as such, 
they caused suspicion at the Porte.41 However, the intricate combination of political factionalism 
and government rendered the concourse of Christian officials indispensable to the Muslim elites 
in the capital.  
One might suspect that once the hospodars arrived in Wallachia and Moldavia they were 
removed from their Ottoman milieu because Muslims were prohibited to inhabit the two 
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provinces.42 The regular Ottoman Muslim presence in the borderlands comprised Ottoman troops 
that guarded the hospodar and local order,43 the divan efendi who was a secretary and judge in 
the council of the ruler and who decided on disputes between Christians and Muslims,44 Muslim 
merchants who secured the supply of the capital and fortresses45 and other passing Ottoman 
Muslim commanders and officials.46 The successive imperial orders47 that forbid Muslim 
settlement in Moldavia and Wallachia indicate that these agents were present in numbers greater 
than those suggested in Romanian historiography. Moreover, these individuals did not act 
separately from the boyars and the hospodar but often shared creditors and political interests. 
Similar relations connected the elites in Wallachia and Moldavia, boyars or hospodars, to the 
ayans and military commanders in the neighboring regions such as Vidin, Rusçuk, Ismail, 
Khotyn, as it will become apparent in the following chapters.  
In the 18th century, as imperial agents from the peripheries strove to influence politics at 
Constantinople and the hospodars were well-connected with the political parties in the capital, it 
was not uncommon for hospodars, boyars and Ottoman Muslim leaders to strike alliances on 
account of the faction they supported. These relations did not eliminate violent conflict: boyars 
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vied for the exploitation of the labor force with Muslim merchants who bought estates, Ottoman 
ayans raided the provinces, fortress commanders appropriated lands near their outposts and 
Muslims and Christians lost their heads depending on which faction was in power at 
Constantinople. But such conflicts were indicative of the complex interplay of interests between 
the Muslim and Christian actors on the borderlands and between the borderlands and the center. 
Samurcas and Rosetti-Roznovanu achieved power by manipulating these networks and the 
tensions inherent to them.  
 
2. Imperial suzerainty, sovereignty and international law 
The history of Wallachia and Moldavia in the 18th and particularly 19th centuries, when 
the international law registered the independence of Wallachia and Moldavia, is to a significant 
extent the history of concepts of “vassalage,” “autonomy,” “sovereignty” and “suzerainty.” 
These concepts are central to the argument about the distinctiveness and survival of the 
“Romanian state” in Wallachia and Moldavia for which national historiography found evidence 
in the theory of the “local privileges.” Their use since the 19th century is indicative of the 
Romanian historians’ creation of a genealogy for Romanian sovereignty through the 
identification of stages of self-determination in the imperial past. But it is equally telling of a 19th 
century trend in international law to create concepts that approximated Ottoman rule and which 
allowed the European powers to define and regulate areas of government that they removed from 
the prerogatives of the Ottoman rule.48 “Vassalage,” local “independent government,” “Ottoman 
sovereignty” or “suzerainty” thus became recurrent in the language of 19th century European 
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diplomats who dealt with Ottoman affairs, and progressively entered the general vocabulary in 
relation to the Eastern Question.   
The European diplomacies’ attempts to control the contraction of the Ottoman Empire 
overlapped, since the middle of the 19th century, with the attempts of a number of local 
intellectuals and officials to invent the Romanian nation. Therefore, the challenge is to 
distinguish between these two trends, and to historicize the construction of the international 
concepts of “sovereignty” and “suzerainty” to define, organize and control Ottoman imperial 
authority. Adhering to the Enlightenment principle that political participation could lead to 
progress,  Balkan intellectuals and elites had proposed since the end of 18th century projects for 
the reorganization of the Ottoman Christians into “republics” that allowed them to exert political 
voice. However, these projects fell on deaf ears with revolutionary European leaders such as 
Napoleon,49 and led to repression against their proponents.50 The claims to political agency in the 
Balkans received consideration as forms of government subordinate or alternative to Ottoman 
rule only in the 19th century, when the European powers began to intervene in Ottoman 
administration through arrangements that became categories of international law.  
After the Congress of Vienna (1815), as the Ottoman Empire became unofficially51 a 
beneficiary of the European monarchies’ commitment to “dynastic legitimacy and state 
sovereignty within defined borders,”52 and a fragile balance of power was reached on the 
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continent, the European states refrained from direct annexations of Ottoman lands. But these 
commitments did not prevent the European powers’ expansionist agendas and conflicts of 
interests at Constantinople, in the Balkans or the Mediterranean Basin. In the 19th century, the 
European powers pursued such projects through agreements in which they formally 
acknowledged Ottoman authority but interfered in the Ottomans’ rule over disobedient subjects 
in the Balkans. Providing definitions for Ottoman authority as “sovereignty” or “suzerainty,” 
these agreements only approximated Ottoman prerogatives and formalized the principle that 
Ottoman rule needed international confirmation. They consecrated European arbitrage with 
respect to the delimitation of Ottoman borders, the division of the obligations between the Porte 
and its subjects and the provision of the ways in which these subjects could be governed. 
In 1827, Britain, France and Russia proposed to the Ottoman Empire to recognize the 
independence of Greece in exchange for the sultan becoming the ruler of this entity.53 The Porte 
did not concede to such a proposal but was finally forced to acknowledge the independence of 
this territory placed under international protection.54 After the Russian-Ottoman war of 1829 
Russia forced the Porte to agree to the Russian “guarantee” of the prosperity of Wallachia, 
Moldavia and Serbia. While referring to these provinces as Ottoman “possessions,” the Treaty of 
Adrianople (1829) defined Ottoman control in Wallachia and Moldavia as “suzerainty,” and 
specified the ways in which it could be exerted: through the collection of a tribute and 
“confirmation” of the administrative reforms that Russia implemented there.55 After the Crimean 
War (1853-1856), the European powers acknowledged the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
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Empire, and repeated that the Ottomans were “suzerains” of Wallachia and Moldavia placed 
under international “protection.”56 Nevertheless, aside from reiterating the sultan’s quality of 
suzerain, the European powers also assigned local government and self-rule to the communities 
of Wallachia and Moldavia. “Sovereignty” as dynastic privilege and local “sovereignty” as self-
rule could not function simultaneously for long, and the latter prevailed with European 
recognition in 1878. 
This evolution appears to confirm the critical approach to international law that argues 
“sovereignty” and international law has served since the 19th century as an instrument of Western 
expansion. “Sovereignty” became a fixture concept in international legal thought and practice to 
prevent major conflicts among the European powers on the continent57 and to further their 
colonial ambitions in the rest of the world.58 Antony Anghie claimed that, in its heyday, 
European colonialism shaped international law and used the concept of “sovereignty” “to create 
a legal system that could account for relations between the European and non-European worlds 
in the colonial confrontation.”59 Colonialism was associated with a particular way of 
understanding the non-Western world according to which the West, having superior scientific 
knowledge of society, should oversee the political organization and development of other 
societies. International law thus became intimately connected to the European colonial powers’ 
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claim to having a “civilizing mission,” as Matti Koskenniemi pointed out, and a mandate to 
reform the world based on their “deep insights about society, history, human nature or 
development laws of an international and institutional modernity.”60 The moment when the 
Western powers began to promote the principle that sovereignty lay with communities as a 
concept of international law was the London Protocol in 1830 that acknowledged “sovereignty” 
to a group of Ottoman subjects61 and set up the territorial and political contours of independent 
Greece.62 The recognition of the independence of former Ottoman subjects in the Balkans 
through the Berlin Treaty in 1878 (among which the United Principalities of Wallachia and 
Moldavia), the creation of the African mandates through the General Act in 1885 and the 
establishment of the Paris system in the aftermath of the First World War sanctioned the active 
regulation of non-Western polities through international law.63  
The ranking of polities according to their degree of “civilization” had not always been a 
major component of international law. In the 18th century, international relations were guided by 
a natural law approach64 that could be extended to entitle non-European entities to the same 
treatment as the European states.65 However, between the 1810s and 1840s this pluralist 
understanding yielded to a conception of “global hierarchy” that became hegemonic in 
international relations due to a combination of ideological factors and transformations in the field 
of international relations. Thus, theories of progress became widespread and, in combination 
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with the universalism residual from the previous natural law approach, created the frame for 
inventing international hierarchies. The rankings according to the degree of “progress” were 
reinforced with divisions between the states that adopted liberalism and promoted reforms and 
those perceived to be incompatible, in their current state, with the European ideas about society 
and government. These ideological transformations became effective in re-organizing the world 
as jurisprudence gained a formative role in international relations.66  
Britain introduced “global hierarchy” in international law during its Eastwards expansion 
in the 1830s when it used a system of unequal treaties to subordinate the great Eurasian empires, 
the Ottomans and Qing China. Sending its colonial representatives and international lawyers to 
the East to press for extraterritorial rights, Britain tried to create effective instruments to control 
these states. In so doing, it also exposed the Ottoman and Chinese empires to the new type of 
international law and transformed them into subjects of international regulation.67 By the end of 
the 19th century, France and Germany also contributed to the development of this model in the 
understanding of the relations with non-European states.68 Even more, non-European empires 
that had been subject to the emerging international law, adopted the concept of “global 
hierarchies” to subordinate their own rivals.69  
This polemic approach to the colonial origins of modern international law provides a 
compelling argument for why “sovereignty” became a constant presence in international 
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parlance and how it informed state and international policies with respect to religious and ethnic 
communities. However, this revisionist trend presupposes that communities and the way in 
which they ruled themselves were the obvious choice for the colonial powers to exert their 
imperialist ambitions. The recognition by Britain, France and Russia of Greek independence 
might have been the precedent for a long series of acts through which the powers granted popular 
sovereignty, but the powers did not adopt this solution immediately after the beginning of the 
Greek uprisings. Granting “sovereignty” based on popular mobilization could have had a 
destabilizing effect on their regimes and influence on the continent. Having committed to uphold 
the dynastic principle at the Congress of Vienna, the European powers were wary of questioning 
this principle for the Greek rebels in the Ottoman Empire, given that revolts had occurred at the 
same time in territories much closer or related to their own lands like Italy and Spain.70 In 
addition, the Congress had also created a fine balance between the European powers, and these 
states were wary that outright annexation of Ottoman territories might prompt their rivals to do 
the same and gain better positions.71  
Furthermore, this interpretation also simplifies the complex contexts in which European 
powers pursued their imperialist tendencies. By focusing exclusively on how a European 
power’s ambitions in a region informed international law, it obscures the politics that shaped 
imperial agendas on that particular site. Inter-imperial rivalries, the multiple and changing claims 
to imperial control, the administration and elites of particular societies had the potential to alter 
international alliances and provisions. In other words, although the process through which the 
international law of global hierarchy became hegemonic and irreversible in organizing inter-state 
relations and regulating local communities’ government, it was not predetermined. An analysis 
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of the imperial and local agendas that combined to shape and implement international 
instructions can help explain why particular arrangements became precedents for more general 
regulations or principles of international law. The practices and norms through which the 
European powers imposed various concepts of “protection,” “guarantee,” “local government” in 
their relations to non-European communities and with each other can help explain the genealogy 
of influential concepts in international law, such as “sovereignty,” as well as how and why 
various international actors acknowledged these genealogies.   
Studying politics on the borderlands of Wallachia and Moldavia reveal the complex 
process that consecrated the division of an empire on the fringes of Europe and of its control 
over land and people into separate concepts of local “sovereignty” and imperial “suzerainty.” 
This division recalled European models of medieval vassalage, placing the Ottoman Empire on a 
subordinate, backward position on the scale to progress. It also paved the way to later European 
intervention in deciding whether local “sovereignty” should continue to be associated to imperial 
“suzerainty” or reflect the local claims to political participation based on the principle of the 
“nation.” Even more, it displays the ways in which different European empires adopted 
selectively their rivals’ imperial arrangements on the Danube borderland and in the Ottoman 
Empire to formulate principles of international arbitration in the area. In this regard, politics in 
Wallachia and Moldavia also reveal the important precedents that Russia and the Habsburg 
Empire, whose influence on 19th century international only begins to be explored, offered to the 
other European powers in designing a body of law pertaining to the Ottoman Empire and its 
possessions in the Balkans. These precedents comprised the delimitation of territory, the use of 
diplomacy to gain sympathizers at Constantinople for various projects concerning Ottoman 
possessions, the creation and consecration through treaty of imperial condominiums in Ottoman 
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territories and the claim to control Ottoman strategic positions such as the Danube borderlands or 
the Straits. 
 
3. Organization of the chapters 
This dissertation explores how intra- and inter-imperial politics interacted on a 
borderland and created different but increasingly related contexts for the display of power: 
territorial demarcation, diplomacy, government and international law that in the long run linked 
and shaped local and imperial agendas. In the first chapter, I examine how Iordache Rosetti-
Roznovanu and his peers in Moldavia who were involved in a trade with land estates in the 
province shaped the delimitation of the Ottoman-Habsburg-Russian borderland at a time of 
Russian territorial expansion (1780s-1810s). Exploring the appeal of this trade among boyars of 
all ranks in the province, I explain that it provided individuals with the cash resources and 
properties necessary to advance in a flexible and venal political system such as that featured the 
Phanariot hospodar’s administration of Moldavia. Also, I demonstrate that the ability of the 
Russian and Habsburg Empires to deal with the rivalries and networks between these elites was 
crucial to substantiate these empires’ claims to their common borderland at the end of an age of 
sustained territorial expansion. 
In the second chapter, I examine the activity as information brokers and mediators that 
elites in Wallachia, such as Constantin Samurcas, deployed between the Ottoman, Russian and 
Habsburg Empires from the time of the Napoleonic wars until after the Congress of Vienna 
(1800s-1820s) to explore two inter-related issues. The first issue is the preservation of power by 
the elites from Wallachia who acted as mediators for the Ottoman Porte, despite the fact that the 
Greek revolt fueled suspicion at Constantinople concerning the reliability of the Christian 
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leadership. The second issue concerns the transformation of diplomacy into one of the main 
instruments for the Porte to secure the survival of the empire in the 19th century, and for the 
European powers to claim indirect control at Constantinople and dispute each other’s influence 
in Ottoman affairs.  
The third chapter surveys the functioning of the Russian-Ottoman condominium in 
Wallachia and Moldavia as a first arrangement that formalized Russian power over the Ottoman 
Empire and materialized active Russian intervention in Ottoman rule (1820s-1840s). To explore 
the creation of a formal imperial condominium, how it functioned with the help of local elites 
and how other European powers perceived it, I explore successive attempts of Nicolae Rosetti-
Roznovanu to address alternative Russian and European imperial projects on the Danube.  
In the final chapter, I reconstruct the career of Alexandru Samurcas in Wallachia from the 
time when the Ottoman Empire faced its first major territorial loss, Greece, to international 
arbitration, through the Russian-Ottoman condominium (1830) and until after the European 
powers took over the protection of the borderland under Ottoman “suzerainty” (1850). Through 
Samurcas’ biography, I examine the way in which the elites of Wallachia survived successive 
changes of the old hierarchies according to different imperial and ideological principles. I also 
explain how the regulation of the government of Wallachia and Moldavia provided the ground 
for European powers to draw on previous Russian restrictions of the Porte’s authority, and for 
the encounter between the European imperial projects and a local movement for “national” unity 
and self-rule.   
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Chapter 1: Buying and selling land on the Danube: wealth, Phanariot politics and inter-
imperial rivalry in Moldavia, 1780s-1810s 
Introduction  
Protracted warfare between the Russian and Ottoman Empires between the 1770s and the 
1810s, with the occasional involvement of the Habsburg Empire, led to successive revisions of 
the frontier on the Danube, in the Crimea and the Caucasus. On the Danubian borderland, in 
Wallachia and Moldavia, warfare stimulated local power holders and imperial agents to engage 
in a decades-long local trade with land estates across the new inter-imperial delimitations, which 
required the attention of the authorities from the imperial centers. How did the flourishing trade 
with land between the 1780s and 1810s influence politics and Ottoman governance on this 
borderland? How did the local agents’ utilization of land for profit shape the delimitation of 
frontiers on a borderland at the end of a period when territorial annexation in Europe and on its 
margins had been a constant preoccupation for most European empires? 
To study the impact of the land trade on the exercise of political power and the separation 
of imperial jurisdictions on the borderland, I follow the enterprises for land acquisition between 
the 1790s and 1812 of the high boyar Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu who enlisted the involvement 
of other officials in Moldavia, of an Ottoman Christian merchant and of Ottoman, Habsburg and 
Russian authorities. More specifically, I examine the dealings between 1798 and 1812 of the 
boyars (local officials) Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu (1764-1836) and Iordache Balş (1742-1812), 
for the acquisition of lands that the Habsburg Crown had obtained in Moldavia after the Russian-
Ottoman war of 1768-1774 and of lands in the vicinity of the fortress Khotyn that Russia took 
over from the Ottoman Empire in 1812. The transactions were based on business partnership and 
political alliance and involved Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu (1725-1806), who was Iordache’s 
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father, Panait Cazimir (1759-1826) who also acted on behalf of his brother Petrache,72 and 
Teodor Musteaţă, a Vlach merchant from Ottoman Macedonia, who traded in the Habsburg 
Empire and who was involved in land subleasing in Moldavia.73 The transactions are amply 
documented in the business letters and deeds of the Rosetti-Roznovanus, the Habsburg 
diplomatic correspondence concerning the management of the estates in Moldavia and the 
documents about the inheritance of the Balş family. 
I adopt an understanding of the borderland as a transitory space underlain by interacting 
and changing political, demographic, cultural and economic boundaries.74 While this 
interpretation admits the existence of ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions among the 
inhabitants of the borderland, it does not assume that such categories delimited spatial 
boundaries before the age of ethnic self-determination. Thus, it provides an alternative to the 
nationalist interpretations of the borderland that obscure the complex transformation of land into 
territory.75  
19th and 20th century local historians in Romania, the successor state to Wallachia and 
Moldavia, revealed significant differences between these provinces and other dominions under 
Ottoman authority, which account for the existence of ownership rights and of a late 18th century 
trade with land estates. Thus, they emphasized that the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia 
could have used and owned lands, prerogatives that did not exist in other Ottoman provinces, and 
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which resembled ownership rights in the Habsburg and Russian Empires. Indeed, land ownership 
in Wallachia and Moldavia was possible because the Ottoman government committed to 
preserve local customs, including those for the use of land, because the two Christian provinces 
had voluntarily accepted Ottoman rule. Land was used jointly by owners - individuals who could 
use and sell the land, and renters – individuals who could only use a share of the land and its 
resources in exchange for various obligations to the owners. By the 18th century, in the context of 
the appointment of the Phanariot rulers, Orthodox Christians from Constantinople too began to 
purchase land estates in Wallachia and Moldavia. Compared to farming revenues from the 
sultan’s property, owning land in Wallachia and Moldavia offered an advantage: the Porte could 
have terminated tax-farming contracts upon will, but could not have interfered with landed 
possessions in Wallachia and Moldavia because custom prevented it.  
On the other hand, by overemphasizing local particularity, Romanian historiography 
represented the borderland of Wallachia and Moldavia between the Russian, Ottoman and 
Habsburg Empires as national Romanian territory. Thus, it isolated the exercise of power in these 
lands from the broader Ottoman imperial system of the “well-protected domains”76 and from the 
inter-imperial dynamics between the Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg Empires that shaped the 
map of Eastern Europe, Crimea and the Caucasus from the 1770s until after the Napoleonic 
wars.77 By examining the ongoing delimitation of territorial jurisdictions that paralleled the 
delimitations of the authority over subjects in Wallachia and Moldavia, I will show how imperial 
history can enhance our knowledge about these borderlands and how these regions can reveal the 
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evolving relations between the three neighboring empires. Current analyses about the Russian-
Ottoman and Habsburg-Russian borderlands provide rich insights about inter-communal 
relations, religious tensions and competing imperial hierarchies across their confines.78  Such 
analyses focus, however, on periods prior to the end of 18th century. The way in which the inter-
imperial Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian confines were re-drawn at the age of the Napoleonic 
wars that changed the maps of Europe, is less studied.79 Finally, my study will add to the study 
of borderlands in general, as it will show that the delimitation of frontiers continued to remain 
elusive until the first decade of the 1800, despite constant European inter-imperial conflicts that 
militarized defense lines and borders, and despite continuous diplomatic encounters over 
territorial delimitation. 
The Ottoman Empire’s borderland in Wallachia and Moldavia acquired renewed 
importance as a confinium between the Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian Empires after the war of 
1768-1774. The Habsburg Empire and Russia acquired sections of Poland and Russia imposed 
its authority in Crimea, at the expense of the Ottomans, bringing the three empires in close 
proximity along a frontier from the south of Poland to the Danube. Their close vicinity and 
successive delimitations of frontiers mixed people of different allegiances and temporarily 
disconnected claims of jurisdiction over people from those over land.  In the aftermath of the war 
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of 1768-1774 Austria annexed the northern districts of the Ottoman-protected Moldavia, also 
known as Bukovina, a space of intense commercial activity and military manoeuvers. Bukovina 
was included in the province of Galicia and placed under the administration of the Habsburg 
authorities in Chernivtsi. Following this territorial acquisition some of the local inhabitants, 
including officials who held considerable political influence, chose to relocate in the lands under 
Habsburg authority, whereas others preserved their allegiance to the sultan. The inhabitants who 
chose Habsburg authority recommended each other as former important officials from Moldavia 
to accede to positions in the Habsburg government of Bukovina.  
The region also comprised several Moldavian monasteries subordinate to the Bishopric of 
Rădăuţi. After the secularization by Joseph II of monastic lands in the empire, in 1783 the 
monasteries’ estates became the property of the Habsburg Crown, in the administration of the 
provincial authorities of Galicia.80 But as the estates were located in the neighboring Moldavia, 
under Ottoman jurisdiction, the Habsburg authorities could not exploit them directly. Instead, 
they rented them to subcontractors from Moldavia or to Balkan merchants who were Ottoman 
subjects but who had the approval to trade in non-Ottoman lands. Because of the difficulties 
encountered in the lands’ exploitation, by the 1798 the Habsburg authorities decided to sell these 
estates. The first offers of purchase were made by individuals who had subleased the lands from 
the Habsburg Crown.81  
The estates that the Habsburg Crown held in Moldavia neighbored at the East estates in 
the exploitation of several Ottoman fortresses that formed a defense line against Russia: Khotyn, 
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Bender, Akkerman, Kilia.82 The peace of 1792 that concluded the war of 1787-1790/1791 
between the Russian and Habsburg Empires, and the Ottoman Empire, 83 offered Russia a small 
portion of steppe in the East of Moldavia and at the north of the Black Sea. This small territorial 
concession was enlarged during the Russian-Ottoman war of 1806-1812 through the Russian 
annexation of the Ottoman fortresses Khotyn, Bender, Akkerman, Kilia and of their land by 
virtue of the law of war and of a wide strip of Eastern Moldavia, between the rivers Prut and 
Dniester, through the peace of 1812. During the war, the Russian troops occupied Wallachia and 
Moldavia and a mixed Russian-local war administration was created that placed these estates 
under the management of the local boyars’ council. The boyars, several of whom had purchased 
estates from the Habsburg authorities in 1798, became interested in acquiring the lands that had 
been used by the population from the Ottoman fortress and, after sub-leasing these estates, 
bought them from the Russian authorities.84 The peace of 1812 provided that the inhabitants of 
the occupied areas could choose their allegiance and relocate under Ottoman or Russian 
authority accordingly. Like in the Bukovinian case, the relocation of people was followed by 
continuous transactions with lands that caused this confine to remain relatively flexible for 
another two decades.  
 In the first section of this chapter, I will provide a depiction of the land business in 
Moldavia to introduce Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and the other characters involved in the 
business, and to discern the connections and tensions between leadership in this region and 
Ottoman rule. Using the frame of politics on the borderland, I will explain how land ownership, a 
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feature that distinguished Moldavia and Wallachia from other Ottoman lands, became at the end 
of the 18th century an important resource that fueled political integration and competition in the 
Ottoman-backed government. In the second section, I will examine the way in which this model 
of politics was exported in the Habsburg and Russian borderland administration and shaped the 
division of Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian imperial jurisdictions authority in Bukovina and 
Bessarabia. 
 
1. Land and networks of power on the borderland 
Between the 1790s and 1812, officials from Moldavia entered negotiations and lobbied 
with Habsburg and Russian authorities and the Ottoman sultan to take over vast properties of 
disputed ownership on the inter-imperial borderland. The most prominent among these officials 
were the treasurers Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and Iordache Balş, who were joined by Panait 
Cazimir, the lower rank official and protégé of Balş. The rulers (hospodars) Constantin Ipsilanti 
and Alexandru Moruzi, Ottoman Christian officials from Constantinople appointed by the sultan 
to rule in the borderland of Wallachia and Moldavia were also involved in the transfer of 
properties. Following the story of land appropriation, I will explain what constituted the power of 
Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and Iordache Bals and why land became such a coveted resource on 
this borderland at the beginning of the 19th century.   
The “land rush” started in the 1770s, when officials from Moldavia began to petition the 
Ottoman sultan and the Russian authorities for the cession of properties near the Ottoman 
fortresses Khotyn, Kilia and Akkerman in Eastern Moldavia asserting that they had belonged to 
their ancestors. The quest for land properties gained momentum after 1792, when the Habsburg 
Empire, which had taken over the Northern region of Moldavia, became the owner of estates in 
Moldavia. Due to the difficulty of profitably managing scattered properties, the Habsburg 
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authorities first exchanged lands with local officials such as Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu, the 
father of Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu,85 then rented and finally sold out the properties to 
officials from Moldavia in 1798. A partnership was concluded immediately in Moldavia between 
the treasurer Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu, the chancellor Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu, his father, 
the treasurer Iordache Balş, the lower-rank official Petrache Cazimir, and the merchant Teodor 
Musteaţă who acted as intermediary and negotiator with the Habsburg authorities. The newly 
appointed hospodar Constantin Ipsilanti also entered the bid for the purchase of the Habsburg 
Crown’s lands, having the endorsement of the Ottoman reis efendi (head of the scribe office and 
chargé with foreign affairs) Mustafa Reşid Paşa. While his interest in the purchase increased the 
price of the estates and he temporarily managed to block his competitors, Ipsilanti did not 
succeed to purchase the lands as he was replaced from office in 1802 by the hospodar Alexandru 
Moruzi.  
The acquisition of the lands that the Habsburg Crown held in Moldavia and the lands 
near the Ottoman fortresses was completed between 1802 and 1812. For one, Iordache Rosetti-
Roznovanu and his associates purchased the Habsburg lands for the staggering sum 331.000 
Dutch guilders or 1.226.000 lei.86 At the same time, the successive Ottoman and Russian control 
and regulations for the lands near the Ottoman fortresses in Eastern Moldavia led to the transfer 
of numerous such properties to Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and Iordache Balş and to their 
associates Panait and Petrache Cazimir. These officials’ claims in Eastern Moldavia began to 
materialize in 1802 when the sultan Selim III, who heeded Habsburg and Russian exhortations, 
ordered the hospodar Alexandru Moruzi to return the properties to their “rightful” owners. 
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Moruzi began the retrocession on a case-by-case basis, one of the first officials to receive 
properties being Petrache Cazimir, the brother of Panait Cazimir. When the Russian army 
occupied Moldavia and Wallachia during the Russian-Ottoman war of 1806 and 1812, and 
captured the fortresses, the Russian commanders allowed the local officials to sublease and 
finally to take the remaining properties in exchange for the amount of the subleases as a gift. 
Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu, Iordache Balş and several other officials who served in the 
occupation administration, were among the recipients of these estates.  
 
Ottoman governance, office and political competition in Moldavia at the end of the 18th 
century 
Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and his associate Iordache Balş reputed remarkable success 
in business because they drew on both their authority as officials as well as on the power that 
their families acquired in Moldavia under the 18th century rules of Phanariot hospodars, 
Constantinopolitan Christian officials whom the sultan selected to govern Wallachia and 
Moldavia. The appointment of the Phanariot hospodars continued the custom of Christian ruling 
in Wallachia and Moldavia and renewed close family and cultural relations between Christian 
elites there and Christian elites in Constantinople. On the other hand, their appointment also re-
aligned local politics to politics in Constantinople as the occupation of office in Moldavia and 
Wallachia, including that of hospodar, translated the political effects of 18th century Ottoman 
tax-farming.  
Tax farming, which flourished as the Ottoman bureaucrats devised new venues to gather 
resources for the public treasury in the 18th century, entailed that private individuals purchased in 
advance the privilege to exploit the revenues from territories that formally belonged to the 
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sultan.87 The auctioning of the rule of the Greek Orthodox provinces Wallachia and Moldavia to 
individuals from the Phanariot complex followed the logic of tax-farming.88 The Phanariot 
hospodars, who served as governors and tax collectors, purchased their appointment from the 
Porte through payments to the high Ottoman officials, payments for the renewal of their 
appointment and the annual tribute to the Porte. To gather these sums, the hospodar Constantin 
Mavrocordat, during whose rule Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu’s grandfather acquired several high 
offices, merged the treasury of the hospodar with provincial treasuries and regularized the sale of 
offices and public revenues to the boyars.89 Thanks to this regulation, and as treasury ledgers 
confirm,90 the ruler could also direct money from the treasury to his private use, to ingratiating 
himself “with the high Turks at Constantinople, […] to the Paşas, […] to the kadis across the 
Danube.”91  
The Phanariot hospodars’ financial devices facilitated the money flow between 
Constantinople and Wallachia and Moldavia and also connected politics on the borderland and 
politics in Constantinople. Although nepotism and sale of offices were recurrent in the local 
administration even before the Phanariot hospodars’ appointment, in the 18th century the 
appointment in boyar offices was known to depend on the aspirant’s family, affinity and credit 
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relations with the hospodar, aside from common political agenda.92 In other words, holding a 
position as boyar began to refer to one’s position in the complex political and economic 
networks that surrounded the hospodar and which connected him to other individuals, Christian 
and Muslim, in the Empire. On the other hand, as the boyars too could sell subordinate offices to 
individuals associated to them through family or business, the new political system catalyzed 
social mobility and involved individuals of various social backgrounds in the political factions 
around boyars and the hospodars, as it was the case with Panait Cazimir, an individual of humble 
origin who managed to rise in office and to become a partner of Rosetti-Roznovanu and Balş.   
 The treasurer Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and his father the chancellor Nicolae Rosetti-
Roznovanu, who provided most of the capital and appropriated the most valuable properties, 
followed these venues to power. Of Constantinopolitan origin, the Rosetti-Roznovanu family 
began holding office in Moldavia shortly before the ascent to power of the Phanariot hospodars, 
but consolidated their position in the local administration during the rule of Constantin and Ioan 
Mavrocordat. Through his administrative and fiscal reforms, Mavrocordat assigned to high 
offices a salary, tax exemptions and the possibility to sell subordinate offices and to purchase 
public revenues (bee keeping, making of wine, customs, salt mines). These rewards motivated 
the Rosetti-Roznovanus to foster connections with the hospodars and with other officials, and 
thus helped these boyars develop an impressive fortune.  
In the second half of the 18th century Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu, the new head of the 
family, held positions of cup-bearer, head judge and chancellor that entitled him to participate in 
the council of boyars. He married Smaragda Hrisoscoleu, the daughter of a family whose 
ancestor served as an administrator of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate and whose members 
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became officials in Moldavia during the Phanariot rules.93 But Nicolae also became involved 
with a group of other high officials, among whom his friend Iordache Balş, who served in the 
Russian administration during the occupation of Moldavia between 1768 and 1774.94 The boyars 
of Moldavia entreated the Russian court to intervene at the Porte for the end of the Phanariot 
rules and the restoration of the officials’ privilege to elect the hospodar from among their ranks. 
Given the Rosetti-Roznovanu’s history of office under former Phanariot hospodars and the fact 
that Iordache Balş too had family relations with the Mavrocordats, I suggest that their opposition 
to the “Phanariots” was ignited by the particular Phanariot families that rose to power in that 
period, rather than by the way in which the Phanariot rulers distributed power and rewards.  
That the two boyars did not object to politics as conducted by the Phanariot hospodars is 
confirmed by the fact that after the end of the war Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu married his niece 
to Alexandru Moruzi, the son of the hospodar Constantin Moruzi.95 The political influence that 
Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu gained in this fashion for his family endured through the rules of the 
hospodars Alexandru Mavrocordat and Alexandru Callimachi and after the Habsburg and 
Russian occupations. It was renewed during the rule of Alexandru Moruzi, when his son 
Iordache became the leader of the Rosetti-Roznovanu family and treasurer of Moldavia (1795). 
Like his father, Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu became a friend and political ally of Iordache Balş, 
which strengthened their authority in relation to other boyars and even with the hospodar. 
Rosetti-Roznovanu and Balş also extended their political influence by co-opting in their 
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enterprises individuals of lower origin, such as Panait Cazimir and his brother Petrache.96 Taken 
since childhood in the household of Balş, where they later exerted administrative tasks, with the 
help of their protector, the two brothers received offices in the administration and began lending 
money to other officials.97  Such credit relations had the potential to become political alliances 
that connected the borrowers to the Cazimir as creditors and to these lenders’ higher associates, 
the Rosetti-Roznovanus and Balş.  
As the boyars rallied to particular hospodars who were involved in the political factions 
disputing power at Constantinople, and who vied for taking the rule of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
they also began to relate to politics in the imperial capital. But by using the resources awarded by 
the hospodars to develop their own political positions, some of the high boyars also began to 
nurture their own projects to become hospodars, and to court Russian support for the purpose. 
The good relations that Rosetti-Roznovanu had with Alexandru Moruzi, as well as his growing 
interest in the rule triggered tensions with the hospodar Constantin Ipsilanti, former grand 
dragoman (interpret) of the Porte and competitor of Moruzi.98 The dissension between Rosetti-
Roznovanu and Ipsilanti only intensified in 1800, during the sale of the Habsburg Crown’s lands 
in Moldavia, as Ipsilanti almost succeeded to win in the bid for these properties. This rivalry 
ended only several years later, with Ipsilanti’s flight from the Ottoman Empire to Russia after the 
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Russian-Ottoman war of 1806-1812. Using his political capital and newly built fortune in 
Moldavia Rosetti-Roznovanu continued even after this moment, to approach the Russian 
authorities with his plans to become hospodar, in the context where the Russian and Ottoman 
Empire agreed that the appointment of the rulers should be confirmed by both courts.  
 
Land as political resource for Phanariot-Moldavian power holders 
The pursuit of the land estates of the Habsburg Crown and in Eastern Moldavia lasted for 
several decades and required significant amounts of money and unending negotiations. That land 
was valued dearly results from the data about the sums invested in the purchase of the Habsburg 
Crown’s lands, from the loans that buyers made for the purchases and from the detailed accounts 
of the estates exchanged, bought and sold. Thus, Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and his partners 
purchased the lands of the Habsburg Crown for an amount almost equal to that of Moldavia’s 
revenues for one year.99 Constantin Ipsilanti, their business competitor and political opponent, 
considered paying the arrearages of the sub lessees on the lands in addition to a sum equivalent 
to that offered by Rosetti-Roznovanu and his partners.100 In what concerns the lands near the 
Ottoman fortresses in Eastern Moldavia, Rosetti-Roznovanu, Balş and other officials were 
willing to offer to the Russian authorities, in sign of “gratitude,” the amount of a year’s sublease 
of the lands. Large debts were also contracted for the acquisition of lands. Teodor Musteaţă, who 
negotiated the deal with the Habsburg Crown, had to cover from his own purse the price increase 
caused by the emergence of a new buyer, Constantin Ipsilanti. He contracted loans from Rosetti-
Roznovanu and from a brother of Iordache Balş, which he failed to pay, thus losing a land estate 
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that he offered as guarantee.101 But why and how did land gain such value as to elicit the 
constant interest of many local actors, among whom the hospodar?  
According to the contracts and evaluation documents about the estates that Rosetti-
Roznovanu and his associates appropriated, as well as to a ledger of incomes and expenses of the 
Rosetti-Roznovanu household, some of the properties were preserved for their families’ daily 
maintenance and expenses, pious donations and to support a lavish lifestyle that involved gifts to 
friends and subordinates and extravagant parties.102 Such expenses were common to elites 
throughout Europe and the Ottoman Empire at the time, and were meant to consolidate power 
hierarchies, and obligations and relations of reciprocity that bound the individual to the local 
community.  
But many other large properties were allotted for subleases for periods that ranged from 
one to several years. Thus, the Rosetti Roznovanu’s household ledger also indicates that 
properties such as those purchased from the Habsburgs produced important revenues from the 
rents paid by tenant peasants but especially from the Armenian and local subcontractors, boyars 
and merchants.103 The subleasing of land estates was a practice that gained impetus in Wallachia 
and Moldavia in the second half of the 18th century. Land subleasing involved a contract between 
a landlord and a renter through which the renters paid the owners, in advance or in installments, 
for the use of the land estates, the facilities therein and the labor of the tenants for a pre-
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determinate period of time. The estates’ subcontractor could have also built and exploited 
facilities such as mills or pubs.104  
The factors that accounted for the success of estates subleasing among owners and sub-
lessees were the Phanariot hospodars’ fiscal reforms combined with the economic effervescence 
on the borderland. The reforms of the prince Constantin Mavrocordat were crucial in this respect. 
In addition to redesigning the management of the public incomes, in 1741 Mavrocordat 
abolished the landowners’ privilege to use the corvée work of tenant peasants who had 
customarily been tax-exempt and made any exemptions dependent on the landowners’ 
appointment in office.105 The general taxes that were imposed on all the tax-payers of the 
provinces,106 such as the poll tax and the tribute, were to be paid together in four yearly 
installments.107 Finally, in 1746 Mavrocordat regulated the labor dues of the peasants who were 
tenants on a landlord’s estate and condemned personal serfdom.108 
These fiscal measures, which regulated the tenants’ dues to the treasury (in addition to 
restricting the number of exempted tenants) and the time they could spend working for the 
landowner, 109 interfered with the landowners’ management of work and production on their 
estates. Under these circumstances, the land owning boyars found it expedient to subcontract 
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their estates to other parties. By leasing out their lands in exchange for an upfront payment, they 
delegated the risks of managing the estate to the sub lessees. In their turn, the subcontractors 
sought to recover their original investment by building new installations of production on the 
estate, restraining the privileges and the access to the facilities (mills, grazing lands, forest) of the 
inhabitants who were by custom entitled to use them, and by extending the term of the lease.110  
Alongside the boyars, scores of new comers from Constantinople, the imperial provinces 
and from the neighboring Empires began to be interested in subleasing and even buying estates 
in Wallachia and Moldavia. Jewish and Armenian money lenders and Muslim111 and non-
Muslim tradesmen such as Teodor Musteaţă brought their businesses to Wallachia and Moldavia, 
where they subleased estates. Ottoman Armenian merchants subleased land estates and pastures 
in Moldavia, Bukovina112 and Bessarabia,113 including the estates of Rosetti-Roznovanu,114 
where they bred cattle that they subsequently drove to the markets in Central Europe.115 The 
arrangement profited the landowners who received constant revenues from the sub lessees, as 
well as the local treasury. In consequence, the hospodars rewarded the Armenian merchants who 
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enhanced the prosperity of Moldavia with their cattle and horse trade, by offering them 
exemptions from taxes and customs.116 
The success of estate subleasing was concurrent with the movement of goods and people 
on the trans-regional trade routes that featured the borderland between the Ottoman and 
Habsburg Empires117 and which developed in the latter half of the 18th century in the context 
where the Ottoman Porte offered enticing trading privileges to the subjects of the European 
empires.118 The regime of the capitulations allowed neighboring empires to dispatch to the 
Ottoman lands “missions” to defend their traders’ interests and also to gather intelligence about 
the local notables, the imperial officials, and about the other empire’s moves. In 1782 the 
Habsburg Empire was the first to send such missions to Wallachia and Moldavia, through the 
appointment at Iassy of the “imperial secretary” Stephan Raicevich.119 As it will be discussed in 
the following section, Raicevich’s successor became deeply involved in the dealings concerning 
the purchase by Rosetti-Roznovanu and his partners of the Habsburg Crown’s properties. On the 
other hand, the capitulations stimulated local markets and commercial routes between various 
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regions, sometimes independently from the agendas of the European representatives in 
Constantinople.120 
Moldavia and Wallachia participated in the movement of people and merchandise 
between the Ottoman Empire and Central Europe, and local products were sold on Ottoman as 
well as Habsburg and German markets.121 In contrast, the economic networks between Wallachia 
and Moldavia and Russia were rather underdeveloped, given that Russia reached these provinces 
only after the annexation of Crimea at the end of the 18th century. When, at the beginning of the 
19th century, Russia took an interest in fostering agriculture on its shores at the Black Sea, this 
region entertained economic relations with the markets in the Mediterranean basin122 rather than 
with its most immediate neighbor, Moldavia, which had a similar economic profile.   
The Phanariot fiscal reforms and the development of trade networks from the Balkans to 
Central Europe explain how subleasing came into being and how it thrived on the Moldavian and 
Wallachian borderlands, but they do not explain why landowners needed the revenues from 
subleasing. I argue that the interest of the boyars in the sublease revenues is directly related to 
the Phanariot hospodars’ tax-farming of Wallachia and Moldavia and the way in which tax-
farming shaped access to power in these provinces. Subleasing constantly produced revenues 
that individuals used to purchase offices, the favor of the rapidly succeeding hospodar and the 
support of other peers. As previously mentioned, one needed to have political, family and credit 
connections with the hospodar or with other Ottoman officials to occupy a position in the power 
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networks in Wallachia and Moldavia, but all such connections were fueled with money and 
expensive gifts. While treasury ledgers specify the amounts that the hospodars spent to repay the 
cost of their appointment in bribes and gifts “as known expenses to Constantinople,” the 
expenses for offices were not consistently documented. But judging from the tight competition 
between officials for better positions and privileges,123 from the increase in the number of 
inferior offices at the end of the 18th century and from the competition between high officials 
over the sale of subordinate offices,124 we can surmise that the boyars allotted significant 
amounts to buy the hospodars’ favor and the cooperation of their peers.  
One might argue that high boyars such as Rosetti-Roznovanu and Balş did not need to 
pay for re-appointment in office because of their already established status. While these officials’ 
position was acknowledged by every hospodar, they still needed to offer the customary monetary 
gifts to the recently appointed ruler at the time of his arrival in the province to obtain the renewal 
in office.125 Even more, they needed significant resources to farm out public taxes and revenues 
from the hospodar who thus received money that he subsequently used for the maintenance of 
the court, the expenses of the administration and his own debts. The farming out of public 
revenues and privileges brought to the officials an annual profit. Even more, it allowed them to 
exert control over the hospodar. The treasurer Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu did not make 
exception as he was purchasing the general tax, the taxes on mines and customs and the tax on 
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wine.126 In addition to the farm of public revenues, the simple ownership of vast properties over 
which he had exemptions from the public taxes allowed Rosetti-Roznovanu to control or at least 
successfully oppose the hospodar. 
When Rosetti-Roznovanu developed his own plans to become hospodar and later, to 
have Nicolae, his eldest son, appointed hospodar, the control over large estates was again an 
important political weapon. He used the money from their sublease to purchase the favor of 
Russian supporters, in the context of the increase of Russian influence in the Danubian 
borderland and over the Ottoman Christians, at the beginning of the 19th century. Moreover, he 
bequeathed these properties to his sons with the hope that they would help Nicolae impose his 
political primacy in Moldavia and gain the support of the Russian and approval of the Ottoman 
authorities.127   
 
2. Phanariot land acquisitions and the delimitation of the Ottoman, Habsburg and 
Russian jurisdictions 
As the two stories of land transactions showed, the manipulation of land as a resource to 
develop political power found a new impetus in the context of the inter-imperial competition on 
the borderland between 1790 and 1812. This competition made available large properties that the 
boyars coveted to support financially their designs for power. At the same time, it also brought 
the networks for power from Moldavia in contact with Habsburg and Russian authorities and 
exported the manipulation of estates for political purposes in the lands that these empires seized 
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from the Ottoman Empire. In this section I will examine how political networks and practices for 
achieving power in Moldavia interfered with the shaping of inter-imperial borders and the 
exercise of imperial jurisdictions there. I will explore the ways in which tensions between and 
within empires shaped the delimitation of territory, and the diverse approaches of the three 
empires to the Danube borderland in the context of the Napoleonic wars. Although the Habsburg 
and Russian empires occupied positions on the Danubian borderland at the same time, in 1791, 
and although both had to deal with the local power holders’ ambitions, they followed different 
purposes for the delimitation of the border and obtained different results.  
 
The Ottoman-Habsburg borderland in Bukovina 
Ever since the Habsburg authorities took over the lands of the Greek Orthodox 
monasteries from Bukovina, which amounted to a quarter of the properties held by the 
Metropolitan See of Moldavia,128 they encountered serious difficulties in exploiting these 
properties that were physically located under the authority of another empire. The tensions 
among the Habsburg authorities and between these authorities and the buyers cannot be 
separated from broader political processes at work in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empire and the 
reconsiderations of domestic government, aside from reforms of the military, which the 
Napoleonic Wars stimulated in these empires and throughout Europe.   
Between the 1798, the date of the partnership under study and 1804, the date of the first 
sale between the Habsburg Crown and the partnership, the way in which the Ottoman Porte dealt 
with the issue of the delimitation of lands with the Habsburg Empire was significantly shaped by 
the political conflict that engaged Ottoman elites in Constantinople and the Balkans over the 
fiscal and military reforms proposed by sultan Selim III and over the choice of an ally in the 
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context of Napoleon’s offensive in Egypt (1798). Compared to the power holders in control of 
other regions in the Balkans, such as Ali Paşa or Pasvan-oglu, who openly challenged the 
sultan’s sovereignty, the hospodars in Wallachia and Moldavia did not defy the sultan’s rule on 
this edge of the Danubian borderland. But relative peace did not signify that the hospodars fully 
agreed with the sultan’s reforms. These tax-farming governors and members of their local 
retinues were involved in the political factions that spread from the capital to the Northern 
Balkans. During the period, three hospodars succeeded on the throne of Moldavia: Alexandru 
Callimachi (1795-1799), Constantin Ipsilanti (1799-1801) and Alexandru Moruzi (1802-1806). 
Each of these hospodars was connected to Ottoman Muslim officials at the Porte, who disagreed 
about domestic policies and international alliances, as much as they vied with each other for 
power.  
In 1800, shortly after Constantin Ipsilanti became hospodar, Mustafa Reşid Paşa Çelebi 
who had a long record in financial offices129 and was a member of the sultan’s reformist group, 
became reis efendi, the chief of the scribes who was entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs. 
Branded as an opportunist,130 he immediately took an interest in the land businesses in Moldavia 
and began assisting Ipsilanti in his bid for the properties with the Habsburg imperial authorities. 
The replacement of Mustafa Reşid Paşa with Mahmud Raif efendi and soon after, the end of 
Ipsilanti’s rule in Moldavia, removed all competition to Rosetti-Roznovanu and Balş in the 
business for the Habsburg lands.  
 On the Habsburg side, due to the severe defeats against Napoleon, by 1800 the central 
imperial authorities appraised measures to improve the imperial army and the collection and 
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redistribution of taxes. It was in this context that Archduke Charles, the emperor’s brother, 
reviewed the revenues obtained from Bukovina and Moldavia and noted that the taxes could 
have increased tenfold through agricultural cultivation and animal husbandry on the monastic 
lands.131 Compared to the estimates made in Vienna, the profits registered by the authorities of 
Galicia were low.132 The Habsburg central authorities thus planned to cut off the sublease 
contracts on account of their unprofitability.133 Even more, as the Habsburg diplomatic 
representative in Iassy and the ambassador Hebert Rathkeal in Constantinople were authorized to 
deal with economic matters that concerned both empires, they began negotiating a new contract 
with Ipsilanti and Mustafa Reşid Paşa for Ipsilanti’s purchase of the lands in Moldavia. The fact 
that both the governor of Galicia and the Habsburg diplomatic representatives had prerogatives 
to deal with the land estates in Moldavia brought these Habsburg agents into a conflict for 
authority. It also catalyzed the competition, on the Ottoman side, between potential buyers such 
as Musteaţă’s partners on the one hand, and the hospodar and his ally, the reis efendi, on the 
other.  
Musteaţă began the negotiations in 1798 by addressing himself to Jan Gaisruck, the 
governor of Galicia, where he travelled often with business, but not to the Habsburg 
representative in Moldavia. Thus, when in 1800 the Habsburg central authorities re-evaluated the 
properties and their representatives began discussions with Ipsilanti and the reis efendi, 
Musteaţă’s deal was in danger of being canceled. The correspondence of Baron Rathkeal with 
his informants and with Ipsilanti and Çelebi Mustafa Efendi shows that the Ottoman authorities 
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suspected Musteaţă of being a pawn of the local boyars134 and that they demanded to the 
Habsburg authorities to cancel the former contract with Musteaţă.  These suspicions were 
justified to a large extent. Although the merchant was not a mere instrument and had his own 
interests in carrying the deal, the Rosetti-Roznovanus and Balş were definitely a driving force in 
the business, as they provided a large share of the capital requested for the purchase.  
While they challenged the legitimacy of the Galician authorities’ arrangement with 
Musteaţă, the Habsburg diplomats were conscious that this agreement could not have been easily 
overturned and that selling the lands to Ipsilanti could not have changed the core of the problem: 
the sale would have still signified that the Habsburg Empire ceded territory to Ottoman subjects, 
and thus, to the Ottoman Empire. Under such unfavorable circumstances, they decided to profit 
from the competition between the buyers to obtain a higher price for the lands. In their turn, the 
Galician authorities rejected the option of a contract with the party supported by the Habsburg 
diplomats and the Ottoman reis efendi. The reason, disclosed in a letter to a Habsburg diplomat 
in Constantinople, was that if the rather small sale price of the transaction with Musteaţă was 
made public, the usurpations of the properties’ margins by their neighbors would have also 
become known. The fear of future trials for the delimitation of the estates or for damages to the 
owners could have compromised the overall sale of the estates.135  
The officials at the Porte and Ipsilanti became aware of the frictions between the Baron 
Herbert Rathkeal and the governor of Galicia and that the ambassador was more inclined to favor 
the hospodar’s bid.  They decided to continue lobbying with him and negotiate a new price for 
the estates, even if higher than that offered by Musteaţă. The ambassador and the reis efendi 
reached a verbal understanding through which the reis efendi accepted to pay the price requested 
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and, in addition, the arrears of the sub lessees who had rented the lands.136 Rathkeal preferred a 
verbal agreement to a written one for fear that once Çelebi Mustafa efendi saw the contract, he 
would have paid the price but delayed as much as possible to pay the arrears. 
The delegate of the Galician governor, the counselor d’Oesner, denied to the ambassador 
any authority to act on such an issue.137 Instead, d’Oesner proposed to Ipsilanti a deal through 
which the hospodar had to pay for the price of the sale and the arrears of the sub lessees, to make 
a first installment worth of ten percent of the value and to pay the entire price within six weeks 
from the signature of the contract. If these conditions were not respected, Ipsilanti would have 
lost the first installment.138 Ipsilanti attempted to negotiate these unacceptable terms but 
d’Oesner responded that the hospodar could have bought the lands at the original price if he 
convinced Musteaţă to repay for the fiscal concessions that he received from the first sale 
contract with the Habsburg court.139 In the meantime, Rosetti-Roznovanu and Balş hurried to 
lend money to Musteaţă to cover for his arrearages as a sub-lessee and to avoid giving the 
Habsburg authorities the pretext to cancel their agreement.  
The Habsburg diplomats were furious at the local authorities’ readiness to act in favor of 
Musteaţă. They accused the governorship of Galicia, during and after the office of Gaisnik, of 
letting themselves to be misguided by low-rank employees who had originated in Moldavia and 
who lacked any knowledge of the treaties between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. While 
the diplomats did not mention the name of Ianake Zotta, former inhabitant of Moldavia who 
entered the ranks of the Habsburg administration of Bukovina and who was a friend of 
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Musteaţă,140 they suspected that employees issued from the ranks of the reaya had helped the 
merchant to obtain the deal. They also accused Musteaţă of having circumvented the regular 
channels for conducting business in Moldavia, i.e. with the hospodar’s approval. To avoid the 
possibility that Musteaţă might obtain the properties, the diplomats further recommended that the 
lands should be sold to the hospodar under the terms for land sales of the Habsburg-Ottoman 
Treaty of Şiştov or pending compromise.141  
As Ipsilanti was recalled from his office in Moldavia to Constantinople in 1801, because 
of his political maneuvers in support of Russia, the sale was finally made to Musteaţă.  The 
Ottomans immediately acknowledged the transaction. In 1804 the sultan Selim III approved 
Musteaţă’ purchase of the estates in Moldavia on account of the fact that he was a member of the 
reaya, i.e. an Ottoman subject, and on condition that the merchant could re-sell the estates only 
pending imperial approval and exchange them only for estates located outside the 
province.142Alexandru Moruzi who was the new hospodar of Moldavia and, as such, the sultan’s 
delegate in the country, acknowledged the purchase of Musteaţă, Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu 
and of their other partners by having their ownership rights registered at the chancellery in 
1805.143 Teodor Musteaţă did not keep for long his lands in Moldavia but sold them out144 and 
invested the profit in buying a domain at Sadagura, near Chernivtsi in Bukovina. He settled in 
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the Habsburg province and, due to his newly acquired quality of estate owner and to his relations 
with the local authorities, by 1825 he was ennobled as “baron.”145 
The negotiations for the properties of the Habsburg Crown in Moldavia reveal that the 
delimitation of territory between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in Bukovina ultimately 
evolved around the use of land as a political resource for imperial and local agents. As shown in 
the previous section, land was an asset for gaining power in Moldavia. But the involvement in 
the sale of the Galician authorities, which assimilated numerous former Ottoman subjects, and 
the rise of Musteaţă in the ranks of the nobility, thanks to his newly acquired properties, shows 
that land was also a resource for Habsburg provincial leadership on the borderland. In this 
context, land acquisition and subleasing opened Habsburg administration in Bukovina to political 
connections that continued the networks in Moldavia, funded with money from subleasing.  
In what concerns the delimitation of effective imperial jurisdictions, it was profoundly 
influenced by the way in which the Ottoman and Habsburg empires could muster the authority 
conflicts within their hierarchies. The strict hierarchy of jurisdictions in the Habsburg 
government could not prevent authority conflicts within its ranks, as the constant involvement of 
the Habsburg diplomats, representatives of the Crown, in the affairs of the gubernatorial 
authorities makes clear. Even when it became clear that the land buyers speculated the tensions 
between the Habsburg authorities to obtain the deal on their terms, the diplomats and the 
government of Bukovina did not cooperate but remained divided over their jurisdictional 
prerogatives. Even more, such conflicts impaired the imperial authorities’ ability to deal with the 
networks of interest that had extended from Moldavia, through the recruitment of former 
Ottoman subjects, in the administration of Galicia.  
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At the other end of the deal, the Ottoman hierarchies in Constantinople and in Moldavia 
were divided along political rather than jurisdictional lines. While the Ottoman imperial rule was 
rife with conflicts, which by the beginning of the 19th century increasingly concerned the control 
of the center over the periphery,146 the changing political networks that rallied individuals from 
the borderlands and from the center did not impede the Ottoman government from claiming 
formal control in its realm. Thanks to this flexibility, the Ottoman sultan managed to turn the 
drawing of the borderland between Moldavia and Bukovina to the Empire’s advantage, given 
that the lands involved in the transaction were lands that the Ottomans had previously lost 
through a treaty. Regardless of the fact that the party endorsed by the reis efendi lost the 
opportunity of buying the lands, this was not a loss to the Ottoman government. Customarily, the 
Ottoman sultan in Constantinople allowed private ownership in the province, and therefore the 
identity of the properties’ owners did not matter as much as the fact that they were under his 
authority. Although the hospodar Ipsilanti lost his bid against Musteaţă, the buyers of the lands 
in Moldavia were still officials approved by the Porte, and Musteaţă – an Ottoman subject. While 
the interest of Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the reis efendi who had served in financial offices, might 
suggest the central authorities strove to tighten the control in Moldavia by having the hospodar 
purchase the lands, I suggest that on this matter Mustafa Reşid Paşa acted more from personal 
interest rather than in response to imperial directives. Even if Ipsilanti managed to purchase the 
lands, his purchase would not have entailed an increase of the taxes collected for the imperial 
treasury. But it would have definitely indebted him to Mustafa Reşid Paşa who could expect 
political support or material reward for his intercession.  
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In what concerns the buyers’ relation with the Ottoman and Habsburg governments, it 
appears that it was a matter of circumstance. The members of the partnership, as well as Ipsilanti, 
were officials under Ottoman authority. However, in conducting the negotiations, they did not 
act on imperial mandate but in pursuit of punctual interests that had repercussions on the exercise 
of Ottoman control in the Moldavian borderland, especially in the context of the coming war 
with the Russian Empire.  
 
The Ottoman-Russian borderland on the Prut river 
During the last three decades of the 18th century, the Russian Empire obtained from the 
Ottoman Empire lands in the Caucasus, Crimea and at the mouth of the river Danube, in the 
South East of Moldavia. In addition, the Russian tsars also began acting as protectors of the 
Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The immediate consequence of these territorial and 
political gains was that Russia could interfere in the Ottomans’ rule on the borderland in 
Wallachia and Moldavia and in the effective functioning of their defense line through the 
fortresses on the Danube and Eastern Moldavia. They also paved the way to Russia’s occupation 
of Wallachia and Moldavia in 1806-1812, as the Russian court aimed to launch a major attack on 
Constantinople and subsequently divide spheres of influence in Europe with Napoleon.  
The Russian court used this privileged position to support the requests that Orthodox 
Christian boyars and hospodars from Moldavia made for the land estates near the Ottoman 
fortresses after Russia’s capture of the Ottoman fortress Ochakov and of the Crimean Khanate 
had left such properties vacant from their inhabitants. The situation of the estates near the 
Ottoman fortresses also attracted the attention of the Habsburg Empire that became the ruler of 
60 
 
claimants to such properties after the 1787-1790/1791 anti-Ottoman war.147 Thus, the Habsburg 
and Russian authorities soon joined the local claimants in requesting the Ottoman Empire to 
solve the problem “equitably.”148  
Selim III adopted a conciliating approach. In 1802, he issued a hatt-ı şerif ordering the 
hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia to return the lands appropriated by the population of the 
Ottoman fortresses to their “rightful owners.” Other orders requested the inhabitants of the 
fortresses to refrain from intruding on the lands of the subjects from Moldavia and specified that 
these subjects could receive the lands they claimed only after providing evidence that the 
properties had been taken from them unjustly.149Alexandru Moruzi, who ruled Moldavia at that 
time, decided on a case-by-case basis that the boyars could levy taxes from estates inhabited and 
used by the population of the fortresses. One of the individuals who obtained such a privilege 
was Petrache Cazimir, the brother of Panait Cazimir and the protégé of Iordache Balş.150 The 
injunctions of the Habsburg and Russian Empires and the Ottoman sultan’s orders in this regard 
gave hope to the boyars and hospodars from Moldavia that the Porte would take note of their 
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requests. They began to devise business projects, to count the estates in their testaments and to 
include them in deals among relatives.151  
The claimants immediately began compiling files with dowries, testaments and 
genealogies to show that their ancestors held possessions in the region. Among them were the 
members of the Rosetti-Roznovanu family who decided that Iordache, their most prominent 
relative, should claim the properties while the others renounced their shares in exchange for 
compensation.152 The situation demanded immediate action since some of the claimants had 
already begun to take over the margins of the coveted estates.153  
As the petitioners from Moldavia and the Habsburg Crown were preparing for the 
concession of the estates that they claimed near Khotyn, Kilia and in the district of Tomarova, 
the Porte soon shattered their expectations, and began to restrict the requests of the inhabitants 
and of the Habsburg and Russian authorities. In 1805 the Porte gained momentarily the upper 
hand in the dealings with the Russian Empire through the conclusion of a new defense treaty 
meant to rally the two states against the offensive of Napoleon. Due to misunderstandings on the 
Russian side, the Ottoman officials managed to obtain an agreement from Russia, without 
relenting to its most important requests: the stationing of tsarist troops in Wallachia and 
Moldavia and the fortresses on the Ionian Sea.154 With Russia having acknowledged the Porte’s 
terms with regard to their common defense, the Ottoman government afforded to reaffirm its 
authority on the Danube and to reconsider the pleas for the lands around its fortresses.  
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Thus, when the imperial authorities in Constantinople agreed to return the properties that 
had been usurped by the inhabitants of the fortresses, they also emphasized that these properties 
only covered a small surface,155 in any event smaller than what the boyars and the Habsburg 
subjects requested. The demands for the large properties were groundless because the ancestors 
of the claimants had willingly sold their estates to the sultan when the Ottoman Empire took over 
Moldavia centuries before, as proven by the documents preserved at the Porte. After this transfer 
of property, the sultan and the Ottoman officials used the estates to sponsor the pious foundations 
of mosques in Constantinople. The Porte also bluntly rejected the requests the Habsburg Empire 
on account that in case monasteries from Bukovina still held properties near the fortresses and 
these lands had been trespassed, the Ottoman Empire had no obligation to intervene because the 
monasteries were not under its authority anymore.156  
The Porte’s attempt at reinforcing its authority with respect to the delimitation of private 
properties near its fortresses was short-lived. Partly due to the Porte’s attempts at re-establishing 
its good relations with France, partly because the Porte did not agree to Russia’s insistence to 
gain access through the Straits for its military vessels, in 1806 the Russian troops occupied 
Wallachia and Moldavia.157 The end of the French-Ottoman alliance led to the dismissal of 
Alexandru Moruzi, the hospodar of Moldavia, and of Constantin Ipsilanti who had begun his 
rule in Wallachia in 1802 and who, due to his open support to Russia, fled to the Ukraine under 
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Russian authority.158  The new war with the Ottoman Empire lasted six years, during which 
conflict and diplomacy on the Danube responded to the changes in Russia’s international 
politics: from hostility to France and uneasy alliance with the Ottomans to alliance with France 
for the division of Europe and of the Ottoman Empire, and finally to peace with the Ottoman 
Empire and open war with France.   
As Russia occupied Wallachia and Moldavia in 1806 and created a mixed administration 
of Russian military and civilian authorities and boyars, the transfer of the properties near the 
fortresses to the claimants in Moldavia, but not to the Habsburg Crown, seemed feasible again.  
Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and Iordache Balş, who preserved their old titles of treasurer and 
chancellor in the new administration, had all reasons to hope that their claims for lands near the 
Ottoman fortresses would be heeded. The Russian military commanders asserted that the 
Ottoman fortresses Khotyn, Kilia, and Akkerman and their assets belonged to Russia by virtue of 
conquest. Accordingly, in 1807 they placed the management of these assets under the 
supervision of the boyars’ council approved by the Russian war authorities, and were included in 
the fiscal and administrative system of Moldavia.159 With Russian approval, the council 
proceeded to rent out the lands near the fortresses, in exchange for deposits to the treasury, to its 
members Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and Iordache Balş, among others. Shortly after, in 1808, 
the Russian administration of Moldavia and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed that 
the lands near the fortresses had to be transferred to their owners and requested the creation of a 
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committee of local boyars to verify the evidence of those individuals who demanded 
restitutions.160  
Within a year, the committee awarded large properties near Khotyn to boyars such as the 
Rosetti-Roznovanu161 and Balş162 and their ownership was registered by the local council.163 The 
committee also afforded some land estates to Panait Cazimir, as one whose ancestors had owned 
property near the fortresses.”164 Once the boyars received the properties, they offered the money 
they used to pay as a rent in 1807 and 1808 to the Russian authorities, instead of the local 
treasury, as a sign of gratitude.165 Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and Iordache Balş soon proceeded 
to dress lists with the new properties, the number of their inhabitants, the grazing surface, the 
presence of mills or other installations, and to select, like in the case of the properties purchased 
from the Habsburg Crown, the estates most suitable for subleasing.166 They speculated that in 
case Moldavia passed permanently under Russian authority, land properties and the money they 
produced would have still been necessary to substantiate political power within the Russian 
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system of imperial rule. The Habsburg Crown, as another claimant to properties near the 
Ottoman fortresses, did not receive any of the estates it claimed as having belonged to 
monasteries from Bukovina. The vacant estates left in Eastern Moldavia after the boyars took 
their share were awarded to high-ranking members of the Russian military and the 
administration.167  
The Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia lasted until the conclusion of the 
peace with the Ottoman Empire in 1812. Thanks to superior logistic resources but also to the 
political turmoil in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian commanders reputed numerous victories 
and planned to advance further south in the Balkans, but Napoleon’s intention to invade Russia 
hindered their plans and paved the way to the conclusion of peace with the Ottoman Empire. 
Aware that the Russian Empire was constrained to conclude peace in order to regroup its troops 
against Napoleon, the Ottoman diplomats strove to obtain the complete withdrawal of Russia 
from the sultan’s Balkan possessions. This aim was partially fulfilled: Russia relented control 
over most of Moldavia and Wallachia, but due to the investments in the war could not return the 
entire occupied territory. Thus, it preserved the Eastern stripe of Moldavia, across the river Prut, 
which offered the Russian Empire exit at the mouths of the Danube, and which included some of 
the properties involved in the business transaction with the Habsburg Crown and the lands near 
the Ottoman fortresses. The peace also stipulated that inhabitants in the ceded territory had to 
choose their allegiance and relocate accordingly. These regulations obscure, however, the 
permeability of the border they had just drawn, and which becomes apparent if we consider the 
movement of people between Ottoman and Russian authority, the creation of a nobility in 
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Bessarabia based on credentials offered by the local council in Moldavia under Ottoman 
authority, and the continuation of the exploitation of estates in Bessarabia by owners from 
Moldavia. The way in which the Russian and Ottoman governments and the local boyars dealt 
with this flexible border in the following two decades underlay the effective delimitation of 
Russian and Ottoman power on this borderland.  
Trading Ottoman for Russian allegiance was problematic, since the boyars could not have 
been certain that they would have obtained political positions comparable, or better, than those 
they held in Moldavia. But Russia soon provided regulations for Bessarabia that enticed lower 
rank boyars in Moldavia, aside from several representatives of the main power holders, to choose 
Russian allegiance. For the next decade, the inhabitants of Bessarabia were allowed to preserve 
their local customs and regulations and were exempt from paying the poll-tax and military 
service.168 In addition, the civil governor of the province chose the members of the 
administration from the ranks of the boyars who received appointments based on their status in 
Moldavia, as confirmed by their peers.169 These regulations allowed individuals who had had a 
lower rank to hope that they could improve their position with the recommendations of their 
acquaintances in Moldavia or Bessarabia.  
Panait Cazimir, the partner of Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and Iordache Balş in the 
business with the Habsburg Crown, who also held estates in Bessarabia, was one of the officials 
who relocated under Russian authority. According to documents from 1809, Cazimir served in 
Moldavia as căminar (boyar who collected the taxes on wine and tobacco and who was not a 
member of the boyars’ council) and serdar (boyar in charge of the post). But when he relocated 
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in Bessarabia in 1814, he received from the boyars’ council of Moldavia, which included his 
former partner Rosetti-Roznovanu, the documentation that Cazimir had served as spătar (sword-
bearer), a higher rank noble. This certificate, together with evidence of land ownership in 
Bessarabia, helped him acquire a noble title from the Russian authorities.  
The treasurer Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu chose to remain in Moldavia where he 
continued to enjoy a prestigious position even after the end of the Russian occupation. Despite 
the regulations for the relocation of the inhabitants who chose Ottoman or Russian allegiance, 
Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu continued to draw on his administrative and political position both 
in the Ottoman rule in Moldavia and in relation to the Russian Empire for two more decades. 
Even more, although he remained in Moldavia, he did not lose ownership over his estates across 
the river Prut in Bessarabia until at least 1821,170 and preserved connections with acquaintances 
of his, such as Panait Cazimir, who took office there. Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and his son 
Nicolae later used these relations and their properties as political assets to ingratiate themselves 
to the Russian imperial authorities. Iordache Balş too preserved his properties in Bessarabia. 
During the short period between the acquisition of the land estates in Bessarabia with the help of 
the Russian occupation and his death in 1812, he bestowed these properties to his son Ioan171who 
subsequently relocated under Russian authority and became a chamberlain at the imperial 
court.172   
While Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu preserved his properties in Bessarabia and continuous 
relations with the Russian authorities there, he did not neglect to declare his dedicated service to 
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the welfare of Moldavia, which was his responsibility as a local boyar. In 1812, together with 
other boyars among whom the brothers of the late Iordache Balş, Rosetti-Roznovanu signed a 
letter to Scarlat Callimachi, the  new hospodar appointed by the Porte, in which they complained 
against the great loss that the cession of Bessarabia meant for Moldavia. Allegedly, the province 
lost a significant number of its taxpayers and revenues that sponsored the local salaries and 
payments to Constantinople, the tenants on the boyars’ estates who worked for them, and the 
richest areas that produced the grains and cattle for the consumption of the imperial capital and 
for the trade with Austria. To compensate for the major loss of Bessarabia, the officials 
suggested to the hospodar that the Porte should attach to Moldavia those Wallachian districts 
that were located on the confine between the two provinces.173 
The letter was obviously meant to show that the boyars continued to be loyal to the 
Ottoman Empire and preoccupied with the welfare of the province’s inhabitants, and to correct 
the impression that they had been supporters of the Russian occupation. But it also shows that 
the boyars did not protest the cession of Bessarabia to Russia. Despite counting the losses that 
the cession had caused to Moldavia, the boyars did not ask for a revision of the treaty that in fact 
helped them to keep connection with Russia and to enjoy their customary privileges granted by 
the regime in Moldavia. Instead, they proposed a new alternative, which could have potentially 
brought them new estates - the annexation of districts from Wallachia to Moldavia.  
The Ottoman Porte obtained rather unexpectedly positive results from the peace of 1812, 
as Russia officially evacuated Moldavia and Wallachia. The fact that boyars in Moldavia 
preserved political relations with their peers who had relocated in Bessarabia and ownership of 
estates in this region could have been used to preserve Ottoman influence in this region. On the 
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other hand, the Ottomans lost the fortresses and their adjacent lands in the East of Moldavia, 
which were strategic gains too important for the Russian Empire to abandon willingly. The Porte 
also lost the lands of pious foundations and the taxes that were levied from the properties in 
Eastern Moldavia.  
After 1812 the Porte could not apply the tactic used in relation to the Habsburg Empire in 
1798 and claim jurisdiction over properties in Bessarabia on account of the fact that their owners 
were from Moldavia. The Russian authorities were more flexible in attracting and maintaining 
the cooperation of boyars in Moldavia and their peers in Bessarabia than the Habsburg Crown 
had been in Bukovina. While both empires integrated former Ottoman subjects in their 
administrations, the Russian Empire allowed for a period of accommodation between local 
administration and elites and its imperial structures. In contrast with the rigid and contradictory 
approach of the Habsburg authorities to the question of the Crown’s lands in Moldavia, the 
Russian authorities accepted the complex overlap of jurisdictions in Bessarabia and did not break 
immediately the connections between the lands and people in this region and those in Moldavia 
under Ottoman authority. This attitude attracted the allegiance of the officials in Bessarabia and 
the sympathy of boyars from Moldavia, such as Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu, without exposing 
imperial structures to the local political maneuvers. In other words, the flexibility of the 
borderland in Bessarabia favored the Russian and not the Ottoman Empire. 
During the next three decades, as Russia became actively involved in Ottoman provincial 
government in Wallachia and Moldavia and in the context of a political conservative climate at 
St. Petersburg, Russia’s imperial program in Bessarabia became more restrictive. In 1828 the 
governor issued a regulation through which he dismantled local self-rule and assumed the civil 
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and military administration of Bessarabia.174 Russian intransigence in interfering with local 
affairs in Bessarabia and with Ottoman provincial affairs led to a decline of the support that 
Russia enjoyed in Moldavia, and to the rallying of the local officials around the Ottoman rule.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I analyzed the trade with land estates that flourished in the Ottoman 
borderland of Moldavia during a period of prolonged warfare between the Ottoman, Habsburg 
and Russian empires (1790s-1810s) and its implications for the local and imperial agendas. I 
explained why despite treaty delimitations, the demarcation of imperial jurisdictions over people 
and territory spanned over decades and led to results that could have differed from the formal 
agreements. By reconstructing the biography of the official Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu, 
alongside with discussing the broad trends in Ottoman imperial rule, I suggested that he and his 
peers began purchasing and subleasing properties on a large scale to obtain monetary revenues 
necessary to gain official appointments and political preeminence in a venal system of rule. The 
use of land as a source of money for power attracted the attention of officials of various ranks in 
Moldavia and of officials from Constantinople.  
These political networks, fueled by money, and the way in which they used land underlay 
Ottoman jurisdiction on the borderland in Wallachia and Moldavia and complicated the 
demarcation of Ottoman-Habsburg and Ottoman-Russian authorities after the territorial 
concessions after the Ottoman-Habsburg/Russian wars of 1787-1791 and 1806-1812. While the 
members of the officialdom in Moldavia agreed to renounce to Ottoman for Habsburg and 
Russian allegiance, they did not automatically renounce to their political connections and the 
interests in properties that they shared with their peers in Moldavia. Instead, they interfered in 
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the exercise of the new imperial authorities over the new lands by means of property rights, and 
by acting as lower rank Habsburg and Russian administrators while keeping relations with the 
officials in Ottoman Moldavia. These individuals’ ambiguous allegiance faced the Habsburg and 
Russian authorities with a problem: how to bring people and land together and how to extend 
effective imperial power over the people. Rigid Habsburg hierarchies were not capable to deal 
with this complex political environment and finally relented land to Ottoman subjects and thus, 
territory to the Ottoman Empire. Adopting a flexible attitude towards the local power networks, 
and drawing on its influence in affairs concerning Ottoman Christian subjects, the Russian 
Empire was better equipped to bring the lands and people it acquired from the Ottoman Empire 
under its effective authority.  
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Chapter 2: Trading news on the borderland: information networks in Wallachia, inter-
imperial diplomacy and the negotiation of Ottoman affairs, 1800s-1820s 
Introduction 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Napoleonic Wars reshaped the map of Europe 
and its Eastern confines. In contrast, the Ottoman-Russian-Habsburg borderland remained 
relatively stable despite inter-imperial warfare and the disruptive effect of the social and ethnic 
uprisings in the area during the 1820s. What made this stability possible? How and why did the 
local leadership under Ottoman control remain in power although the Ottoman and Russian 
Empires became unsatisfied with their administrative service in the context of new conflicts on 
this borderland?  
I suggest that during the first decades of the 19th century the borderlands Wallachia and 
Moldavia became a nodal point in the diplomatic and information networks that the Ottoman, 
Habsburg and Russian Empires established in the context of their rivalry and of the emerging 
concert of European powers.  For almost two decades, between 1813 and 1828, the diplomatic 
networks facilitated an Ottoman-Habsburg alliance that helped the Porte resist Russian 
expansionist tendencies. The boyars and the hospodars of the borderland became important links 
in these networks, as information traders, and thanks to this role they preserved their authority as 
officials on Ottoman mandate.  
The exploits of Constantin Samurcas (?-1825) who held high offices in Wallachia, but 
whose father had arrived from Constantinople, reveal the workings of information networks on 
the Danube until after 1821. To a large extent, Constantin Samurcas is a typical figure of politics 
on the borderland in Wallachia. He rose to rank and power in the service of a hospodar 
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appointed from Constantinople, the dragoman Alexandru Ipsilanti,175 and he developed his own 
influence through political networks and the marriage to the daughter of local officials, a woman 
who also happened to have been the widow of another official with ties to Constantinople and 
Wallachia.176 But Samurcas was also a particular character. He managed to preserve a prominent 
position during the Russian occupation of the province (1806-1812), successive changes of 
hospodars between 1796 and 1821 and through the uprisings of 1821. Once he fled Wallachia in 
1822 and he began to openly identify himself as a Greek, he succeeded to become a 
correspondent in the service of the Austrian chancellor Metternich who was a defender of the 
Ottoman Empire against Russia and a critic of the Greek uprisings.  
The boyars became deeply involved in borderland diplomacy in the context of constant 
warfare and negotiations between the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires and of the 
development of the Ottoman diplomatic corps by the sultan Selim III. This sultan acknowledged 
the principle of reciprocity in the relations with the European powers and created permanent 
diplomatic representations in London, Vienna, Berlin and Paris.177 He assigned the contact with 
foreign representatives to the reis efendi, an office occupied by a Muslim bureaucrat, and to the 
imperial dragomans and hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, offices monopolized by 
Constantinopolitan Christians who had been actively involved in informing the Porte and 
                                                           
175 Anca Podgoreanu and Geta Costache (eds.), Alexandru Tzigara-Samurcaş: biobibliografie (Bucharest: Biblioteca 
Centrală Universitară, 2004), XXII 
 
176 Zoe Samurcas was the descendant of a family of boieri in Little Wallachia, the Brânceanu, which had 
connections among the Phanariots. Zoe’s first late husband was the cup bearer and treasurer Constantin Gianoglu, 
the son of a “local” woman and a new-comer from Constantinople (ANIC, Inv. 2584, Documente istorice, Pack 
MDL/no. 50). Her cousin was Constantin Varlaam, former treasurer during the Russian occupation of 1806-1812, 
who subsequently fled to Russia (ANIC, Inv. 2270, Documente istorice, Pack MDXVI/no. 2, no. 11) 
 
177 J.C. Hurrewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System,” Middle East Journal 15, no. 2 (1961): 145 
 
74 
 
negotiating on its behalf since the end of the 17th century.178 As rulers of Wallachia and 
Moldavia, the dragomans and hospodars co-opted the officials from these principalities in the 
imperial power factions (Chapter 1), as well as in the transmission of information and 
negotiations. The fact that the boyars, serving as informants and correspondents, were known to 
furnish information to rival parties only helped them to enhance their political position on the 
borderland. The empires interacting on the borderland expected the informants to change sides 
provided they were well rewarded. Thus, although the officials in Wallachia and Moldavia acted 
in the broader Ottoman framework and could have been punished for insubordination or treason, 
none of the empires imposed effective control on the information networks and on the 
informants. In their turn, the officials who traded information could demand protection from the 
representatives of these empires. 
On the other hand, although the boyars and the hospodar in Wallachia and Moldavia used 
information brokerage as a new instrument to obtain greater authority and money awards, their 
success as informants depended, essentially, on their ability to remain in offices. As divisions 
along social, linguistic and geographical lines resurfaced between the officials in the context of 
political and social turmoil in the Balkans, the group began losing its flexibility and many of its 
members – the grip they had on offices. In consequence, during the Russian occupation of 1806-
1812 and especially after the Greek revolts of 1821 that brought up divisions along social, 
linguistic and hierarchical lines, members of the officialdom in Wallachia and Moldavia began to 
regroup and to invent new arguments for their legitimacy as boyars.  
I aim to explain how Christian leaders on the Ottoman borderland, and especially those 
who were Hellenized, tried to reconcile their sense of geographical, linguistic and ethnic 
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distinction with appointment in the service of the Ottoman Empire and conservative imperial 
politics, at a time when such distinctions compromised political careers. By focusing on the 
continuation of the information trade through the Russian occupation of 1806-1812 and the 
Greek revolts, I will also explore the continuities and changes of Ottoman control in Wallachia 
and Moldavia between 1800 and the 1820s. Finally, I will examine the continuities between 
imperial rule, imperial expansionism and inter-imperial politics on the Danube borderland during 
and after the Napoleonic Wars.  
Samurcas’ mostly successful attempts at gaining recognition from different empires 
suggest that he had a good knowledge of how contending empires regarded each other and of 
how they conceived of their servants and subjects. This knowledge was shared by other political 
agents in a contact zone such as Wallachia, a social space where individuals and empires 
engaged in relations of power, reproducing and shaping the context for future encounters.179 At 
the end of the 18th century, Wallachia and Moldavia became a borderland where the hospodars’ 
activity as Ottoman diplomatic mediators received renewed importance, the European empires 
began dispatching diplomatic missions, and the officials became familiar with the priorities of 
these empires and the models of service they requested. Thanks to this knowledge, the hospodars 
and the boyars could trade news, rumors and directives and portray themselves as suitable to the 
momentary projects of each empire, receiving in exchange money and political support.  
By emphasizing the role of borderland information networks in the Russian-Ottoman and 
Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic encounters, I adhere to an interpretation of diplomacy that draws 
on a recent critical trend in diplomatic studies and historical analyses of power in “contact 
zones.” According to these revisions, “diplomacy” does not refer only to the formal 
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communications between mutually exclusive sovereignties, according to the priorities of 
centralized institutions. Diplomacy, in fact, encompasses statecraft, foreign policy and 
international relations. Defining diplomacy as a field of power for state and non-state agents 
shifts the attention from institutions and formal communication to the practices of diplomacy and 
the way in which it serves as “contact-zone” between alterities, involving “diversity” and 
“connectivity,”180 negotiations and appropriations of languages of power. This analytical frame 
also emphasizes the understudied role of “diplomacy from below,” i.e. the activity of actors who 
do not hold formal diplomatic positions or leadership positions, but who can influence inter-state 
relations.181  
To survey the creation and functioning of inter-imperial diplomacy on the borderland 
through the story of Samurcas’ official activity and diplomatic involvements, I divided this 
chapter into three main sections. In the first section, I use Samurcas’ service in the administration 
of the former dragoman and hospodar Constantin Ipsilanti to explain how the diplomatic reform 
of Selim III, which assigned an important role to the reis efendi and the dragomans eligible to 
become hospodars, facilitated the boyars’ access to information. The fact that European consuls 
had just received Ottoman permission to act in Bucharest and Iassy where they collected news 
added value to the boyars’ information trading.  
In the second section, I reconstruct Samurcas’ activity during the Russian occupation of 
Wallachia (1806-1812) to explore the functioning of the information and political networks with 
the Ottoman authorities at the south of the Danube. While informants such as Samurcas or 
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mediators such as the Armenian creditor Manuk Bey facilitated the Russian-Ottoman 
negotiations and provided news to the Russian authorities, they also disclosed information about 
the Russian plans to the Ottoman officials, among whom the reis efendi Galib Paşa. Despite 
suspicions against the service and loyalty of the boyars, the Russian diplomats continued the 
contact with them even after the peace. Thus, the Russian ambassador at the Porte Gregory 
Stroganov even their reports about the way in which the hospodars appointed by the Porte 
respected the terms of the peace and about the emerging diplomatic networks between the 
hospodars, their supporters and the Habsburg diplomats.  
In the last section, I follow Samurcas’ evolution from the time when he was a counselor 
to the hospodar until his exile in Habsburg Transylvania after 1821, where he attempted to 
obtain the help of the Habsburg diplomatic agents and of the Ottoman vizier Galib Paşa, the 
former reis efendi, to become again an official in Wallachia. Retracing Samurcas’ contacts with 
the Habsburg agent Friedrich von Gentz, I analyze the creation of the Habsburg-Ottoman 
diplomatic and information networks in 1813 and the overlap of Habsburg and Russian 
information channels that used the services of boyars from the borderland. In the context of the 
international crisis provoked by the Greek uprisings in 1821, the Habsburg Empire became a 
mediator between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, thus allowing boyars with a past of service 
for rival diplomacies or supporters of Greek independence, such as Samurcas, to hope that they 
can receive their office and position back.  
 
1. Politics and diplomatic networks in Wallachia in 1800 
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In 1796, Constantin Samurcas, the son of Giorgos, a fur-merchant and creditor from 
Constantinople,182 became a member in the retinue of the former imperial dragoman and 
hospodar of Wallachia Alexandru Ipsilanti who gave him the office of second chancellor (vtori 
logofăt).183 Although his protector was soon replaced and the rule of Wallachia successively 
passed to several other Phanariot dragomans, Samurcas continued his rise in office. A căminar 
of Wallachia during Alexandru Moruzi’s rule, he served as kaymakam, i.e. administrator and 
representative of the hospodar in Little Wallachia, under Constantin Ipsilanti.  
Samurcas began his career in service during a turbulent period. In the last years of the 
18th century, the ayan and paşa of Vidin Pasvan-oglu repeatedly raided Wallachia in a show of 
power against the hospodars and other ayans in the region and of contempt against the sultan’s 
authority. The hospodars Moruzi and Ipsilanti were powerless against Pasvan-oglu. They lacked 
the military means to defend the province against the raids and the incursions scattered the 
population and disrupted the collection of taxes. Samurcas, who was a kaymakam of Little 
Wallachia, the Wallachian region most exposed to the raids, suffered major losses since his 
revenues depended on the taxes from the region. Faced with such a challenge, Moruzi and his 
successor Ipsilanti asked for loans from their neighbor, the ayan of Rusçuk Tirsinikli Oglu, to 
bribe Pasvan-oglu and to pay irregular troops against the paşa. Tirsinikli Oglu dispatched Manuk 
Mirzayan, his trusted creditor and associate, to provide his services to Ipsilanti and to make a 
loan to the treasury of Wallachia.  
Even though there is no evidence that Samurcas was personally in contact with Tirsinikli 
Oglu or Manuk, he must have been aware of these connections. If they wanted to acquire and 
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preserve positions in the close retinue of the rulers, the officials of Wallachia had to gain 
accurate knowledge of the relations between the hospodars, the ayans and not lastly, the 
Russian, Habsburg and French representatives in Bucharest. The European consuls were 
dispatched on the borderland to collect information about the rule of Wallachia and Moldavia 
and the authority of the rebellious ayans and their patrons and associates in Constantinople. By 
1806 Samurcas would have been well versed in Wallachian politics, regional dynamics and the 
information networks between local power holders and the European representatives. 
This section provides an insight into the Ottoman-European information networks that 
developed across the Danube at the end of the 18th century. Continuous continental warfare 
between 1792 and 1815 might suggest that European diplomacy had entered a period of crisis.184 
However, war also motivated the European powers to learn about each other’s strategies and 
pursue new alliances through spies and diplomats. Russia’s expansion against the Ottoman 
Empire and the Napoleonic Wars stimulated the European powers to procure intelligence and 
alliances with the Ottoman elites. In his turn, sultan Selim III paid particular attention to the 
development of Ottoman diplomacy and of continuous diplomatic relations with Europe. The 
dilemma among the European powers was how to address the Ottoman elites’ shifting political 
agendas, to obtain their support. In their turn, the Ottoman officials pondered which potential 
alliances could help the Ottoman Empire resist the expansionist tendencies of a European power 
or another, and their domestic agendas at a time when the reforms of Selim III fueled political 
conflict at Constantinople.  
It was in this context that the elites from the Balkans acquired an unprecedented role in 
war and diplomacy. The Balkans gained significant strategic importance for the warring 
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European powers at the same time that strong local leaders disputed each other’s power and the 
sultan’s authority. Ali Paşa of Ioannina, power holder from Western Rumelia who openly 
challenged the authority of the sultan and contemplated creating his own rule, immediately 
attracted the attention of the British and French diplomats. Unlike Ali Paşa, the paşa of Vidin 
Pasvan-oglu, who had antagonized the neighboring ayans and opposed the sultan, did not 
consider secession from the Ottoman Empire and the European powers could not rely on his 
cooperation. But his acolytes’ violence against the inhabitants in the region triggered a local 
Serbian uprising whose leaders Russia immediately approached at the beginning of the Russian-
Ottoman war of 1806-1812.185 The Russian Empire adopted a similar approach with other 
Ottoman power holders in the region. Having occupied Wallachia and Moldavia in 1806, they 
acknowledged the power of the boyars who preserved their positions in the war administration. 
Also, they began discussions with Mustafa Paşa Bairaktar, the successor of the ayan Tersinikli-
oglu and commander of the Ottoman army at Rusçuk who had become a supporter of the 
recently deposed sultan Selim III, and with other fortress commanders. These discussions 
concerned the conclusion of armistices but the Russian commanders also went as far as to 
propose to the Ottoman commanders the abandoning of the fortress defenses in exchange for 
honors in the Russian Empire.  
However, in the administration and conduct of diplomacy on the Danube, the Russian 
agents had to deal with political and information networks difficult to control. The boyars of 
Wallachia and Moldavia had served and continued to have relations with the hospodars who also 
acted as Ottoman diplomats and negotiators. Samurcas, for instance, had been a boyar in the 
retinue of two hospodars, former Ottoman negotiators: Alexandru Moruzi and Constantin 
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Ipsilanti. These individuals and other Phanariot officials were involved in the Russian-Ottoman 
negotiations for the condominium of the Ionian Islands taken from Napoleon in 1800,186 the 
negotiation of a new treaty for mutual defense against Napoleon in 1805187 and even the 
negotiations during the war of 1806-1812.188  
In other words, when trying to manipulate the interests of Ottoman local and central elites 
to achieve their projects in the Balkans, the European representatives found a match in the 
Ottoman diplomatic establishment and its branch associated with the administration of Wallachia 
and Moldavia. Ottoman diplomacy had been recently reformed by Selim III and received a 
certain degree of agency in the conduct of foreign relations under the leadership of the reis efendi 
or reisül küttab,189 the “chief of scribes,” who managed the activities and information involved in 
diplomatic contacts and representations.190 While Selim’s fiscal and military reforms were 
ultimately reversed after his deposition in 1807, the information networks set up during his rule 
survived. Individuals who oversaw the diplomatic corps under Selim remained at the forefront of 
turbulent Ottoman politics for the following two decades. This was the case of Galib efendi who 
served as Ottoman negotiator after the French invasion of Egypt (1798), during the Russian-
Ottoman war of 1806-1821 and after 1821, in the context of rising Ottoman-Russian tensions.191  
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As the Phanariot dragomans and interpreters became a lynchpin of the Ottoman 
diplomatic corps, the appointments to Wallachia and Moldavia between the 1790s and 1821 were 
made almost exclusively from among individuals who had served as dragomans of the fleet and 
imperial dragomans: the Callimachis, the Suţu, the Ipsilanti, the Moruzis, the Caradjas and the 
Hangerlis. From their position of hospodars, they called on various local officials, in addition to 
those who customarily managed contacts with foreign representatives (such as the kapı 
kehayas192 at Constantinople and the postelnics193 in the province), to gather intelligence about 
the foreign representatives and their relations with neighboring Ottoman power holders and 
officials. The local boyars, in search of any connections that would have helped them acquire a 
more influential office, took this opportunity. Like their patrons, they gathered information 
through contacts with the European consuls in Bucharest and Iassy, the Ottoman power holders 
in the region, the Russian authorities governing neighboring Bessarabia and with the Russian 
commanders during the occupation of 1806-1812.   
The European powers began establishing consulates in Bucharest and Iassy only in the 
1780s, in the context of Russia’s imperial expansion against the Ottoman Empire, and of the 
French and Napoleonic Wars that brought the region to the attention of the Western cabinets. 
The Russian court evoked the provisions in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca about the protection 
of its commercial interests and the protection of the Ottoman Christians to establish a consulate 
at Bucharest in 1782 and vice-consulates at Iassy, Ismail (1786) and Kilia (1787).194 The 
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Habsburg Court dispatched its first “secretary” to Bucharest in 1781 and to Iassy in 1782 to 
protect the merchants who acted under Habsburg protection, but also to gather information 
similarly to a regular diplomatic representation.195 Prussia and Republican France dispatched 
their consuls in 1784 and 1796 respectively.196 The consuls in Wallachia and Moldavia recruited 
agents among the Greek Orthodox and Armenian merchants who claimed the protection of the 
consulate to receive tax exemptions in the Ottoman lands and among boyars and hospodars in 
Wallachia and Moldavia.197  
Gathering information from actors in the Ottoman governance or from other European 
agents produced valuable intelligence, but its success was unpredictable. As previously 
mentioned, the European states attempted to manipulate Ottoman officials and power holders but 
as a result their representatives also became exposed to the political factions at Constantinople. 
Although these agents sometimes succeeded to impose their agendas with the help of a faction, 
they were also manipulated by Ottoman officials and power holders who had their own interests. 
Particularly during the first decade of the 19th century, as the Napoleonic Wars rapidly changed 
alliances and politics at Constantinople was in turmoil over the rule of sultan Selim III, the 
hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia used their involvement in the Ottoman-European political 
and diplomatic relations to secure appointment and help their faction prevail at Constantinople.  
Constantin Ipsilanti cooperated, sometimes simultaneously, with the French and Russian 
representatives until he became the exclusive correspondent of Russia during the first decade of 
the 19th century.198 In Constantinople, he was associated to both the vizier and to the reis efendi 
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Mahmud Raif. Ipsilanti’s relative and competitor Alexandru Moruzi, together his brothers 
Panaiot and Dimitrie who were dragomans at Constantinople, followed a similar tactic. Moruzi 
informed both the French and Russian representatives, although he tended to support the Russian 
agendas at Constantinople, hoping that he would preserve his appointment with Russian 
support.199 At the Porte, the Moruzi also benefitted from the support and confidence of the reis 
efendi. The double-game and the change of the political faction in the capital ultimately caused 
his and his brothers’ demise. Scarlat Callimachi, who served in the subordination of the 
following reis efendi, Ahmed Vasıf, cooperated with the French diplomats in Constantinople, but 
he also preserved good relations with the Russian representatives.200 Ioan Caradja, another 
dragoman in the first years of the 19th century, who succeeded Ipsilanti at the rule of Wallachia, 
was a contact of France, similarly to his patron, the Ottoman reis efendi Said Halet efendi,201 but 
also kept correspondence with the Habsburg agent von Gentz and with the Foreign Minister of 
Russia Capodistria.202 Constantin Samurcas was a boyar in the close circle of all these Phanariot 
diplomats and hospodars.  
Moreover, even the ranks of the French and Russian diplomacies were divided by 
personal rivalries and political dissensions. For instance the Fontons, a Levantine family that had 
served France for generations but which had royalist sympathies, abandoned French service after 
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the execution of the king and entered Russian service. The Russian consuls in Wallachia and 
Moldavia did not trust the Fontons’ reports suspecting that they had never ceased to serve the 
French, and their associations with the Phanariot circles.203 These rivalries were used by the two 
enemies against each other, as well as by the Ottoman diplomats in Constantinople, Bucharest 
and Iassy.  
The Russian-Ottoman war on the Danube between 1806 and 1812, and the emergence of 
a temporary Russian-French agreement for the division of Europe and the Ottoman Empire 
fueled the information networks at Constantinople and in the borderlands. However, the Russian 
occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia and the political conflict that followed the deposition of 
Selim III complicated the relations between the information traders in the provinces and the 
Ottoman diplomats at Constantinople. On the one hand, the political alliances between boyars 
and the Constantinopolitan factions continued to function despite the Russian occupation and the 
recall of the hospodars from the provinces. On the other hand, although the boyars in the 
provinces and the Ottoman Muslim and Christian diplomats at Constantinople shared the same 
preoccupation with securing their positions and keeping contact, they also operated in different 
circumstances. Between 1806 and 1812 the boyars on the borderland served in the administration 
set up to supply the Russian troops against the Ottoman Empire.  
 
2. Russian-Ottoman information networks during the war, 1806-1812 
The boyars in the Russian administration of Wallachia 
The Russian occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia was the first stage of an ampler 
offensive that the Court in St. Petersburg planned against the Ottoman Empire, after having 
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reached in 1807 an agreement with Napoleon over the division of lands and spheres of influence 
in Europe.204 Under these circumstances, Russian statesmen began considering Wallachia and 
Moldavia not only as strategic points conquered in the conflict with the Ottomans, but as lands 
that would ultimately experience the Russian imperial project.205 At the beginning of their 
occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia, the Russian commanders found it expedient to preserve 
the existing political customs and elites. In this fashion they left almost intact the political and 
administrative establishment in Wallachia, with its venal official appointments and appropriation 
of public funds.  
The Russian authorities replaced the hospodars appointed from Constantinople with a 
Russian senator who was assigned to oversee a boyars’ council in charge of collecting the taxes 
and the supply of the Russian troops. But the change of the hospodar with a Russian senator 
intensified the officials’ competition: accusations of corruption and misappropriation of funds, 
while accurate, were leveled against almost every administrator in the immediate proximity of 
the Russian authorities.206 Such accusations were accompanied by claims that certain officials 
should not hold office on account of the fact that they were “new comers” and “Greeks” or that 
the council of boyars in Bucharest was not entitled to make appointments in other regions of 
Wallachia, such as the Western districts.  
Similarly to other boyars, Samurcas adapted fast to the occupation to preserve his 
position at the forefront of Wallachian politics. He formally endorsed Russian administration, 
estimating, accurately, that he would be preserved in office. To strengthen his local political 
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connections, in 1807 he married Zinca Brânceanu, the daughter of a local family of officials and 
the widow of a prominent Wallachian-Phanariot official in Little Wallachia, Constantin 
Gianoglu. He also received from the council of boyars in Bucharest, with the approval of the 
Russian authorities, the office of kaymakam, i.e. administrator of Little Wallachia. Until the end 
of the Russian occupation in 1812, he was re-appointed to this office three more times and was 
also granted, by the Russian authorities, the office of great treasurer of Wallachia.207 Although 
these were highly remunerative offices that allowed him to sell subordinate appointments and a 
share from numerous revenues, Samurcas did not hesitate to appropriate other offices too, to the 
exasperation of other boyars.  
The disgruntled officials submitted complaints to the Russian authorities against 
Samurcas personally and against the appointment, by the council in Bucharest, of administrators 
of Little Wallachia. Samurcas had allegedly enlisted a few “rapacious” associates and almost 
scattered the inhabitants with his numerous taxes, in obvious violation of his responsibility to 
safeguard the tax-payers and thus, the good functioning of the fiscal system.208 In support of the 
claims that Samurcas was unable to work together with the others and to fulfill his obligations, 
the officials pointed out that the kaymakam was a “foreigner,” a “Greek” who had come to 
Wallachia solely to enrich himself and to “extort” the inhabitants.209 The designation of “Greek” 
suggested that the bearer of the name was a Christian individual arrived from Constantinople and 
who spoke Greek. More importantly, it was used to castigate a new comer who strayed from the 
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model of behavior expected of him and who was too ambitious and/or did not share his rewards 
with his peers.  
In addition, the officials from Little Wallachia petitioned for their “sovereignty” and the 
separation of their appointments from the council of boyars of Wallachia, based on alleged 
historical precedents.210 While the main target of these projects was again Samurcas who had 
received his appointment in Little Wallachia from the boyars in Bucharest, his detractors also 
aimed to take control of their positions and corresponding revenues without having to share them 
with new comers or the administration in Bucharest in which some of them had previously 
served.211 These officials imagined that by proposing a new venue for tax-collection that the 
Russian authorities could use, they could detach themselves from the obligations to their peers in 
the council of Bucharest and share the local revenues only among themselves.  
Samurcas and his detractors soon reconciled to welcome the new leader of the Russian 
army and to commit together to “the preservation of justice and order among the inhabitants.”212 
But such political reconciliations usually lasted only until another boyar gained the favor of the 
ruler or of the Russian president after 1806, and occupied remunerating positions such as that of 
treasurer. The Russian authorities, like the hospodars, awarded promotions based on bribes, gifts 
                                                           
210 Radu Rosetti, Arhiva Senatorilor, Vol. 4: 314-315 
 
211 The most vocal detractors of Samurcas were Cornea Brăiloiu, Stan Jianu and Constantin Haralamb. Brăiloiu had 
served as clucer and was member in the boyars’ council of Wallachia in 1800 (Theodora Rădulescu, “Sfatul 
domnesc și alți mari dregători ai Țării Românești din secolul al XVIII-lea (II),” Revista Arhivelor  34, no. 2 (1972): 
306). Jianu had been a cup bearer and member of the boyars’ council of Wallachia in 1786 (Theodora Rădulescu, 
“Sfatul domnesc și alți mari dregători ai Țării Românești din secolul al XVIII-lea (II),” Revista Arhivelor  34, no. 2 
(1972): 314). Haralamb served as cămăraş of the salt mines in 1788 (Theodora Rădulescu, “Sfatul domnesc și alți 
mari dregători ai Țării Românești din secolul al XVIII-lea (IV),” Revista Arhivelor  34, no. 2 (1972): 662) and as 
great pitar in 1799. (Theodora Rădulescu, “Sfatul domnesc și alți mari dregători ai Țării Românești din secolul al 
XVIII-lea (II),” Revista Arhivelor  34, no. 3 (1972):451 Thanks to these offices, he was member of the boyars’ 
council. 
  
212 T.G. Bulat, “Pagini triste din istoria Olteniei,” Arhivele Basarabiei 1, no. 3 (1929), 30. In addition, on this 
occasion Samurcas and his accusers asked the Russian general to place the local council under his direct order, and 
not under the authority of the council in Bucharest. 
 
89 
 
and other favors from boyars. For instance, the General Miloradovic, senator of the Russian 
administration in Wallachia, preserved Constantin Filipescu for a long time on the position of 
treasurer. Samurcas, in his turn, benefitted from the support of Miloradovic and of the general-
major Engelhart. But by participating in the rivalries between the boyars and the appropriation of 
public funds,213 the Russian authorities could not secure the proper supply of the troops. In 
addition, they unknowingly provided information that these officials subsequently traded to their 
acquaintances in Constantinople and to the other European representatives.  
 
Information brokers shaping Ottoman-Russian relations during and after the war 
Information trade on the Danube flourished in the context where the Russian offensive 
against the Ottoman Empire proved more complicated than expected due to the intervention of 
France in mediating the conflict in 1807214 and to the difficulties in assailing the Ottoman 
fortresses on the Danube.215 On the Ottoman side, Mustafa Bairaktar and the Porte attempted to 
conclude truces or the peace with the Russian commanders. Manuk Mirzayan, the confident and 
creditor of Mustafa Bairaktar played a central role in these negotiations. Samurcas, less 
influential than Manuk, was also deeply involved in the information networks across the Danube.  
In 1807, Mustafa Bairaktar assumed the mission to restore sultan Selim III who had been 
deposed through a Janissary-led rebellion. He delegated his Armenian creditor and confident 
Manuk Bey to conduct negotiations with the Russian commander Alexander Prozorovsky for an 
armistice that would have allowed him to drive his troops on Constantinople and restore the 
sultan. In 1808, Bairaktar deposed the current sultan and because Selim III had been killed 
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during the ensuing clashes, he placed the rule in the hands of Mahmud II. Being appointed as 
vizier, Bairaktar asked Manuk to continue submitting peace proposals to the Russian 
commanders and to promise potential support in the case of a war between Russia and other 
states, implying France.216 Bairaktar was killed shortly after and his rivals rose to power again, 
threatening the lives of the ayan’s former associates. Manuk relocated to Wallachia under 
Russian occupation, where the boyars awarded him land estates and farms of public taxes in 
return for his previous loans to the treasury,217 and continued mediating between the Ottoman 
and Russian camps. It was possibly during his stay in Wallachia that Manuk also became 
acquainted with Samurcas.  
After the death of Bairaktar, the reis efendi Galib efendi, who had risen to prominence in 
Selim’s diplomatic corps,218 took the lead of the Ottoman-Russian negotiations for peace. Like 
his predecessor, he used the services of Manuk 219who was well acquainted with the commanders 
of the Russian troops, Russian consuls and diplomats: Prozorovsky, the commander of the 
Russian troops in 1809, the generals Miloradovic and his successor Bagration, Joseph Fonton, 
the dragoman of the Russian embassy in Constantinople, and the diplomat Karl von Nesselrode 
(who would become in 1816 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs).  
But aside from Manuk, who circulated information and negotiated between the two 
camps, Galib also received news from the boyars in Wallachia, among whom Samurcas. The 
lack of documentary evidence about the information that they disclosed to the Ottoman 
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authorities is compensated by the boyars’ own admissions to having kept contact with Galib 
paşa, and the Russian authorities’ accusations of betrayal. Thus, Constantin Filipescu, the 
treasurer who had the support of the general Miloradovic was exiled on account of his 
collaboration with the French and Ottoman agents.220 Samurcas, in his turn, later acknowledged 
that Galib paşa defended him against the attempt of the occupation authorities to send him in 
exile to Russia.221 Despite the continuous suspicions against him, Samurcas received in 1811 the 
Russian Order of Saint Anna in second class, at the recommendation of Miloradovici,222 and 
continued to act both in the Russian administration and as an Ottoman informant until the end of 
the war. 
In 1812, the count Alexander Langeron, a general who fought in the campaigns in 
Wallachia, complained that the occupation authorities made a mistake by keeping in office the 
local boyars, especially the “Greeks” and accepting their venality. These individuals disclosed 
the secrets of the campaign and the administration to the Ottomans, damaging the Russian 
position in the war. General Miloradovic had been particularly susceptible to the boyars’ 
machinations and:  
placed the administration in the hands of the enemies of Russia and appointed Samurcas as 
treasurer and as members of the council and officials of Wallachia – Greeks from Phanar whose 
fathers, brothers, relatives, wealth and hope were at Constantinople. He completely delivered us to 
the creatures of the Turks and the French.
223
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When accusing the “Phanariots,” Langeron targeted the entire political class of Wallachia 
that he perceived to be closely related to the interests of the Porte. He condemned Samurcas as 
much as he did Filipescu and other boyars who manipulated the allegedly well-meaning Russian 
officers224 to preserve offices, detour public funds and inform the Ottomans and the French.  
But despite Langeron’s negative evaluation, the Russian authorities continued to use the 
boyars’ information networks after the end of the war and the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), when 
the rules of Wallachia and Moldavia were returned to dragomans from Phanar. Apparently, 
although the Russian representatives held suspicions against the hospodars and boyars, they still 
needed their information and could not avoid their diplomatic concourse.  In fact, even the Peace 
Treaty of Bucharest was brokered by the Ottoman dragomans Panaiot and Dumitru Moruzi, the 
siblings of the former hospodar Alexandru Moruzi. As Russia was under the threat of 
Napoleon’s invasion, the Ottoman representatives pressed for favorable peace terms. Russia 
accepted to return most of the territories occupied in the Balkans with the exception of Eastern 
Moldavia, but kept the territories it occupied in the Caucasus. The Porte accredited the local 
leadership that had taken over the administration in Serbia after the local revolts. The hospodars 
from Phanar were reinstated to rule Wallachia and Moldavia but for seven years mandates, with 
the approval of Russia. The two provinces were also exempted from imperial taxes for the 
following four years.  
The sultan appointed in 1812 the former dragomans Ioan Caradja and Scarlat Callimachi 
to rule Wallachia and Moldavia, with the confirmation of Russia. Samurcas and Manuk’s lives 
took different paths but they continued exchanging information. Samurcas remained in 
Wallachia where he took office in the administration of Ioan Caradja, as kaymakam of Little 
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Wallachia between 1813 and 1815,225 and later as vornic. As these offices offered significant 
financial rewards and the vornic was a participant in the ruler’s council, we can infer that 
Samurcas and the hospodar had good relations.    
Manuk, whose former protector Mustafa Bairaktar had been an enemy of Caradja’s 
patrons, fled Wallachia with the help of the Russian authorities. After a brief stay in the 
Habsburg Empire,226 he relocated to Bessarabia where he had purchased land estates around the 
Ottoman fortresses that the Russian troops occupied at the beginning of the war and subsequently 
became the property of the tsar (see Chapter 1).227 In 1816, the Count Gregory Stroganov, who 
replaced Italinski as the Russian ambassador at the Porte, made a main object of his mandate to 
oversee the application by the Porte of the peace terms.228 Motivated by the ambition to receive 
noble title in the Russian Empire and by his personal enmity with Caradja, Manuk offered his 
services again, and requested local boyars who kept the records of the treasuries of Wallachia 
and Moldavia to testify that the hospodars, with the Porte’s consent, ignored the tax exemptions 
stipulated in 1812.229 One of the boyars whom Manuk contacted was Samurcas. Having received 
high offices from Caradja, Samurcas was not willing to undermine the hospodar and therefore 
sent inaccurate data to Manuk,230 compromising their cooperation.  
 
3. Habsburg – Ottoman diplomatic networks, 1813-1828 
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Competing for intelligence on the borderland: the Habsburg information networks 
At the end of 1812, the Habsburg diplomat and knight Friedrich von Gentz wrote to the 
newly appointed prince of Wallachia, Ioan Caradja, to start again an allegedly customary 
correspondence between the hospodars and the Court in Vienna.231 Part of a broader 
reorganization of imperial diplomacy begun during the Napoleonic wars,232 this initiative gained 
impetus under the command of Metternich who strove to transform the Habsburg Empire into the 
arbiter of European affairs and to prevent Russia from weakening Austria’s position in the 
Balkans.233 It was in this context that Friedrich von Gentz provided Metternich with regular 
updates and analyses about the European colonies in South America, current events in Europe 
and particularly about the Ottoman Empire in the context of the Eastern Question.  
To procure data about the Ottoman Empire, von Gentz sponsored information networks 
that connected Vienna and Constantinople, and which functioned through the correspondence 
with the hospodars in Wallachia and Moldavia, the Habsburg secretary there and numerous other 
boyars and couriers. These networks provided first-hand information about Ottoman politics and 
diplomatic projects, given that the hospodars were active diplomats. As the networks operated 
with multiple informants, including boyars from Wallachia and Moldavia, who sent informative 
notes, the data gathered in this fashion was also verifiable. On the other side of these networks, 
the hospodars received the reports of Gentz, mostly about the projects of Russia with respect to 
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the Ottoman Empire, which they subsequently transmitted to Constantinople. Samurcas did not 
begin to communicate directly with von Gentz until 1822. However, as a boyar and counselor to 
the hospodars Ioan Caradja and Alexandru Suţu, he was familiar with the Viennese 
correspondence234 and possibly provided advice in the drafting of the letters to the Habsburg 
agent. 
The rulers and the boyars used the diplomatic channels with Vienna also as their own 
sources of information, on which they tapped to preserve offices or to establish connections that 
could help them later on. Some of the boyars also served as informants to Pini, the Russian 
consul who had succeeded Kiriko as representative in Wallachia,235 and traded information 
between both sides. Thus, von Gentz’ network of information functioned simultaneously and 
intersected with the Russian information channel that the consul Pini developed after the Treaty 
of Bucharest (1812). Pini’s collection of information from the boyars was typical activity for an 
imperial representative in Wallachia and Moldavia but in 1816 it gained new importance as the 
new Russian minister at the Porte, Count Stroganov, received instructions to make sure that the 
Porte observed strictly the applications of the Treaty of Bucharest. Although Russia followed the 
provisions of the Treaty selectively, the Russian authorities insisted that the Porte should respect 
the tax exemptions offered to Wallachia and Moldavia for four years after the treaty and the self-
rule of Serbia and that it should demolish its fortresses on the Danube.236 Immediately, Manuk 
bey, who had entered Russian service after relocating to Bessarabia,237 offered to compile fiscal 
                                                           
234 Ioan C. Filitti, “Corespondența domnilor și boierilor români,” 975, 988 
 
235 Nicolae Iorga, Istoria Românilor (Bucharest: 1938), Vol. 8: 230 
 
236 After the Treaty, Russia evacuated some of the Ottoman territories in the Caucasus but preserved others not 
mentioned in the agreement. Matthew Anderson, The Eastern Question, 59 
 
237 Gheorghe Bezviconi, Boierimea Moldovei dintre Prut şi Nistru  (Tritonic, 2004), 13, 43-44, 52 
 
96 
 
tables from the boyars of Wallachia and Moldavia, which would have shown the violation of the 
tax-exemptions by the Porte and its hospodars. Samurcas provided false information, and Manuk 
soon brought this deceit to the attention of the Russian authorities.  
Even after this incident, Samurcas and other officials continued participating in both 
Russian and Habsburg networks. When Suţu died suddenly in 1821, Samurcas allegedly 
misappropriated his letters with Vienna and remitted them to Pini, in revenge for not having been 
selected as correspondent with the Habsburg agent, without knowing that the hospodar in fact 
kept a second, secret line of correspondence with Gentz.238 Given that Samurcas had only 
recently provided incorrect information to the Russian representatives, it is equally possible that 
he delivered the letters to Pini because he did not know about the existence of the other 
correspondence or because he planned to misinform the Russian consul.  
Soon after Suţu’s death in 1821, Wallachia became the stage for two uprisings that 
caused the destruction of the leading Phanariot families at Constantinople and the flight of 
officials from Wallachia and Moldavia to neighboring Habsburg and Russian regions (see 
Chapter 3). This temporary displacement would, in its turn, re-align local politics and provide the 
boyars with new incentives to offer information to Russian and Habsburg diplomats. Philike 
Hetaireia was an Odessa-based society for the liberation of Greece and the Balkans from 
Ottoman rule that launched its campaign in Moldavia, under the command of the Russian officer 
Alexander Ypsilantis, who was the son of the hospodar Constantin Ipsilanti, Samurcas’ former 
protector. Having received meager support from the officials in Moldavia, the rebels crossed into 
Wallachia. At the same time, a local peasant uprising against the boyars’ exploitation began in 
Little Wallachia under the command of Tudor Vladimirescu, a former protégé of Samurcas. The 
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two movements coalesced briefly until the imminent intervention of the Ottoman military 
prompted Vladimirescu to declare his loyalty to the Ottomans, leading to his death at the hands 
of Hetairist supporters. The Ottoman troops from the fortress of Silistre soon entered in 
Wallachia to extinguish the rebellion.239 
Samurcas was again caught in the events. He had connections among members of the 
Philike Hetaireia,240 which in the pre-1821 circumstances was not an exceptional occurrence.241 
When the Hetaireia deployed its campaign in Wallachia, it comprised individuals of various 
social and linguistic backgrounds,242 some of whom were Greek-speaking Orthodox officials, 
including the dragoman Mihail Suţu, several boyars, Greek merchants from Odessa or former 
members of the irregular troops that ayans and the hospodar Constantin Ipsilanti had at the 
beginning of the century. As an official in Wallachia, and especially as one interested in 
gathering intelligence, Samurcas also became acquainted with such characters. While Samurcas 
had contacts with Hetaireia members and with Pini, who had encouraged this campaign,243 and 
his peers dubbed him “Greek,” Samurcas was not a revolutionary.  
Similarly to the other boyars, he felt the direct threat of the peasant rebellion that targeted 
the boyars’ mansions and properties, and of the turbulences caused by the Hetaireia. He acted 
jointly with his peers to end the disorder. Thus, according to his testimony, he allegedly took a 
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contingent of irregulars to quell the tensions in Little Wallachia.244 More certainly, he followed 
the proposal of the local council to take a significant sum from the treasury and to attempt to 
bribe or to have Vladimirescu assassinated.245 The vornic failed in his mission, and Vladimirescu 
continued the uprising, pledging to take revenge against the boyars. Samurcas and his fellow 
officials, some of whom had been supporters of the Hetaireia but most of who feared the 
disturbances, did not wait for the clashes between the two movements’ troops and the Ottoman 
forces, and fled to Braşov, in Transylvania.  
The Ottoman troops took charge of Wallachia and Moldavia and the sultan publicly 
denounced the Phanariots, who shared the same language and confession with the rebels, as 
traitors. This denunciation led to massive reprisals against the Phanariots and “Greeks” in 
Constantinople and whoever in Wallachia and Moldavia was suspected of having connections 
with them.246 At the same time, the Porte could not afford to eliminate entirely an important 
portion of their diplomacy, especially in the context of continuous negotiations with Russia over 
the application of the peace treaty of 1812 and the Ottoman management of the Greek rebellions 
in the Empire.247 For a short time the sultan preserved in office Scarlat Callimachi, the former 
hospodar of Moldavia and dragoman in the discussions with Russia, whom he appointed to rule 
Wallachia.248 Callimachi only had time to create a temporary governorship to prepare his arrival 
until he was dismissed several months later. His delegates briefly exerted the leadership of 
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Wallachia before two of them, including Ioan Samurcas, the brother of Constantin, were 
executed for treason.249 
As the Ottoman Empire deployed a violent campaign of repression against the rebellions 
that started in the Greek lands in the aftermath of the Hetaireia expedition in 1821, the Russian 
and Habsburg Empires began to assess the potential results of this crisis for the balance of power 
in Europe and their influence in the Ottoman Empire. The tsar Alexander I, who was committed 
to the preservation of the equilibrium in Europe, also condemned the Ottoman violence against 
Orthodox Christian subjects250 for whom Russia claimed to have intercession rights. Metternich 
was committed to defending the Porte’s authority in domestic matters, but was also concerned 
about how Russia would respond to the escalating crisis. Under the circumstances, the effects of 
the Hetaireia on politics in Wallachia and Moldavia and the exile of the boyars in Habsburg and 
Russian lands were not urgent issues. On the other hand, the representatives of the two empires 
preserved relations with the boyars who could continue to serve as their informants and 
potentially uphold the influence of their empires on the borderland.   
Some of the boyars of Wallachia who had taken shelter in Transylvania appealed to 
Russian support and were in contact with the consul Pini.251 They distanced themselves from the 
Phanariots who had caused the troubles and asked for the appointment of the hospodar from the 
boyars “from the land,”252 a principle currently mentioned in the Ottoman-Russian agreements 
since 1802. The Russian authorities did not heed their petition, given the delicate international 
situation caused by the Greek revolts, but their wishes were ultimately fulfilled due to the 
                                                           
249 Christine M. Philliou, Biography of an Empire, 62 
 
250 Matthew Anderson, The Eastern Question, 61-62 
 
251 A.D. Xenopol, Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiană (Bucharest: Cartea Românească), Vol. 11: 61 
 
252 Nicolae Iorga, Istoria Românilor, Vol. 8:279-280 
 
100 
 
sultan’s own decision of eliminating the major Constantinopolitan Phanariot families and of 
subsequently appointing boyars to the rule. Despite the Russian authorities’ lack of 
receptiveness, the petitioners continued their correspondence with the Russian authorities after 
their return to Wallachia, but this time to inform them about the new hospodar’s  “abuses.”253  
Another group of boyars who had fled to Braşov chose to ask the Porte to replace the 
Phanariots with hospodars “from the place.” This group of boyars, which returned to Wallachia 
in 1822, selected two individuals from their ranks to submit their petition to the Porte. Upon 
receiving the delegation, the sultan appointed Grigore Ghica, one of its members, as hospodar.254 
Immediately after his appointment, in 1822, Grigore Ghica became the correspondent of 
Friedrich von Gentz in Wallachia.255 Aside from Ghica, other officials who had taken shelter in 
Braşov created a pro-Habsburg faction256 and joined the informative circle of von Gentz. Among 
them were boyars from Little Wallachia and Grigore Filipescu, the son of the old treasurer 
Constantin Filipescu whom Langeron suspected of informing the Ottomans and the French.  
 Although Gentz and through him, the chancellor Metternich, continued to defend the 
Ottoman Empire’s right to manage its domestic affairs as it saw fit, the Habsburg representatives 
began to take a more prudent attitude with respect to the Ottomans, von Gentz even advising the 
hospodar to ponder the information he delivered to Constantinople.257 Accounting for the 
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knight’s prudence is the fact that the Ottoman commanders were fast at delivering death 
punishments to whomever they suspected of treason and Gentz did not want to endanger his 
connections in Wallachia. In addition, international public opinion and cabinets began to 
sanction the Ottoman reprisals against the Greek Christian rebels and Metternich, while still 
pleading the cause of the Ottoman Empire, had as his priority the preservation of stability in 
Europe.  
 
The diplomacy of the Greek revolution and the mediation of opposite imperial 
agendas   
It was in this context that Samurcas first contacted Gentz in 1822, having been introduced 
by George Sakellario,258 a Greek Orthodox physician and creditor from the Ottoman Empire, 
who became a correspondent of the knight and received the title of “baron.”259 Samurcas wanted 
to occupy a special place in the information network of von Gentz and not be a mere courier or 
correspondent. Thus, he attempted to introduce himself as a counselor on “Greek” and 
“Ottoman” issues, and European politics in general. He even requested Gentz to provide him 
with news from the Ottoman Empire that he could have analyzed.  
Samurcas’ intervention near Gentz in 1823, two years after his arrival to Transylvania, 
was partially due to the fact that the Habsburg authorities, keen on preserving good relations with 
the Ottomans, were preparing to expatriate the boyars who had arrived in 1821.260 If he 
succeeded to ingratiate himself to Gentz and become his liaison, he could have averted the 
danger of being expelled to Wallachia where the rivalries between the boyars in the province and 
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between them and the hospodar could have placed him in mortal danger. Although Samurcas 
had spent his fortune in exile and was in a pitiable condition, according to Sakellario,261 he was 
not prepared to return in such a hostile environment. However, despite his fear of expatriation, 
Samurcas did not consider settling in Transylvania either. His plan, as it becomes clear in the 
correspondence with von Gentz until 1824, was to return to Wallachia in safe circumstances, to 
recover his positions of vornic and to reinsert himself in the Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic 
networks.  
Shortly after first establishing contact with Gentz in 1822, Samurcas sent him an 
autobiographical account in which he explained the reasons of his flight from Wallachia and his 
service for Russia and the Ottoman Empire.262 The vornic narrated that he was born in 
Constantinople but settled in Wallachia where he married one of the prominent ladies of the 
province, and thus acquired a place among the high “nobles.” Once a member of the leadership 
in Wallachia, he invested all his efforts in securing the wellbeing of his adoptive country during 
the invasions of the neighboring rebellious ayans and the Russian occupation. With these details, 
Samurcas strove to convey that although he was a “Greek,” a Greek speaking new comer from 
Constantinople, he had fulfilled the conditions to be considered a boyar and even a boyar “from 
the land,” implying that he was different from the new comers who had no ties to the land and 
who had also caused the turbulences in 1821. Although he had showed himself a zealous servant 
of the Ottoman Empire, this dedication brought him the hostility of the other boyars263 and his 
efforts and loyalty to the Porte were forgotten when the Greek revolt broke out in Morea and the 
Porte began to see a traitor in any Greek, i.e. the members of the Phanariot complex. The boyars 
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of Wallachia whom the Porte selected to take the reins of rule in the province compiled lists of 
their enemies whom they accused of treachery and of having led the insurrection. Samurcas was 
included in the list, lost his good standing with the Porte and could not return to Wallachia for 
fear of execution on imperial order.264  
Compared to the other boyars who had fled to Braşov and corresponded with von Gentz, 
Samurcas placed himself in a particular category and admitted that he was Greek. He had 
multiple reasons to do so. Gentz might have already heard from the other boyars “envious” of his 
service about his entanglements with the Hetaireia. Recommending himself as “Greek,” and part 
of a community that after 1821 had been broadcasted as an oppressed nation, he could imply that 
he had good knowledge of the “Greek affair” that had captured the attention of the European 
cabinets. In this respect, despite his averred belonging to a rebellious “nation,” he tried to 
reassure a correspondent averse to revolutionary disorder such as Gentz, that his origin was not a 
liability and that he provided loyal imperial service in Wallachia. Thus, Samurcas also 
mentioned that through service and marriage he had entered the ranks of the boyars, an 
eminently conservative group, and served Ottoman imperial authority.  
This was the beginning of the correspondence between Gentz and Samurcas, and it 
functioned at the same time that Gentz kept contact with Grigore Ghica, the newly appointed 
hospodar. The vornic and the knight sent each other interpretations about issues that had the 
potential to disrupt the balance of power in Europe and the existing monarchical order, such as 
the revolts in Naples and the conflict between Spain and its rebellious colonies. Predominantly, 
however, the two correspondents discussed the Ottoman reactions to the uprisings in Greece, 
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how the situation could have evolved under European supervision, and Russia’s involvement in 
the settlement of a crisis with far-reaching implications. 
The vornic knew that his chances at entering Habsburg-Ottoman networks depended on a 
climate of relaxation at the Porte, which was in its turn conditioned on whether the Habsburg 
diplomats could have helped the Ottoman cause in Europe. However, the international situation 
was such that Metternich could not fully defend the Ottoman interests in Europe or convince the 
Russian Empire to accept Ottoman displays of power on their common borderland such as, for 
instance, the stationing of Ottoman troops in Wallachia and Moldavia after 1821. The Greek 
revolts occurred in tandem with the revolt in Naples and the secession of the Spanish colonies, 
all crises that had the potential to affect the European stability and monarchical order,265 and 
complicated the latent rivalry between the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires on one hand, and 
the Russian Empire on the other. Under these circumstances, Habsburg diplomacy was guided by 
two, increasingly at odds, principles: the defense of the Ottomans’ prerogatives to manage the 
revolts in their domains, and the preservation of peace between the Russian and Ottoman 
Empires, which became increasingly interlinked with the solution to the Greek crisis.  
Accordingly, Metternich and his diplomats attempted to bring to fruition any opportunity 
for Russian-Ottoman reconciliation, and to grasp any sign of good-will between the two courts. 
Alexander I sent such signals in 1823, when he appealed to the help of Habsburg diplomacy to 
obtain several concessions from the Porte.266 The Russian authorities requested the withdrawal of 
the Ottoman troops sent to Wallachia and Moldavia in 1821. They also demanded that the Porte 
should stop arresting the foodstuff cargoes of Russian ships that crossed the Straits, and which 
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served the trade of Odessa, the outlet for the grains of the New Russia. While such concessions 
were reasonable, and the Russian foreign minister Nesselrode and new consul to Wallachia 
Minciaki were conciliating, the Russian ambassador to Vienna, Dmitry Tatishchev adopted a 
stern attitude that antagonized the Ottoman diplomats. Even more, the Russian representatives 
also provoked the Ottomans’ indignation by evoking their alleged privilege of protectors of 
Wallachia and Moldavia to ask for the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from these 
provinces.267 While actively involved in appeasing such disagreements between the Ottoman and 
Russian representatives, Metternich also began considering the options to prevent Russia from 
gaining effective influence in the Greek affair, including the secession of Greece from the 
Ottoman Empire and its transformation into an international condominium.268  
In a letter from November 1823, Gentz informed Samurcas about these negotiations and 
about Metternich’s assessment that the tensions between the Ottoman and Russian Empires 
would have soon become complicated by the solution to the problem of the Greek insurgents in 
the Ottoman Empire. Although the negotiations appeared to proceed rather slowly, both Gentz 
and Samurcas were optimistic about their result. Samurcas, who was under financial strain at 
Braşov despite the help of Gentz,269 hoped that an Ottoman-Russian agreement under Habsburg 
auspices would have appeased the Porte and allowed him to return to Wallachia. He responded to 
Gentz with his interpretation of the current situation and with information from an undisclosed 
source about the climate at the Porte. Samurcas, who had been directly affected by the dispatch 
of Ottoman troops to Wallachia, observed that their presence could only offend Russia instead of 
appeasing those very few local officials who vainly hoped for Russian military intervention and 
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deliverance from the Ottomans.270 He also agreed with Gentz that the Porte was suspicious about 
the Russian motivations to seek reconciliation271 and that this attitude might have slowed the 
negotiations. Finally, he also addressed the belief among the Habsburg diplomats that the 
situation in Greece would soon require international intervention. Samurcas, who few months 
before had deplored that “a fatal blindness” captured “confused peoples,”272 now proposed that 
the great powers of Europe could shape the Greek revolt in a fashion that would correspond to 
their “politics.”273 Although Samurcas did not provide further details, it is clear he suggested that 
the Habsburg Empire should intervene and prevent that the Greeks’ secession from the Ottoman 
Empire might serve the exclusive interests of one power, i.e. Russia. 
In subsequent letters from 1824, Gentz and Samurcas discussed more at length the 
“Greek affair.” While Gentz declared outright that he was a supporter of the cause of the Porte, 
Samurcas built an entire argument favorable to the Greek rebels combining identity politics, for 
which he provided historical details, with considerations about the impact of the transformations 
in the Ottoman Empire on the international order, and about how to control the international 
effects of the revolts.274 Samurcas’ exposé made Gentz exclaim that they shared completely 
opposite political views: while Samurcas was a supporter of change and freedom, almost a 
liberal, the knight defended power and stability.275 At the same time, Gentz acknowledged that 
despite this divergence of approach he and Samurcas ultimately followed the same purpose: 
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stability in Europe.276 Explaining why their correspondence continued despite this obvious 
disagreement, can help us to understand how Samurcas envisioned assisting Habsburg diplomacy 
in relation to the Ottoman Empire and in what ways his intention matched Habsburg agenda was 
in the Near East.   
Although Samurcas declared himself to be a member of the “Greek nation” and despite 
the fact that he found a logic in the Greek uprisings, he was not a revolutionary. In fact, the 
Greek revolts caused turbulences that dealt a serious blow to Samurcas’ position in the province. 
In the vornic’s opinion, the revolts erupted due to the oppression by agents of the Ottoman 
government against the Greeks and were a symptom of a greater problem, the breaking of the 
Ottoman “colossus.”277 This problem would have obviously had repercussions on the balance of 
power and order in Europe that the Habsburg diplomats’ planned to maintain.  
By recognizing the reasonable nature of the Greek uprisings and the creation of a state 
entity in Greece, European powers would not have simply heeded to the demands of 
troublemakers. They would have conserved continental order as an agreement between states to 
refrain from aggression against each other. A Greek state278 could have contributed to the 
international stability, whereas a disintegrating Ottoman Empire, whose lands were object for 
international competition, was a threat to international equilibrium. Although the European 
powers could not have determined the fate of the Ottoman Empire, they could have reduced its 
disruptive potential until the Empire would have disintegrated or reformed by itself. In contrast 
to the declining Ottoman Empire, the Greeks had shown that they were capable of creating a 
state. Descendants of the Ancient Greeks, they became merchants and officials who gathered 
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wealth and created knowledge in the empire that had subdued them. Later, through the 
establishment of the Seven Islands Republic,279 they also became capable of ruling 
themselves.280 Briefly, they had the resources and the preparation to be given the chance of 
creating a state.  
Samurcas’ analysis was obviously influenced by current discourses, among the self-
identified Greeks and their European supporters, about the continuity between the Ancient and 
modern Greeks. But by referring to the “Greek” merchants and officials in Constantinople and 
Wallachia and Moldavia as the agents of the Greek renascence, Samurcas also displayed an 
understanding of the “Greeks” as the larger Greek-speaking, Greek-Orthodox community in the 
Empire. This community based on confession and participation in a Hellenized culture recalled 
the earlier conceptualizations proposed by Rhigas Feraios, a figure of Balkan republicanism who 
proposed a Balkan uprising against Ottoman despotism. But by praising the significance of the 
Greek revolt for the Greek communities, he also tacitly endorsed the view of Feraios’ successors 
about a Hellenic anti-Ottoman revolt, exclusive of the non-Greek speaking population in the 
Balkans.281  
Notwithstanding these views about the Greek community and the revolts, Samurcas was 
not a supporter of an independent Greek republic. That Samurcas committed to the legitimist 
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version of European order that Metternich proposed is revealed in his last recommendation about 
the Greek state: this entity would have been organized as a monarchy under a king from a ruling 
house of Europe, placed under Ottoman suzerainty and the protection of the European powers. 
282 
Samurcas hoped that his project about the “Greek affair,” which reconciled the uprisings 
with the preservation of the monarchical order and balance of powers in Europe, could have 
recommended him as an ingenious consultant whom the conservative Gentz and Metternich 
might have coopted in their relations with the Ottoman Empire. Gentz, however, seemed 
rightfully reluctant about the project although he appreciated the exchange of opinions. In the 
event that any power proposed such a scenario, the others would have suspected that it aimed at 
gaining control in Greece, as it soon happened with a Russian project. Alexander suggested the 
creation of autonomous Greek “principalities,” similar to Wallachia and Moldavia but Great 
Britain was particularly adverse to the project suspecting that it was a device to bring Greece 
under Russian control.283 
Overcoming his first reaction to Samurcas’ report, Gentz was impressed with his 
interlocutor and continued their correspondence. Samurcas began to believe that his plan of 
becoming a correspondent between the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires was feasible. Shortly 
after his exchange with Gentz, in January 1824 Samurcas received news from Constantinople 
that Galib Paşa, the Ottoman reis efendi with whom he had been in contact during the Russian-
Ottoman war of 1806-1812, was appointed vizier. Samurcas praised Galib Paşa as being an 
experienced and reconciling diplomat, who enjoyed public support and could help the Porte 
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overcome the crisis. The appointment of an individual who rose to power during the reforms of 
Selim III signaled that the Empire could still undergo improvement and avoid the collapse that 
the Habsburg diplomats feared and Samurcas had speculated about. As Galib Paşa was also an 
old acquaintance of his, Samurcas indicated that he might become an intermediary between the 
Habsburg court and the vizier to whom he could send communications from the Habsburg 
authorities.284 While Gentz recommended caution until the vizier would have shown his 
approach to the tensions with the Russian Empire,285 the Ottoman authorities’ alleged 
willingness to withdraw some of a troops in Wallachia and Moldavia286 seemed to confirm 
Samurcas’ estimates. All these signals from the Porte and Gentz’ reassurances encouraged 
Samurcas to believe that he would soon return to Wallachia as a vornic. But Samurcas’ plans 
never materialized. The vizier soon fell gravely ill and could not fulfill his assignments anymore, 
which led to his removal from the post in the fall of 1824.287 In the winter of the same year, 
Samurcas died in exile at Braşov.288 
During the following years, the involvement of the European powers in a war against the 
Porte became unavoidable. The Ottomans’ hostile reaction to the French, Russian and British 
proposal of a solution whereby the Porte acknowledged Greek self-rule in exchange for the 
recognition of its suzerainty led to the naval battle of Navarino (1827) and the destruction of the 
Ottoman fleet. The Ottomans’ unwillingness to demilitarize the Danubian borderland, according 
to an agreement with Russia in 1826, led to a new Ottoman-Russian conflict (1828-1829). These 
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events made it apparent that the management of the Greek revolt and the creation of a Greek 
government became interlinked with the interests of the great powers, adding a new stake in the 
international rivalry. 
On the Danube borderland, the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) that concluded the Ottoman-
Russian war  reiterated the terms negotiated before the war, such as the demilitarization of 
Wallachia and Moldavia, which involved that the Ottoman fortresses on the Danube would pass 
under the authority of the hospodars, and self-government for Serbia. But in addition to these 
provisions, Russia obtained the Ottomans’ approval for the stationing of its own troops in 
Wallachia and Moldavia until the Porte repaid the war indemnity, and the right to reorganize 
their administration. The peace confirmed Russia’s influence over the Ottoman government and 
its control of the Straits, which the authorities in Saint Petersburg reinforced in 1833, as they 
provided troops to the Ottoman Empire against the claims of the rebellious governor of Egypt.289  
These transformations damaged Metternich’s ability to preserve the peace at the expense 
of Russia and forced him to acknowledge the ascendancy of this power in the Balkans through 
the Ottoman-Russian Treaty of Adrianople (1829).290 After this date he became more amenable 
towards Russia in Wallachia and Moldavia, as he attempted to maintain Austria’s commercial 
privileges on the Danube.291 By 1830 Metternich was also to ready to accept the option of an 
independent Greek state.292 The Treaty of Adrianople and the settlement of the Greek crisis 
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through the Treaty of London in 1832 under the patronage of Russia, France and Great Britain 
ended the influence that the Habsburg Empire had exerted on Ottoman affairs since 1813 and the 
diplomatic channel that functioned ever since between Vienna and Constantinople.  
 
Conclusion 
Between 1800 and 1825 the Constantinopolitan newcomer Constantin Samurcas was one 
of the most important officials of Wallachia and informants between the Ottoman, Russian and 
Habsburg Empires. It was not a matter of coincidence that he deployed both activities 
simultaneously. Since the last decade of the 18th century, holding office on the Danube 
borderland became dependent on the incumbent’s ability to predict how Ottoman politics and 
European diplomacies influenced each other at Constantinople and in the Balkans. The sultan’s 
reform of the Ottoman diplomatic corps during the Napoleonic Wars, when the Ottoman Empire 
and its territories gained new strategic importance, complicated the political game in Wallachia 
and Moldavia.  The hospodars, who served as diplomatic negotiators while also participating in 
imperial politics, lobbied for an empire or another to prepare their appointment to the rule on the 
borderland. The boyars, whose position depended on the selection of a particular hospodar began 
to interfere in inter-imperial politics to predict changes that could have affected their and their 
hospodar’s standing. In addition, the able manipulation of information between two or more 
empires offered the boyars material gains and the occasion to undermine their opponents. 
In its turn, Ottoman diplomacy and its extensions on the Danubian borderland became 
important for the designs of the Russian and Habsburg Empires in the region and in the context 
of the Napoleonic Wars. Russia had a keen interest in the information available from Wallachia 
and Moldavia and, aside from the ambassador dispatched to Constantinople, the Russian 
authorities delegated consuls to collect news from Bucharest and Iassy. The trade of information 
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between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which involved many of the high officials in Wallachia 
and Moldavia, thrived especially during the Russian occupation of 1806-1812 and between 1816 
and the Hetairist uprising of 1821. After Russia occupied Wallachia and Moldavia in 1806, the 
commanders of the Russian troops did not alter the local administration, which allowed local 
factions to enlist several Russian authorities in their competition and to use information about the 
Russian and Ottoman movements as currency. Samurcas, who was the incumbent of the high 
offices of administrator of Little Wallachia and treasurer of Wallachia, came increasingly under 
suspicion of offering intelligence about the Russian campaign to the Ottoman diplomats with 
whom he was well acquainted. In 1816, Russia began to supervise the Porte’s application of the 
peace treaty of 1812, by having its representatives at Constantinople collect information about 
Ottoman infringements of the peace provisions. The Russian representatives at the Porte and in 
Wallachia also began to inquire about the emerging diplomatic channel between the Ottoman 
and Habsburg Empires. Samurcas, who kept his power after the end of the occupation, was 
involved in both projects of information collection. 
In 1813, as part of Metternich’s broader project to prevent Russia from gaining too much 
influence in the region by exploiting the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, the Baron Friedrich 
von Gentz initiated correspondence with the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia that lasted 
until the Russian occupation of these provinces in 1828. This channel was designed to circulate 
information between the Court in Vienna and the Porte in addition to gathering unofficial 
intelligence about the political situation in the Ottoman capital. The informal diplomatic 
networks through the intermediary of the borderland power holders assumed yet a new task after 
1821, in the context of rising tensions between the Ottoman and Russian Empires and of the 
transformation of the Ottoman management of the Greek uprisings into a matter of international 
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concern. Metternich attempted to mediate between the two empires but in the context where  the 
Greek crisis endangered the European balance of power, the Austrian chancellor also began to 
considered scenarios less favorable to the Ottomans, for which he was using the information of 
Wallachian boyars, among whom Samurcas.  
Samurcas’ long political career in Wallachia together with his ability to trade information 
between the Russian and Ottoman diplomacies and his correspondence with Gentz suggest that 
he was particularly successful in an activity typical for the boyars at the beginning of the 19th 
century. This success is even more remarkable given the fact that Samurcas had only recently 
arrived from Constantinople and lacked the family history of office and the well-established 
political networks of his peers. Even more, the label of “Greek,” which he received due to his 
formation in Constantinople, became a liability in the context of the Hetairist uprising in 
Wallachia and of the Greek revolts that triggered the dismantling of the Phanariot complex and 
denunciations among boyars.  Samurcas attempted to transform this liability into an asset by 
presenting himself as an expert in “Greek affairs” that the Habsburg Empire could have used in 
its Near Eastern diplomacy and relations with the Ottoman Empire. 
The flexible and rapidly changing networks that traded information in Wallachia and 
Moldavia between the Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg Empires became obsolete after the 
Russian-Ottoman war of 1828-1829 and the temporary Russian administration of the two 
provinces granted through the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). The Russian administration, which 
implemented a package of regulatory measures, known as the Organic Statutes, redrew and 
institutionalized the hierarchies of boyars. Moreover, the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) that 
defined the nature of Ottoman rule in Wallachia and Moldavia as that of “suzerainty” and the 
activity of local boyars as “independent internal administration” within the borders delimited in 
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1812 inaugurated a new stage of European diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of 
Adrianople and the Treaty of London of 1832 were agreements through which the European 
powers defined the prerogatives of power that the Ottoman Empire could exert in its own 
domains. By interfering in Ottoman rule over its lands and subjects, the European diplomacy also 
diminished the incentive for boyars to trade information about Ottoman politics and also their 
role as potential mediators. During the following decades they would appeal to international 
arbitrage to defend their prerogatives in relation to the Ottoman and Russian Empires.  
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Chapter 3: Running an imperial condominium on the borderland: local elites and the 
implementation of Russian imperial projects in Moldavia, 1820s-1840s  
Introduction 
Between 1829 and 1834, the Ottoman domains Greece and the Danubian provinces were 
placed under the European powers’ protection, which signaled international control in these 
lands and at Constantinople. Russia participated actively in these arrangements: it was a 
protector of Greece, together with Britain and France, and the sole guarantor of the prosperity of 
Wallachia and Moldavia.293 When the troops of the rebellious governor of Egypt Mehmed Ali 
were about to overtake Constantinople in 1833, Russia intervened to defend the Empire and 
gained unprecedented control over the Straits and several Ottoman European dominions.294 The 
Russian-sponsored administration in Wallachia and Moldavia epitomized the Russian 
interference in Ottoman affairs and an unprecedented Russian-Ottoman condominium in a 
territory under formal Ottoman authority. How did this condominium unfold and according to 
what imperial imperatives? How did local politics shape the Russian and Ottoman imperial 
projects during their tense co-management of Wallachia and Moldavia? Answering these 
questions can expose the interplay of various local and imperial motivations that shaped formal 
European regulation of rule in a territory acknowledged as being Ottoman possession.   
My approach to these questions is to examine the attempts at asserting power of the local 
leaders, Russian administrators and the Porte in Wallachia and Moldavia at a time when the 
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Court in Petersburg assessed that it was in Russia’s best interest to control the eventual 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.295 The interaction of imperial projects with local politics 
ultimately influenced the composition of the local leadership by propelling some boyars to the 
positions of hospodars and ending the power of others. It also exposed Russian imperial projects 
to the intrigues of the boyars who addressed Ottoman officials and European representatives to 
support their efforts at becoming rulers. Exploring the attempts of Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu 
(1794-1858), the heir of Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu, to gain Russian support and become 
hospodar reveals these dynamics.  
From 1821 until the second half of the 1830s, Rosetti-Roznovanu and some of his peers 
corresponded or were in personal contact with several important Russian authorities. Among 
these authorities were the baron Grigorii Stroganov, the ambassador of the Russian Empire at the 
Porte, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Nesselrode, the general Pavel Kiselev who 
commanded the Russian troops in Wallachia and Moldavia in 1829, and the count Michael 
Vorontsov, vice-regent and governor of the neighboring Russian provinces Bessarabia and New 
Russia. In their turn, these individuals showed great interest in the administration of the 
Danubian provinces and the way in which it could serve Russia’s interests regarding the Ottoman 
Empire.  
In the early 1820s, Stroganov and Karl Nesselrode surveyed closely the application of the 
Ottoman-Russian treaty that had been in effect since 1812 and which concerned, among others, 
the rule of Wallachia and Moldavia by the Ottoman-appointed hospodars.296 After the war of 
1828-1829, as Nesselrode took the lead of Russian diplomacy, he adopted a moderate view with 
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respect to the role of the Russian administration in Wallachia and Moldavia. The military 
commanders Vorontsov and Kiselev were involved in the conduct of the operations during the 
Ottoman-Russian war of 1828-1829.297 In addition, Vorontsov served as governor-general and 
viceroy of Bessarabia, the district on the Eastern edge of Moldavia that Russian received from 
the Ottoman Empire in 1812. He was entrusted to extend to this district the territorial 
administration of the province New Russia,298 which significantly altered the prerogatives that 
the local leadership had held since 1812.299 The General Kiselev, Chief of staff of the Russian 
Second Army, and one of the main leaders of the offensive against the Ottoman Empire, served 
beginning in 1829 as president of the administration that Russia implemented in Wallachia and 
Moldavia during the war.300 While in office, he proposed the annexation of Wallachia and 
Moldavia as necessary to Russia’s control over the Ottoman Empire, an alternative that did not 
coincide with the Russian diplomats’ projects concerning the Ottomans.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will examine how Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu and his 
father Iordache began a systematic campaign to attract Russian support for their project to obtain 
the rule of Moldavia. Ever since 1816 Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu provided reports about the 
rule of hospodar, which the Russian diplomats could use to substantiate accusations that the 
Ottoman Porte breached the Treaty of Bucharest (1812).  After the Ottoman intervention against 
the Hetaireia in 1821 and during the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828-1829, father and son traveled 
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to Russia, changed their political strategy and began submitting complaints against the Ottoman 
rule and projects for the organization of Moldavia. However, their prolonged stay in Russia 
weakened their position in the political circles in Moldavia.  
In the second section, I will review the different projects that the Russian authorities 
envisioned for Moldavia to contextualize the efforts of Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu and to 
discuss Russian imperial projects concerning the Danubian provinces. Thus, I will juxtapose 
Rosetti-Roznovanu’s project for an enlightened rule of Moldavia under Russian auspices, which 
he submitted to Count Vorontsov, Kiselev’s project to become a governor of Moldavia and the 
projects that Russia ultimately pursued through the custody that it shared with the Ottoman 
Empire in Moldavia and Wallachia. Kiselev’s plan diverged from the strategy of the Russian 
diplomacy and ultimately failed, but his re-organization of the local government strengthened the 
grip on power of several boyars two of which were appointed as hospodars in 1834. 
In the third section, in which I explore Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu’s political strategies 
after his return to Moldavia, I will analyze to what extent local politics and the appointment of 
the hospodars from among the boyars materialized the newly defined Ottoman “sovereignty” 
and Russian protectorate in Moldavia. I will also examine how this arrangement exposed Russian 
authority in Moldavia to local politics and the interference of other European powers that 
endeavored to check Russian preeminence over the Ottoman Empire.   
 
1. Russian imperial projects and local politics in Moldavia during the 1820s 
Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu was the eldest son of Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu, treasurer 
of Moldavia who, since the end of the 18th century, had amassed a considerable landed fortune 
that secured his family a leading political position in the province until the second half of the 19th 
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century (Chapter 1). With the help of his father, Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu entered the political 
and administrative establishment of Moldavia early in his youth. By 1818, when he travelled 
abroad to France and Germany, Nicolae had already served as spătar (sword bearer), and aga 
(chief of police forces).301 He also married the daughter of the prominent chancellor of Moldavia, 
Constantin Ghica.302 Thus, Nicolae used the usual instruments to build a political career in the 
context of the Phanariot rules: family relations, political connections and the money to facilitate 
them. In addition, Nicolae also took pride in being a knowledgeable young man, the owner of a 
library of classics and modern philosophers and economists among which Etienne de Condillac 
and Jean-Baptiste Say.303  
The Rosetti-Roznovanus had begun making plans to be appointed as hospodars since the 
beginning of the 19th century. In 1812, the sultan ordered the annihilation of the most prominent 
Moruzis, a Phanariot family of dragomans and hospodars to whom the Rosetti-Roznovanus had 
been connected through politics and family relations. After this date, the treasurer Iordache 
Rosetti-Roznovanu focused on gaining Russian support to replace the existing hospodar, Scarlat 
Callimachi, as Russia had obtained in 1802 an Ottoman imperial decree according to which the 
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Porte and the Russian representatives decided together the change of hospodars suspected of 
wrongdoings.304  
An opportunity occurred in 1816, when Stroganov, Russian ambassador in 
Constantinople, began to compile evidence that the Ottomans had broken the Treaty of Bucharest 
(1812). Among other provisions, the Treaty stipulated fiscal exemptions for Wallachia and 
Moldavia and restricted the hospodars from collecting taxes for several years. Following rumors 
that the rulers had levied taxes regardless of the treaty, Stroganov enlisted the help of the former 
Ottoman subject Manuk Mirzayan to collect data about this abuse that the Porte allegedly 
condoned (Chapter 2). Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu, treasurer of Moldavia, submitted estimates 
that confirmed the Russian suspicions. Rosetti-Roznovanu had collaborated before with the 
Russian authorities during the Russian occupation of Moldavia (1806-1812), but after 1816 he 
began to support Russian interests in Moldavia and the Ottoman Empire more consistently, 
although not exclusively, as he also traded information to the Habsburg authorities.305 Iordache’s 
ambition was soon stifled. The collection of reports about fiscal abuses in Moldavia did not have 
an immediate effect and the tensions between the Russian ambassadors and the Porte over the 
application of the Treaty of Bucharest continued until 1828. Moreover, when the sultan removed 
Scarlat Callimachi from the office of hospodar in 1819, on suspicion that he collaborated too 
closely with Russia, the office was assigned to another individual from Constantinople, the 
dragoman Mihail Suţu.306  
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Suţu’s appointment in office delayed Iordache’s plans, but it also brought Nicolae to the 
forefront of local administration and politics. Nicolae used the opportunity to demonstrate that he 
was not a mere follower of his father, but an autonomous political actor. Nicolae expressed a 
different view of service introducing himself to the Russian and Habsburg representatives not 
only as a political actor and a treasurer but also as a manager of the province. In the context 
where liberalization of trade, and particularly of grain trade, had become a political and 
economic issue throughout Europe,307 the treasurer Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu endeavored to 
show to the Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman authorities that he could introduce Moldavia in the 
trade circuits without disturbing the economic connections with Constantinople. After discussing 
with Andrei Pisani, the Russian consul in Iassy,308 in 1820 Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu proposed 
to Stroganov, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, to intervene at the Porte for the free 
exportation of Moldavian corn to Habsburg Transylvania and Bukovina, a measure that would 
have partially covered for the deficit in the treasury.309  
The Russian ambassador commanded Rosetti-Roznovanu on this initiative,310 but for 
reasons that were political rather than economic. By the 1820s only few high-ranking Russian 
officials and nobles openly discussed ways in which the reform of the Russian society by the 
government could strengthen the power of the Empire, as the tsar Alexander I himself had 
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become more conservative in his views.311 Count Michael Vorontsov, the soon-to-be viceroy of 
Bessarabia and governor of New Russia, who upheld the idea that free trade in the south-east of 
the empire can help enhance imperial control, was in minority.312 Vorontsov could openly pursue 
a reformist agenda313 in New Russia, because the tsar and the imperial authorities agreed that this 
province was rich and in need of skillful administration to develop.314 
But although free trade did not become a priority for domestic government, the Russian 
authorities used it as a new theme in their interventions on behalf of Wallachia and Moldavia at 
the Porte. Specifically, at the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian representatives in the 
provinces began to accuse the Ottoman “monopoly” of causing the pauperization of these 
countries, and to extol the advantages of free trade. This discourse did not dwell on the specifics 
of trade in Wallachia and Moldavia but used “monopoly” to evoke the oppressive nature of the 
Ottoman rule that Russia, as protector of the Ottoman Orthodox and intercessor on behalf of 
Wallachia and Moldavia, had the obligation and the right to denounce. In their turn, the high 
boyars of Wallachia and Moldavia adopted the theme of the “monopoly,” i.e. “Ottoman 
oppression” in the petitions that they addressed to Russia after 1821,315 when they fled the 
province to escape Ottoman reprisals against the supporters of Alexander Ypsilantis’ Hetairist 
campaign.  
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Iordache and Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu were some of the most prominent boyars in 
exile at Kishinev, in Bessarabia, and they promptly incorporated the “Ottoman monopoly” in the 
petitions entreating Russia to limit the prerogatives of the Porte in Moldavia. Iordache and 
Nicolae’s petitions about the need to check Ottoman rule in Moldavia were part of a broader 
lobby campaign with Stroganov and Vorontsov, through which the two boyars hoped to obtain 
appointment as rulers with Russia’s concourse, in defiance of the custom nomination of the 
hospodars by the Porte. This lobby campaign entailed receiving the support of other boyars in 
exile and fostering personal contacts with the Russian authorities to whom Iordache and Nicolae 
attempted to introduce themselves as the most suited individuals to rule a province that would 
become Russian or managed by Russia.  
The Rosetti-Roznovanus enjoyed impressive political capital among the local316 and 
Russian authorities in neighboring Bessarabia. Yet, they were not the only aspirants to the rule of 
Moldavia or the only ones who hoped to obtain it by alluring to Russian or Ottoman imperial 
projects. Between 1821 and 1826, the political leadership of Moldavia was split in three groups. 
High boyars in exile in Bukovina promoted a project through which the province would enter 
Russian control and its rule would not be assigned to a hospodar anymore, but shared by the high 
boyars. The boyars in Bessarabia followed closely the directives of the Russian representatives 
for Moldavia with the objective of having the Rosetti-Roznovanus instated as rulers under either 
Russian or Russian-Ottoman control.317 Finally, several high boyars worked in the administration 
under the supervision of Stephanos Vogorides, a Christian official from Constantinople who had 
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served before in Moldavia,318 while the Ottoman troops from the neighboring district of Brăila 
were stationed in the province.319 These boyars petitioned the Porte to end the appointments of 
Constantinopolitan Christians at the rule of Moldavia. The Porte heeded their request and named 
Ioan Alexandru Sturdza a boyar “from the land,” instead of Bogorides who was a “Phanariot,” to 
rule Moldavia. Ioan Alexandru Sturdza was a less powerful brother-in-law of Iordache Rosetti-
Roznovanu. Iordache had never expected that this poorer relative could endanger his plans of 
becoming hospodar.320  
The appointment of Sturdza by the Porte and the fact that the new hospodar had 
manifested reverence towards Russia introduced a new variable in the power struggle for 
authority in Moldavia, prompting the boyars in exile to revise their strategies with respect to their 
rivals and to the Russian and Ottoman authorities. Relying on the fact that he could run the 
administration with the help of the boyars who had remained in Moldavia, Sturdza soon 
answered an order from the Porte and requested the exiled boyars to return to Moldavia under 
penalty of expropriation of their estates and loss of their titles. In response, the boyars in 
Bukovina submitted complaints to the Porte, with the Russian authorities’ knowledge, against 
Sturdza and his supporters, of low and high rank.321 They claimed that Sturdza profited from 
their absence to have his supporters agree to oppressive taxation that violated the fiscal 
regulations by the Porte at the intervention of Russia. The commander of Silistre who received 
the exiles’ complains as well as favorable reports from boyars in Moldavia about the rule of 
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Sturdza, decided to heed the latter. He arrested the discontent boyars and sent them to Moldavia 
where the hospodar punished them with monetary fines and temporary exile on their estates.322 
The Rosetti-Roznovanus were adamant about receiving Russian support for their 
projects, especially in the context where the tensions between the Russian and Ottoman Empires 
escalated over the application of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), the Ottoman violent repression 
against the Greek rebels and the Ottoman confiscation of Russian cargoes that passed through the 
Straits. Therefore, Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu returned to Moldavia from the Russian Empire 
only in 1826 and Nicolae – in 1834, after having traveled to Saint Petersburg and Odessa.323 In 
1821 they reprised the communication with Stroganov, the Russian ambassador in 
Constantinople, to expose the situation of Moldavia and to renew demands for Russian 
intercession at the Porte. This communication might have continued after the Rosetti-
Roznovanus relocated to Kishinev. I suggest that they also began to develop their relations with 
the Count Vorontsov who was appointed viceroy of Bessarabia in 1823. The Count was of the 
opinion that the expansion of the Russian Empire to the West could only gain from allowing 
local leaders and “aristocrats” preserve their authority and co-opting them in the Russian 
imperial project.324 Such an attitude encouraged the Rosetti-Roznovanus to contact the Count 
and to press their agenda in 1830 when Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu relocated to Odessa, possibly 
following Vorontsov who had built his residence there.   
The Roznovanus’ aim was to demonstrate to the Russian authorities that had their empire 
taken over Moldavia, it would have been preferable to name a boyar to their rule, instead of a 
Russian governor, and to prefer Iordache or Nicolae to any other boyar. Their strategy was to 
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reiterate a decades-old language about the “privileges” of Moldavia, on which Russia could have 
capitalized against the Porte, and to propose socio-political analyses of the province that 
recommended them as skillful administrators. Through this discourse, Nicolae and Iordache 
attempted to appeal to the Russian diplomats’ interest in interfering with the Porte’s affairs and 
to Vorontsov who was preoccupied with creating a government that produced prosperity.  
Between 1823 and the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828-1829, Iordache and Nicolae signed 
several petitions to unnamed Russian authorities who, I suggest, were Stroganov and Vorontsov, 
and to the tsar. While father and son acted and possibly wrote their pleas together, Nicolae’s 
attempts to portray himself as a modern and capable administrator is apparent throughout these 
writings, even in those signed exclusively by his father. Their petitions followed a three-section 
structure, the first treating the “situation of the country,” the second – “the position of the 
inhabitants” and the last – the measures to be taken in Moldavia, with the implicit endorsement 
of Russia. The analyses of society and politics in Moldavia, combined with references to 
Russia’s interventions at Constantinople concerning this province and to current changes were 
meant to demonstrate that Rosetti-Roznovanu had an informed opinion about Russia’s imperial 
projects and about how the make-up of the province could serve these projects.  
Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu began his petitions to the Russian authorities with a review 
of the province’s “old privileges” and of the Ottoman abuses and “monopoly,” in which he 
exposed his allegiance to Russia. These “privileges” were fabricated by the boyars during the 
Russian occupation of 1768-1774. They referred to an alleged medieval covenant between the 
sultan and the boyars whereby the former offered his protection to the latter in exchange for 
taxes, and refrained from altering their political control.325 As Russia increasingly assumed the 
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role of defender of the Ottoman Orthodox subjects after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774),326 
the Russian representatives readily adopted the theme of the “privileges” of Wallachia and 
Moldavia to interfere in Ottoman affairs, and subsequently inserted it in diplomatic documents 
between the two empires.327  
Iordache and Nicolae Rosetti Roznovanu argued repeatedly that the Ottomans had 
encroached on the “privileges” of Wallachia and Moldavia when the sultan appointed 
Constantinopolitan “Greeks” as hospodars. These rulers mismanaged the finances, increasing 
arbitrarily the amounts of the taxes to satisfy their greed and impaired the boyars’ authority by 
making appointment to office and tax-exemptions dependent on service to the hospodar. 328 In 
contrast to the abuses of the Porte, Russia intervened through treaties and pressures to curtail the 
hospodars’ abuses and to restore the system consecrated by the “privileges.”329  
By 1826, as Ioan Alexandru Sturdza continued to be the ruler and the Russian Empire 
criticized the Ottoman administration on the Danube on account of its trade restrictions there, 
Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu added the theme of the “Ottoman monopoly” to his argument that 
the Porte breached the “privileges” of Moldavia. As corrective measures, Nicolae recommended 
not only that Russia, instead of the Ottoman Empire, should appoint the hospodars330 or organize 
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elections, but also that Russia should intervene for the liberalization of Moldavian trade.331 The 
tsar’s stern attitude towards the Ottoman Empire during the Greek crisis encouraged Roznovanu 
to suggest that Russia’s past interventions in favor of Moldavia and Wallachia indicated a clear 
intention to add these provinces to its empire.332 
In the second section of the letters, Rosetti-Roznovanu offered an overview of the 
political and social composition of Moldavia, to indicate the crucial role of the “class” of boyars 
in the province and the expertise that recommended them to become hospodars. Between 1823 
and 1826 the assessments in this subdivision changed progressively, suggesting that the 
Roznovanus altered their attitude vis-à-vis Bogorides and Sturdza’s official appointments. These 
discursive changes did not change significantly the argument that Russia needed to keep the 
boyars’ in charge of managing Moldavia, despite their divergences. In fact, the Roznovanus 
combined social and political analyses to craft an essentially political argument about the boyars’ 
preeminence in the province.  
Iordache and Nicolae explained how the boyars’ power was intricately connected with 
the administration of the province. Thus, a great deal of the boyars’ power derived from the role 
that the hospodars, including the Phanariots, assigned to them through offices and collection of 
revenues. To avoid that such an explanation might depict the boyars as accomplices of the 
Ottoman-Phanariot rule, the Roznovanus added that only the boyars could have implemented any 
political project in the province.333 If we consider this interpretation about the boyars in relation 
to the references about Russia’s preservation of the “old privileges,” it becomes apparent the 
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Roznovanus suggested that the preservation of the boyars’ positions was crucial to Russia’s 
control on the Danube.  
The Roznovanus proceeded to substantiate the power of the boyars also in relation to the 
social hierarchies and “classes” in the provinces. Their brief “class” overviews were reminiscent 
of the social taxonomies in the European economic literature, but they had a political and 
circumstantial purpose. “Classes,” in the vision of Iordache and Nicolae, did not refer to the 
social groups’ relations to resources and labor. Instead, their “class” hierarchy suggested that 
certain groups were more entitled than others to exert political privileges, a notion that would 
have seemed familiar to the Russian officials who were accustomed to a system of estates where 
groups ranked according to their privileges.334 Thus, although the Roznovanus noted that the 
Moldavian society was made of boyars, “peasants,” “Jewish merchants” and “Gypsy” slaves,335 
they mentioned “classes” mostly in reference to the different ranks that composed the hierarchy 
of the boyars.   
The political dimension of the “class” classification becomes apparent if we consider that 
after 1822, Bogorides and Sturdza’s newly- appointed and lower-rank officials proposed their 
own projects for the rule of Moldavia,336 threatening the positions of the old boyars in the 
province and in relation to Russia. Beginning in 1823, the Roznovanus and Nicolae in particular, 
addressed this trend by reviewing the “class” hierarchies first to reject and later to accommodate 
the new changes. In 1823, Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu reconfirmed that the boyars derived their 
authority from having served as officials and that they were the nexus of the political rule of 
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Moldavia, but he also emphasized that they were land-owners who had an astute political and 
social understanding.337 In this respect, I suggest that even though Rosetti-Roznovanu associated 
the boyars with the ownership of land, he did not abandon his political understanding of “class” 
for a more social oriented approach. He evoked land ownership to uphold the authority of the old 
boyars and to reiterate the hierarchies that organized a complex social body where the owners 
were capable, due to their long tradition of political leadership, to procure for the well-being of 
the others.338 “Class,” therefore, was used as a political category to distinguish the high boyars 
from the newly appointed officials. 
Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu began to revise his former opinion about the new boyars by 
1826, considering that their rise to power was a political transformation that could have been 
used to support his projects for the rule of the province. Such a change of attitude was also 
recommendable given that the Ottoman and Russian empires negotiated the conclusion of a new 
agreement that would have had direct bearing on the appointment of the hospodars in Wallachia 
and Moldavia. Thus, unlike his father who adamantly opposed the massive boyar appointments 
of 1822 and the new boyars’ attempts to intervene in the selection of the hospodar,339  Nicolae 
began to consider ways in which he could obtain local support for his plan to take the rule. 
Accordingly, he readjusted his discourse about the new boyars in the letters to his Russian 
interlocutors and began proposing that old and new boyars could participate together in the 
elective assembly. Such reconsiderations also shaped his definition of the boyars in the frame of 
the Moldavian society. More specifically, Rosetti-Roznovanu pointed out that the boyars did not 
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only rule and own land but also engaged in various activities productive of wealth, such as 
trade.340 Rosetti-Roznovanu re-conceptualized the category of boyars to include the traditional 
group of politically active officials as well as the entrepreneurs who bought their ranks.  
Iordache and Nicolae’s calculation that Russia would effectively take control in Moldavia 
and could impose them at the rule did not materialize in 1826 as the Russian court and the Porte 
reached an agreement. The Convention of Akkerman settled the Ottoman-Russian frontier in the 
Caucasus and the borderland on the Danube. The Porte agreed to recall the Ottoman troops from 
Wallachia and Moldavia, which had been a major point of Ottoman-Russian contention, and to 
acknowledge the local authority that the Christian power holders who had revolted in Serbia in 
1804 received through the Treaty of Bucharest. In Wallachia and Moldavia the appointment of 
the hospodar was deferred to the council of boyars who were assigned to elect the incumbent of 
the office from among themselves for a term of seven years. The Russian and Ottoman courts 
would have confirmed the results of the election. This convention’s provisions for the election of 
the hospodar encouraged Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and other high boyars to return to the 
province from their exile in Bessarabia and Bukovina. Among them were the treasurer 
Alexandru Sturdza, the high chancellors Grigore and Dimitrie Sturdza, the hatman Alexandru 
Ghica, the vornics Grigore Ghica and Theodor Balş, the treasurer Alexandru Balş and the 
hatman Răducanu Rosetti.341 
 However, Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu did not follow his father and chose to remain in 
Russia, relocating from Kishinev to Petersburg and subsequently to Odessa in Crimea. In so 
doing, Nicolae might have assessed that while Iordache could survey and control politics in 
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Moldavia, he would cultivate his relations with the reformist Count Vorontsov. The Count could 
then have been persuaded to consider the reform of Moldavia, under a skillful ruler such as 
Nicolae, as useful to his own projects for the economic development of the neighboring 
Bessarabia and New Russia. 
 
2. Politics in Moldavia between local factions and diverging Russian imperial 
projects (1828-1834) 
The destruction at Navarino, in 1827, of the Ottoman fleet by the European powers, 
including Russia, led to a new Ottoman-Russian war between 1828 and 1829. This war initiated 
a decade-long period of Russian ascendancy over the Ottoman Empire whose most constant 
manifestation was an imperial condominium in Wallachia and Moldavia. Russia’s intervention in 
the administration of Moldavia during the war activated new coalitions between the elites in the 
province and the Russian authorities and inspired new imperial projects with respect to the Porte. 
Boyars in Moldavia and Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu in Russia adjusted their strategies to 
improve their positions or to become hospodars according to how they envisioned the Russian 
and Ottoman projects in the region and to the local changes introduced by the massive 
appointments in office after 1821. The Russian supervisor of the administration in the 
principalities, the General Pavel Kiselev became adept of the idea that Russia should annex these 
borderlands, while the Russian diplomacy and the tsar considered the strategic advantages of 
offering protection to the Porte in the context of a brooding conflict between the sultan and the 
governor of Egypt.  
In 1828, after the Russian troops that crossed and occupied the province deposed the 
hospodars, the Court in Saint Petersburg placed the administration of Moldavia under the 
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supervision of Count Pahlen who acted as the president of the boyars’ councils in both Wallachia 
and Moldavia. The former Russian consul in Bucharest, Matvei I. Minciaky, became vice-
president of the boyars’ council of Moldavia.342 Pahlen also coopted some of the high boyars, 
former exiles during the rule of Sturdza, in an executive council under his command. Others, 
who opposed Russian preeminence in Moldavia, were marginalized.343  
Pahlen was soon replaced by the General Zheltukhin as president of the councils, a 
change that affected directly the officials in the occupation administration. The general 
eliminated the revenues that the boyars usually farmed out and restored taxes that had been out 
of use since the end of the 18th century.344 He also divided the attributions of the boyars’ councils 
by creating “executive” and ”judicial” councils for each province. Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu 
was re-instated in office and included in the executive council of Moldavia. Further, Zheltukhin 
requested several officials organized in two, Wallachia and Moldavian, commissions to propose 
measures for an institutional reform of the provinces. These proposals were allegedly only 
amendments to a project that he had already received from Saint Petersburg. 
Pahlen was accused of having treated the local officials in a discretionary manner. 
However, he allowed them to make provisions such as the election of the hospodar by an 
extraordinary assembly made of boyars, which clearly suited their ambitions. When the 
commander of the Russian army Pavel Kiselev replaced Zheltukhin as the president of the 
councils, these provisions had already been submitted to the Russian state council.345 Although 
he mistrusted the boyars, Kiselev submitted the officials’ subsequent proposals to Saint 
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Petersburg for confirmation. These proposals and others with respect to the functioning of 
government, taxation and the role of Russia and the Ottoman Empire in Wallachia and Moldavia 
will be known as the “Organic Statutes” and will be included in the Ottoman-Russian peace 
Treaty of Adrianople.  
Concluded in 1829, as the Russian troops had advanced into the Balkans within a short 
distance from Constantinople,346 this treaty provided rather harsh conditions for the Ottoman 
Empire. The treaty awarded Russia new territories in the Caucasus and at the north of the mouths 
of the Danube and access for Russian ships through the Straits and on the Danube.347 It provided 
the dismantling of the Ottoman fortresses on the northern shore of the Danube to secure the 
application of the old “privilege” that these lands were restricted to Muslim settlement but 
acknowledged Wallachia, Moldavia and other Balkan lands as the sultan’s “possession.” The 
treaty reiterated the self-rule privileges of Serbia and placed Wallachia and Moldavia, referred to 
as “principalities” under Russian control until the Porte would have paid the war indemnity. The 
Porte committed to respecting the “old privileges” of Wallachia and Moldavia and their 
“independent internal administration” in exchange for the collection of the tribute.348 Lastly, “the 
Sublime Porte, desirous of securing, by every means, the future prosperity of the two 
principalities,” committed to reinforcing their “old privileges” and applying the “administrative 
statutes” that had been compiled “in consequence of the wish expressed by the assemblies of the 
most influential inhabitants of the country” and which were supposed to be applied in full 
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obedience of “the rights of sovereignty of the Sublime Porte.”349 Russia, in its turn, claimed that 
it was the guarantor of the “principalities’” prosperity and that as such, it watched over the 
application of the “old privileges” and of the Ottoman-Russian treaties that pertained to them. 
The Treaty of Adrianople consecrated Russian interference in Ottoman rule in the 
Balkans. It reconfigured Ottoman territory in Wallachia and Moldavia through the 
dismantlement of the Ottoman fortresses that had given to these provinces their traditional role of 
buffer region.350 It also translated the nature of Ottoman authority there as “sovereignty,” a 
concept that approximated the power that the Ottoman Porte had enjoyed in Wallachia and 
Moldavia. Whereas before Wallachia and Moldavia were integrated in the Ottoman rule through 
leadership, participation in the imperial financial system and as a buffer and defense line on the 
Danube, in 1829 Ottoman “suzerainty” meant that the two provinces paid tribute, the sultan 
confirmed the hospodars and the statutes materialized the sultan’s commitment to these lands’ 
prosperity.  
But although the treaty requested the Ottoman Porte to dismantle its fortresses on the 
Danube and prohibit Muslims from entering the “principalities,” it also re-affirmed Ottoman 
possession over Wallachia and Moldavia. Russia committed to withdrawing its troops from the 
Ottoman Empire, and to “restoring” the “principalities” and other Balkan territories, to the 
Ottoman sultan. Thus, the treaty formally limited Ottoman prerogatives to “suzerainty” to 
collection of tribute and supervision of local politics but at the same time it also acknowledged 
that this “suzerainty” was effective on the territory of Wallachia and Moldavia. When an 
                                                           
349 E.S. Creasy, “Appendix A: Treaty of Adrianople,” 524 
 
350 About the role of the fortresses on the Danube for the Ottoman defense in the 18th century, and their relations 
with the neighboring Wallachia and Moldavia, see Virginia Aksan, “Whose Territory and Whose Peasants? Ottoman 
Boundaries on the Danube in the 1760s” in The Ottoman Balkans 1750-1830, edited by Frederick F. Anscombe 
(Princeton University: Department of Near East Studies, 2006), 62-64; Virginia Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans 
among Early Modern Empires,” Journal of Early Modern History 3, no. 2 (1999): 123 
 
137 
 
international concert later replaced Russia as guarantor of the “principalities,” its members 
adopted the 1829 concept of Ottoman suzerainty within a delimited territory.   
By outlining Ottoman prerogatives and stipulating the application of the Russian-
sponsored statutes, Adrianople inaugurated a Russian-Ottoman condominium in Wallachia and 
Moldavia, which reflected the beginning of a period of Russian ascendancy over the Ottoman 
Empire. But the implementation of this condominium was left to local and imperial actors who 
pursued different personal and imperial agendas.  
Kiselev’s supervision (1829-1834) of the borderland did not end the rivalry between the 
boyars. Nicolae, still in Odessa, believed that his father, who had returned to Moldavia, could 
recover the political influence that the family enjoyed before 1821. But during Iordache’s long 
absence the Sturdzas, Ghicas, Balş and other boyars who had enjoyed high social and political 
status even before 1821 took over the administrative councils and the commissions for the 
review of the Organic statutes.351 These boyars who were also great landowners used the 
occasion of reforming the taxation system in the province to reduce the amount of the public 
taxes and to increase the obligations that the tax-payers, in majority peasants and tenants on their 
lands, owed to the land lords. They also standardized the dues owed by peasants to the 
landowners and restricted the customary use of land by the peasants. While such provisions also 
favored the Rosetti-Roznovanus, the Sturdzas and the Ghicas jealously defended the power they 
had gained as the main participants in the administration set up during the Russian occupation.352 
Their unchecked political ascendance explains why Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu entered the 
local executive council only after three years from his return to Moldavia. Also, he did not 
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appear in the general assembly called in 1831 to approve the final form of the statutes. 
Notwithstanding these setbacks, Iordache continued to hope that his son would become hospodar 
and helped him finance his long stay in Russia.353  
Nicolae, in his turn, endeavored to improve his connections with Russian high officials 
who were influential at Petersburg and especially with count Michael Vorontsov, a high ranking 
officer and the scion of a prestigious Russian noble family. Vorontsov was committed to 
developing New Russia, the vast and scarcely populated region neighboring Bessarabia where he 
became governor in 1828, by abolishing serfdom, settling Ottoman Christians, encouraging 
agriculture and opening the province to international trade.354 Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu strove 
to gain the governor’s political support through projects for the economic-political organization 
of Moldavia that explained how, under a skilled management, this province could have played in 
Vorontsov’s project to develop the south-east of the Russian Empire. It is difficult to ascertain 
whether Vorontsov could intervene for Rosetti-Roznovanu at the Court or whether he believed 
that an economic reform of Moldavia could play into his own plans for the development of New 
Russia and the Empire’s south-eastern regions. However, the fact that Nicolae Rosetti-
Roznovanu traveled to Odessa, the city of Vorontsov, and informed the governor about his 
projects suggests that the treasurer believed so.  In other words, Rosetti-Roznovanu attempted to 
graft his political ambition on what he perceived to be Vorontsov’s imperial project.  
In 1830, when the boyars in Moldavia used their positions in the Russian-sponsored 
administration to claim the position of hospodar, Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu sent a project to 
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Vorontsov,355 in which he discussed the general “advantages of industry and trade over 
agriculture” and the particular ways in which the productive activities of Moldavia could be re-
organized to enhance the wealth of the province and its inhabitants.356 Having noted that 
industrial activities return greater profit and produce more wealth than agriculture, Nicolae 
proposed an argument about the profitability of agriculture that combined the Physiocrats’ 
appreciation of this economic field with the vision of the liberal economist Jean-Baptiste Say 
about the freedom of trade.357   
The treasurer began his project with a demonstration about the value of the goods and 
resources involved in agriculture and of the tight relation that could exist between agriculture and 
industry. Thus, he observed that land, the main instrument of production in agriculture, was also 
a repository of value, including for the profits obtained from industry.358 Further, Rosetti-
Roznovanu questioned the idea that industry produces goods more highly valued than agriculture 
and explained that consumption in communities involved in agriculture could balance the price 
of agricultural and industrial goods.359 Based on these observations, he subsequently proposed 
that political rule should combine agriculture and forms of industry that use agricultural raw 
materials on the model of the English “industries” and apply a system of taxation that would 
balance the taxes levied from agriculture and those from industry. What Rosetti-Roznovanu had 
in mind was a merger of the putting-out system and the economic privileges that were effective 
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in agriculture in Moldavia. Allegedly, landowners who had the customary right of using various 
installations for production on their land estates could have rented these installations to industrial 
enterprises that used agricultural raw materials.360  
He further added that these mechanisms could produce profit if the freedom of trade was 
guaranteed. By referring to the freedom of trade as the main condition for a prosperous 
agriculture Rosetti-Roznovanu obviously tried to show that he was a nobleman and a 
connoisseur of economic theories, similarly to the reformist Vorotsov. He also implied that he 
was a follower to Vorontsov’s approach to trade in New Russia and that he had welcome 
Russia’s intervention for the end of the “Ottoman monopoly” through the Treaty of Adrianople.  
Vorontsov responded with punctual comments on the proposed model but did not offer 
his political support to the boyar. The governor was not persuaded by Roznovanu’s argument 
about the economic success of associating agriculture with industry and provided counter-
examples that questioned the industrial exploitation of agricultural raw materials.361 Moreover, 
whether on purpose or misguided that Rosetti-Roznovanu was only interested in a discussion 
about economics, Vorontsov did not vouch to offer his support for the boyar’s political 
ambitions. Rosetti-Roznovanu soon ended his stay in Russia and returned to Moldavia where he 
made clear his intention to become hospodar. But the years that the treasurer had spent away 
from the political game in the principality and from the leading offices that would have allowed 
him to make allies placed him at a disadvantage compared with the other boyars.  
Having drafted the Organic Statutes, which provided for the election of the hospodar 
from among the officials, the boyars of Moldavia were preparing to run for office. However, the 
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Russian authorities hesitated about organizing the elections before the official ratification of the 
document by the Ottoman and Russian governments. Kiselev intended to pass the Statutes before 
the elections, while the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Nesselrode pressed for elections 
before the approval of the Statutes. This dispute over timing was indicative of a deeper 
disagreement with respect to the application of Russian authority in Wallachia and Moldavia. 
General Kiselev lobbied for their annexation to the empire: implementing the Organic Statutes 
under Russian observation could only help the assimilation in the Russian Empire and control the 
intrigues of the boyars. Moreover, Kiselev disregarded the elections also because he had begun 
to consider assuming the rule of Wallachia and Moldavia. Nesselrode and the central imperial 
authorities, on the other hand, had begun to consider the diplomatic benefits of a more 
accommodating approach to the Porte and suggested to Kiselev that the organization of elections 
should have been received priority.   
Kiselev chose to first pass the regulations. He oversaw the vote of these provisions, 
which were later know as the Organic Statutes, by the local boyars’ assemblies in 1831 and their 
submission to Saint Petersburg and Constantinople for review. The General and the Russian 
army remained in the principalities pending the payment of the war indemnity by the Porte.362 
For the following two years, the boyars waited for the imperial approval of the documents to 
prepare for elections. Most of the members of the administrative councils, among whom 
representative of the Sturdza and Balş families were well-versed in local politics and, according 
to a contemporary, they pursued their own agendas and avoided effective administrative 
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responsibilities.363 In their turn, Kiselev and Nesselrode debated the annexation of the 
principalities to Russia.  
Until 1833, when Russia agreed through the treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi to defend the 
Ottoman Empire against foreign attack, Kiselev continued to plead for the necessity of annexing 
Wallachia and Moldavia by appealing to two arguments. First, he emphasized that the boyars 
were unreliable and that their rule of Wallachia and Moldavia would have undermined, rather 
than assisted, Russian control. Second, he also claimed that the Ottomans would have deferred 
indefinitely the application of the treaty provisions unless Russia showed that it was ready to 
adopt stern measures to have the Porte comply with its obligations.   
In 1830, the General complained to Nesselrode that the boyars used the drafting of the 
administrative regulations to promote their social interests at the expense of the other inhabitants, 
the peasants. Such a situation could only profit them and not the government of the 
principalities.364 When he wrote his report to the Minister, the boyars had already adopted the 
provisions with respect to the obligations of the peasants to the landowners. Their ability to 
impose such regulations and the fact that they had influenced the stipulations concerning the 
election of the hospodar made Kiselev understand that their reputable social and political power 
could not have been easily controlled.  
The approval of the Statutes and the fact that the Russian and Ottoman courts had agreed 
to a reduction of the war indemnity owed by the Porte365 did not deter Kiselev from continuing to 
promote Russia’s annexation of Wallachia and Moldavia. The General continued to emphasize 
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the importance of keeping a Russian administration in the principalities in the eventuality of 
another anti-Ottoman campaign and to force the Porte to acquit its treaty obligations. According 
to Kiselev, who had commissioned in 1819 a study of the resources of Wallachia and 
Moldavia,366 these provinces could provide the supplies and assist campaigns of the Russian 
troops camped at Silistre, which had entered under Russian control, against Constantinople.367 In 
his opinion, the principalities were the “means to uphold our political influence in the Orient.”368 
Furthermore, Russia should have kept its army in the principalities until the Ottomans effectively 
paid the war indemnity.369  
Nesselrode responded by appealing to a realistic assessment of the short and long-term 
consequences of the principalities’ annexation. Thus, he pointed out that the take-over would 
have caused general hostility in Europe against Russia. It was also possible that the Porte, whose 
finances had been depleted by the expenses for the sultan’s reforms and the campaigns against 
the Greek uprisings, would have relented willingly the control of Wallachia and Moldavia to 
Russia. But such a concession was not profitable. Most of the principalities’ revenues would 
have been spent for the upkeep of the imperial administration, and the remaining amounts were 
too insignificant to warrant the annexation of Wallachia and Moldavia.370 On the other hand, the 
organization of the principalities according to the Russian directives and under the elected 
hospodars who felt obliged to the Empire offered the most efficient apparatus to supply the 
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Russian troops at Silistre and their potential dispatch against Constantinople. In addition to the 
costs and difficulties of a Russian imperial government in Moldavia and Wallachia, the Russian 
central authorities were also anxious about the broader consequences of dismantling the Ottoman 
Empire. If Russia pursued the annexation of Ottoman territories, the other European powers 
would have also requested compensations that the Russian authorities could not have controlled. 
Therefore, it was preferable to maintain the Ottoman Empire, as weak as it was but a de facto 
international actor, and to place it under Russian influence, than to dismantle it and provoke 
unpredictable European tensions.  
A new turn of events in the Near East confirmed Nesselrode’s calculation and offered 
Russia a new occasion to reinforce its influence in the Empire without taking over provinces 
where it had recognized Ottoman “suzerainty.” In 1831 Mehmet Ali, the powerful governor of 
Ottoman Egypt who had provided troops to the Porte to quell the Greek uprisings, demanded 
control over Ottoman Syria in reward for his help. When the sultan refused, his son began a 
campaign through the Ottoman Middle-Eastern dominions and soon drove his troops against 
Constantinople. As Britain, Russia’s rival for influence in Ottoman matters declined to support 
Mehmet Ali but also failed to provide military assistance to the sultan,371 Russia offered to send 
a fleet to the Bosphorus and the troops from the principalities to defend the Ottoman capital.372 
While Russia chose to secure its control over the Ottoman Empire through assistance and 
diplomacy, the dispatch of the military from Wallachia and Moldavia reinforced Kiselev’s 
conviction that Wallachia and Moldavia were positions that should remain in the possession of 
Russia.    
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Nesselrode agreed with Kiselev that the Porte postponed the payment of its debt until the 
political strife in Wallachia and Moldavia would have allowed the Ottoman officials to argue that 
the Russian administration had failed and to impose revisions to the statutes. On the other hand, 
the minister, in full agreement with the recent Russian approach to Ottoman affairs also pointed 
out that diplomatic and political influence favored more Russia’s presence in the region than 
hostility and annexation. Alexei F. Orlov, Russian ambassador in Constantinople, responded to 
Kiselev’s proposals in a similar fashion.373  
Nicholas I soon capitalized on the help that he offered to the sultan against Mehmet Ali. 
In 1833 he proposed a Russian-Ottoman treaty for mutual defense, which was aimed at 
combating British and French influence at the Porte and at improving Russia’s strategic position 
against them in the Straits. Nesselrode and Orlov succeeded to negotiate the Treaty of Hunkar 
Iskelessi on favorable terms. The Porte confirmed again the Treaty of Adrianople and the 
independence under European protection of Greece and agreed to close the Straits to any foreign 
military ships in case of war. In exchange, although Russia did not commit to guarantee Ottoman 
territorial integrity, it pledged to offer military support to the sultan. The Treaty confirmed 
Russia’s role of defender of the Ottoman Empire374 and assured its supremacy in the Eastern 
Mediterranean for the next two decades until miscalculation of its power at Constantinople and 
the European powers’ alliances led to the Crimean War (1853-1856) and to the end of Russian 
hegemony in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman-Russian agreement of 1833 was soon followed 
by the two empires’ convention in Saint Petersburg (1834) for the ratification of the Organic 
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Statutes and the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the principalities, which marked the 
effective beginning of the Ottoman-Russian condominium on the Danube.  
The Ottoman delegates at Saint Petersburg, among whom the Grand Admiral Ahmed 
Fevzi Paşa and Nicolae Aristarki, the son of a former Ottoman Phanariot dragoman, did not 
propose amendments to the Statutes and agreed that these regulations complied with the Porte’s 
authority in the principalities, as stipulated in the Treaty of Adrianople. However, they also 
requested, as a one-time exception from the Statutes, that the first hospodars should be appointed 
by the Porte and Russia, instead of being elected by the boyar assemblies.375 Russia was willing 
to accept this amendment that would have allowed the two courts to control the factions in the 
principalities during the seven-year mandate of the hospodars. On his way back to 
Constantinople, Fevzi Pasa stopped in Iassy and Bucharest to take the candidatures of local 
boyars and submit them to the Porte. Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu and his father decided that their 
chances would have increased if only one of them, Nicolae, submitted his candidature.376 Other 
high boyars, such as Alexandru Ghica and Mihai Sturdza, the son of the high chancellor Grigore 
Sturdza, also submitted their applications to the Admiral.  
Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu’s plans were shattered when Mihai Sturdza, a young boier 
whose family had a long history of official appointment just like the Rosetti-Roznovanus, was 
appointed hospodar. The nomination of Sturdza was not an accident: his family enjoyed great 
authority in the province and was also well connected to the Ottoman and Russian officials. At 
Constantinople, Sturdza had the backing of his father-in-law, the powerful Stephanos Bogorides, 
administrator of Moldavia during the Ottoman occupation of 1821-1826, and Ottoman dragoman 
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in the 1830s.377 Sturdza had also built his prestige with the Russian authorities. Unlike Nicolae 
Rosetti-Roznovanu who did not return to Moldavia after 1829 but tried to obtain the backing of a 
distant although important character as Vorontsov, Sturdza served in the administration that the 
Russian generals oversaw after the war. Thus, he introduced himself as a competent, 
knowledgeable and loyal boyar, qualities that recommended him for appointment. His strategy 
was successful.  
 
3. Local power struggles in an uneasy condominium 
The investiture in 1834 of Mihai Sturdza as hospodar of Moldavia and of Alexandru 
Ghica as ruler of Wallachia marked the beginning of the two provinces’ “independent internal 
administration” under Ottoman “sovereignty” and Russian “guarantee.” The shared Ottoman-
Russian custody of the principalities epitomized Russia’s ascendancy over the Ottoman Empire. 
However, this ascendency did not remain unchallenged. The conflicts that featured local politics 
involved the Russian consuls who were in charge of supervising the application of the Organic 
Statutes. The Porte eagerly exerted its role of instance of appeal for discontent boyars from the 
principalities and preserved political connections with local actors. The European powers, 
suspicious that the condominium on the Danube and the Ottoman-Russian treaty of 1833 were a 
first step in Russia’s plan for hegemony at Constantinople, intervened in the principalities’ 
politics to perturb the activity of the Russian consuls and developed their own plans to gain 
influence in the Ottoman Empire.  
The Rosetti-Roznovanus were competing with their peers and the hospodar, and tried to 
place themselves in the European imperial projects with respect to the Ottoman Empire. Iordache 
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was named chancellor and Nicolae recovered his title as treasurer due to the fact that Mihai 
Sturdza, involved in a constant conflict with the boyars, could not afford to dismiss such 
powerful officials without antagonizing them. They received positions in the assembly and 
Sturdza’s executive council,378 institutions that reprised the administrative attributions of the old 
boyars’ council, in addition to assuming legislative attributions. But in a dynamic political 
setting such as that of Moldavia in the 1830s, these positions did not automatically entail 
political cooperation with the ruler. The boyars and the hospodars, who disputed each other’s 
power, sent their complaints and asked for support from Constantinople, the Russian consuls and 
the other European representatives.  
By acting as arbiter in the local competition and preserving some of the old political 
networks between the local elites and the Christian elites in Constantinople, the Porte aimed to 
use fully its “suzerain” prerogatives. The appointment of the hospodar Mihai Sturdza in 1834 
revived old political relations. At the symbolic level, the ceremony of investiture of the 
hospodars, while stripped of many of the symbolic gestures that featured the appointment ritual 
before 1829, reiterated the hospodars’ role of delegates of the sultan. The selected candidates for 
the office were called to the imperial palace for a meeting during which the sultan Mahmud II 
offered them the fez and medals, distinctions that were bestowed to all Ottoman officials in the 
new administration, and which affirmed the sovereign’s authority over the two rulers.   
Moreover, although the Greek revolt dealt a heavy blow to the Phanariot networks, some 
of the old relations between the boyars, the hospodars and the Constantinopolitan Christian 
officials who now acted mostly in the Ottoman diplomacy were still functional. At the formal 
level, these relations involved the preservation of the office of kapı kehaya, the Christian 
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representative of the hospodar at Constantinople, an individual who resided in the capital, was 
deeply involved in the Ottoman government and defended the hospodar’s interests to the 
authorities there. The kapı kehaya was meant to serve the hospodar but he also enacted the 
authority that the Porte could legitimately claim as “suzerain” of Moldavia and as an arbiter of 
the local elites. The sultan and the other Ottoman authorities could immediately use this 
prerogative, given that the hospodar and his opponents began sending denunciations shortly after 
the nomination of Sturdza.379   
These formal connections overlapped to a significant extent with old family, patronage 
and political relations. Thus, Mihai Sturdza’s kapı kehaya in Constantinople was his father-in-
law Stephanos Bogorides. Nicolae Aristarki, the kapı kehaya of the hospodar of Wallachia, was 
an old acquaintance of Nicolae Suţu, the son of a former Phanariot hospodar, who served as a 
prominent official in the Moldavian administration after 1830. Suţu, who was a supporter of 
Russia, did not refuse Ottoman distinctions in 1834380 or preserved his old connections at 
Constantinople. Costache Conachi, another high official who participated in the administration 
set up by Russia during the war married his daughter to the son of Stephanos Bogorides. The fact 
that Conachi was related to Sturdza’s father-in-law did not deter the boyar from submitting 
complaints against the ruler to the Porte.381  
The Rosetti-Roznovanus, whose family had gained power and fortune during the 
Phanariot rules but who had been openly supporting Russian agendas in Moldavia did not tap on 
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their connections with the Christian officials in Constantinople.382 Disappointed by the previous 
lack of support from Russia, after 1833 Iordache and Nicolae maintained certain contacts with 
the Russian consuls,383 but also began to develop their connections with the French 
representatives in the province. They were hardly the only ones to do so. The communication 
between the boyars and the representatives of the European empires, other than Russia, in the 
province, was indicative of the fact that local politics combined with rival imperial interests to 
cause problems to Russia in the principalities.  
Russia attempted to scrutinize closely the administration under the hospodar and 
especially the rising conflict between the hospodar and various boyars who hoped that his 
deposition and subsequent elections would bring them to power. The Russian consuls accepted 
denunciations from the boyars but could not always control the outcome of the conflicts, thus 
becoming involved in local intrigues. The hospodar Mihail Sturdza preserved good relations 
both with the Russian consuls and with the Porte where he sent reports against the boyars whom 
he accused of causing troubles in the principality because they had not received the position of 
hospodar.384 But participating in the local power schemes the Russian consuls alienated some old 
supporters. The boyars did not hesitate to address the consuls of the other European powers, who 
used the opportunity to vex the Russian consuls in the principalities.385 In this respect, the French 
consuls hoped that the hospodars, who had been trained in Paris, would be particularly open 
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towards them, especially after the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the province.386 The 
Porte turned the blind eye to the increasing interference of the other European consulates in local 
affairs. The Ottoman officials could not and in fact were not willing to prevent European 
opposition to Russia’s preeminence in Ottoman affairs: international rivalry could keep Russia’s 
potentially growing ambitions in check. 
France and Britain had missed a major occasion to gain effective influence at 
Constantinople during the Egyptian crisis of 1830 and allowed Russia to repute two major 
diplomatic successes in 1833. These were the Treaty with the Ottoman Empire at Hunkar 
Iskelessi and an agreement with the Habsburg Empire whereby the two powers committed to 
preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the power of the sultan,387 and which 
consecrated in fact Russia’s new hegemonic position in the Near East. In response, Britain strove 
to improve its diplomatic relations with Constantinople, and to actively intervene for the 
modernization and strengthening of the empire against any domestic challenges, including the 
claims of the governor of Egypt.388 France, on the other hand, had been a supporter of Mehmet 
Ali, and although it finally joined the European opposition against the Egyptian governor, it 
preserved its interest in controlling Ottoman territories. In 1833 the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs de Rigny dispatched the Baron Charles Bois le Comte on a mission through the Ottoman 
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lands from the Danube to Egypt and Syria, during which he took notes about local social and 
political conditions.389  
When Bois le Comte reached the capital of Moldavia, Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu 
requested an audience with the French delegate. If Russia had not been willing to support his 
candidacy to the rule of Moldavia, Nicolae was committed to improve his chances with the 
support of Russia’s rivals. Introducing himself as a French-educated individual, a liberal and an 
admirer of the values of emancipation and political rights the treasurer soon received le Comte’s 
attention.390 Nicolae presented an overview of the recent transformations in Moldavia to 
emphasize the patriotism of local boyars such as himself, and to explain how their enthusiasm for 
freedom had been manipulated by Russia for its imperial expansion in the Balkans. Russia 
attracted wide support in the Balkans by calling to confessional solidarity and claiming that its 
mission was to protect the Orthodox peoples there and to create a new “Roman” empire in which 
these peoples would enjoy freedom and prosperity. When Rosetti-Roznovanu and other boyars 
offered their support to Russia, they did so believing that they would have received self-rule for 
the principality and that Moldavia would not be annexed to the Russian Empire. The boyars soon 
became aware that the principles they defended, political freedom and patriotism, contradicted 
the despotism that Russia or the Austrian Empires manifested.391 Nicolae’s assessments echoed 
le Comte’s own opinions. In his reports to de Rigny the French diplomat noted that the Russian-
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sponsored Organic Statutes helped introduce the “progress” in the principalities, but that Russia 
used them as an instrument for expansion.392  
Yet, Nicolae did not receive effective political support from Comte. The diplomat had 
met with other boyars too, and showed great admiration for the hospodar Mihai Sturdza who, in 
his turn, had also claimed that through the Organic Statutes he and the other boyars attempted to 
implement constitutional liberalism on a borderland between three autocratic powers. Bois le 
Comte commanded Sturdza’s efforts but he did not promise any help to him either. Instead, the 
delegate explained that France could prevent Russia’s intrusions by bringing the principalities to 
the attention of the international “public opinion.”  
This response was emblematic for the stance of France in this imperial condominium. Its 
consuls might have vociferously opposed the attempts of Kiselev to annex the principalities393 
and received the boyars’ visits but could not challenge Russian authority in the principalities. 
Instead, France attempted to capitalize on the cultural influence that it acquired among the 
boyars thanks to the education they received in Paris and as a moderate monarchy compared to 
the autocratic allies the Russian and the Habsburg Empires. Moreover, le Comte’s note about the 
“national spirit”394 in Wallachia and Moldavia signaled the emergence of another opportunity for 
French ambitions agendas and local ambitions to meet. Yet these French missions and a new 
European-Ottoman agreement in 1839 that replaced the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelessi and ended 
Russia’s hegemony in the Ottoman Empire did not challenge the Russian-Ottoman condominium 
in the principalities. The concept that France could sponsor the national development of 
Wallachia and Moldavia gained currency, during the next decades, among local nationalists, 
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French liberal intellectuals and the French monarch and fueled the developing anti-Russian 
opposition there.  
As Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu’s contacts with the French representatives did not amount 
to significant political gains, he and his father attempted to manipulate local politics in their 
favor and to develop collaboration with the hospodar. Mihai Sturdza, who used any means to 
undermine opposition, was wary of the Rosetti-Roznovanus’ power. Although he was familiar 
with these officials’ ambition to gain the nomination of hospodar for Nicolae, he offered 
Iordache a position in his close circle as president of the hospodar’s council. Iordache, in return, 
made his acceptance dependent on the nomination of his son, Nicolae, as minister of internal 
affairs, and of protégés of his in the courts of appeal.395 Iordache’s death in 1836 stopped short 
the discussions between the hospodar and the boyar.396  
The heir of a great fortune, which had been gathered by his father, Nicolae preserved his 
rank and position at the forefront of politics in Moldavia but did not enter the hospodar’s 
entourage. Sturdza, in his turn, maintained himself in power regardless the intrigues of the 
boyars and the accusations of corruption until 1848 when the Porte, but especially the Russian 
court, fearing that the project of reform endorsed by several boyars would lead to revolutionary 
unrest, occupied the principalities. Nicolae’s political career was not affected by the events of 
1848 but the two courts disregarded him again as a candidate to the rule when appointing a 
replacement for Sturdza in 1849.  The Rosetti-Roznovanus’ ambition to become rulers of 
Moldavia ended with Nicolae. Nunuţă, his son, continued the family’s tradition of service and of 
tight connections with the Ottoman Orthodox officials at Constantinople and served as a deputy 
in the parliament of the United Principalities, Wallachia and Moldavia’s successor political 
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entity. But Nunuţă also yielded the position at the forefront of local politics and followed a 
career in the bureaucracy and district administration that will be followed by his successors too.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I followed the treasurer Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu’s unrelenting efforts 
to become hospodar of Moldavia from 1822 when the Ottoman Empire reasserted its authority in 
the province, until after Russia’s supremacy over the Ottoman Empire materialized in a Russian-
sponsored Russian-Ottoman condominium in this province. By examining Rosetti-Roznovanu’s 
strategies to obtain the rule of Moldavia over a span of twenty years, I aimed to reveal how the 
Russian-Ottoman rivalry transitioned in Russian-Ottoman shared control on the Danube 
borderland, changing substantially the nature of Ottoman rule there. The definition of the 
Ottoman authority as “sovereignty” over a stable territory and a population whose prosperity was 
guaranteed by Russia and the workings of the political and administrative apparatus that had 
served Ottoman and Russian custody created a precedent for later international interventions. I 
also aimed to investigate how local politics shaped the application of the imperial condominium 
and various imperial claims on this borderland.   
Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu owed his rise to power to the financial support and to the 
political relations that his father, the influential boyar Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu, had already 
developed with Russian representatives and members of the leadership in Moldavia. But as the 
Russian Empire imposed its authority in former Ottoman lands, Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu 
became convinced that the most efficient method to become hospodar was to present himself as 
a supporter of Russian expansion and as a reform-minded individual who could contribute to the 
development of the Russian Empire’s southern provinces. In so doing, he neglected the fact that 
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Russia implemented another imperial project in Moldavia and Wallachia, one which did not aim 
at territorial annexation but at extending Russian influence over Ottoman affairs in general. 
Thus, the re-organization of the administration that general Kiselev implemented as a first step 
towards annexation was subsequently used to reflect Russia’s new status of defender of the 
Ottoman Empire. It also offered to members of the local leadership a new venue to re-assert their 
political preeminence over the rule in Wallachia and Moldavia. 
In this fashion, the new hospodars that the Ottoman and Russian Empires selected to rule 
Wallachia and Moldavia were individuals who, like Rosetti-Roznovanu, had been involved in the 
rule of the provinces under the Phanariot rules and who had political connections at 
Constantinople and among the Russian authorities. However, unlike Rosetti-Roznovanu, these 
individuals did not pursue supposed imperial projects but maintained their active position in the 
administration and thus showed their credentials to be placed at the head of the “independent 
internal administration.” Even though Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu’s miscalculation did not 
prevent him from claiming an important political and official position in this administration after 
1833, it compromised his family’s chances at taking the rule of the principality. His son, Nicolae, 
also downplayed political activity for a steady career in the administration. How elites in the 
principalities became divided along institutional lines and how this transformation combined 
with a new stage of inter-imperial rivalry on the Danube will be the object of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Politics at the end of empire: European expansion, “imperial suzerainty” and 
“national government” on the borderland, 1830s-1850s397 
Introduction 
The Treaties of London (1827) and of Adrianople (1829) through which the European 
powers defined Ottoman control in Greece, Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia as “suzerainty” lay 
the foundations for an emerging body of international law that placed irreversible restrictions on 
Ottoman authority in the Balkans. Politics in Wallachia and Moldavia during the following 
period are emblematic for the way in which Russia and other European powers created the 
arrangements that restricted Ottoman control over Ottoman lands and Christian subjects and for 
the way in which local Christian elites that implemented Ottoman rule reacted to this 
interference. How did local elites and successive international agreements shape each other and 
imperial “suzerainty” in a region where European powers competed to control the dismantlement 
of the Ottoman Empire? 
In this chapter, I aim to reveal the continuities between different forms of European 
intervention in the Ottoman Empire as they manifested through the design of a local government 
from former servants of the Ottoman rule on the borderland in Wallachia. I also aim to show the 
continuities between imperial agendas and international agreements with respect to the Ottoman 
Empire and an emerging national project endorsed by some members of the local government. 
Finally, I also aim to retrace the ways in which local leadership changed through the creation of 
an international-sponsored government and internationally-condoned nation-building process. To 
analyze these levels of continuity and change between imperial expansion, international arbitrage 
and local rule and the transformation of flexible borderland elites into “national” politicians, I 
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will reconstruct the career of Alexandru Samurcas (1805-1870), the heir of the prominent official 
Constantin Samurcas (Chapter 2). Alexandru Samurcas was a boyar in the local administration 
supervised by the Ottoman military after the uprisings of 1821 and a boyar and prosecutor in the 
administration set up under the Ottoman-Russian condominium after 1830. Although he 
eventually withdrew from politics, he prepared his son for a career in the service of the United 
Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, the political entity that succeeded to the autonomous 
Wallachia and Moldavia after 1859.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will examine the continuities and changes between 
the elites that exerted local power under the Ottoman-appointed hospodars and the leadership 
that was entrusted during the Russian-Ottoman condominium with governing the population and 
securing local prosperity. In this respect, I will emphasize that the divisions caused by the Greek 
revolts and the increase in the number of appointments made by the hospodar influenced the 
composition of the local leadership but did not change factional politics. In the second section, I 
will explain how the administration established under Russian protection of the “autonomous” 
Wallachia through the Organic Statutes and incipient ideological mobilization in Wallachia led 
to the multiplication of political sites and activities. In the third section, I will explore the 
connections between the Russian protection of Wallachia and Moldavia in the 1830s and 
collective European guarantee in the 1850s and the mutual influence between the European 
arrangement for the Ottoman Empire and the local leadership.  
 
1. Empires bridging old divisions: the creation of local government under 
Russian protection and Ottoman suzerainty, 1825 – 1834 
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In 1829, Russia imposed on the Ottoman Empire the recognition of Russian protection of 
Wallachia, Moldavia and Serbia and arrogated the supervision of a local government in the 
“principalities” Wallachia and Moldavia that would act “independently” on “internal” matters 
but would not hinder Ottoman “sovereignty.”398 The Russian-sponsored government became a 
prize for local factional politics and in the conflict along hierarchical levels between the officials 
who had served Ottoman rule after the removal in 1821 of the Phanariot hospodars. The power 
conflict shaped the implementation of this government, the way in which Russian “protection” 
played out locally and the way in which it was perceived by other European powers that 
endeavored to exert influence in Ottoman affairs. Alexandru Samurcas’ attempts between 1825 
and 1834 to gain a rank comparable to that of his ancestors can shed light on the way in which 
local elites grafted their ways of doing politics on the administration that Russia sponsored to 
implement its influence over the Porte.     
 
Old politics and new divisions in Wallachia under Ottoman rule after 1821 
In 1825, the death of the kaymakam and vornic Constantin Samurcas in Braşov left his 
nephew Alexandru without material and political backing. Alexandru decided to return to 
Wallachia and to re-forge his family’s associations to obtain an appointment. The young 
Samurcas would not have been in such a precarious position had a series of misfortunes and the 
time’s changes not brought the family on the verge of extinction. At the end of the 18th century 
the Samurcas, who had recently arrived from Constantinople, enjoyed a prominent and stable 
position among the first officials of Wallachia. Constantin had risen to high prominence as 
administration of Little Wallachia and treasurer and through the marriage to a “local” woman, 
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Zinca Brânceanu (Chapter 2). Another brother, Dimitrie, earned a diploma in medicine but he 
relocated to Moldavia where he tended, among others, the Rosetti-Roznovanu family.399 Their 
youngest sibling, Ioan, took offices of judge and administrator in Wallachia and Little 
Wallachia400 where he married Catherine Rallet, the daughter of a prominent official in the 
administration.401 By 1821, Ioan also acquired the office of postelnic,402 which was in charge of 
managing the hospodars’ correspondence and contacts with foreign representatives. Constantin, 
who was the most powerful member of the family, did not have children but Ioan and Catherine 
had three sons, Costake, Dimitrie and Alexandru.403  
The relative prosperity and stability of the family was shattered in 1821 when the 
Hetairist campaign and the local uprising by Tudor Vladimirescu, a former protégé of Constantin 
Samurcas in Wallachia, led to the dispatch of Ottoman troops to quell the turbulences. The 
subsequent revolts in Greece fueled persecutions against the Phanariots in Constantinople and 
led to the removal of the Phanariot hospodars in Wallachia and Moldavia and to denunciations 
against some boyars for having supported or corresponded with the Greek rebels. Constantin 
became fearful of retaliation and fled to Habsburg Transylvania. Ioan decided to remain in 
Wallachia where, together with two other boyars, he became overseer of the administration 
under Ottoman military supervision until the newly-appointed hospodar Scarlat Callimachi 
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would have taken charge.404 But as the Ottomans continued to indiscriminately punish the 
Orthodox officials in Constantinople and those who had arrived from the capital to Wallachia, 
Callimachi’s appointment was soon revoked and two of the kaymakams, among whom Ioan, 
were executed.405 Ioan’s eldest son, Dimitrie, took his place in the administration but he soon 
converted to Islam and relocated to Adrianople to avoid execution on accusations of 
mismanagement.406 Alexandru, only a teenager, moved to Braşov where he lived with his uncle 
Constantin and began law studies.407  
Left without significant support upon his Constantin’s death in 1825, Alexandru returned 
to Wallachia’s Western region, Little Wallachia, where his father and uncle had once been in 
office. The boyars in the province offered him an honorary title as clucer, which placed him at 
the bottom of the first rank, and exemptions from public taxes for some of the tenants on its 
lands,408 as it was customary for all first generation descendants of officials. These privileges, 
which under ordinary circumstances would have been the first step for a political career, were 
not of major help to Alexandru Samurcas. Recent changes in the rule of the province of 
Wallachia made the ascension of Alexandru, who lacked family help or wealth to sponsor his 
projects, all the more difficult.  
As the Greek uprisings triggered violent Ottoman reprisals in Constantinople and the 
dispatch of the military in Wallachia, in 1822 some of the boyars who took refuge in Braşov 
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submitted petitions in which they requested that the sultan should appoint the hospodars from 
among the local officials and not from the ranks of Constantinopolitan Hellenized Orthodox 
officials.409 The sultan Mahmud II, who had dismantled the main Constantinopolitan families 
rotating at the rule of these provinces, accepted the boyars’ petition and appointed the former 
chancellor and representative of Little Wallachia Grigore Ghica as hospodar. Ghica was the 
descendent of a numerous and prestigious family with strong political and blood ties in 
Wallachia and Moldavia as well as Constantinople.410 To the Porte, he seemed the right choice to 
preserve the established imperial rule in Wallachia without the political complications and 
suspicions that featured the rules of hospodars from the Constantinopolitan Phanariot families. 
But in Wallachia, his appointment fueled conflicts between boyar factions and between boyar 
ranks.   
Divisions between the boyar ranks had existed before the Phanariot rulers and the 
reformist hospodar Constantin Mavrocordato formalized them to re-assert the connection 
between the officials’ authority and that of the hospodar. Thus, the boyars were separated 
between those who served in high administrative positions and those who had less important 
appointments, and between those who were in service and those who did not occupy any position 
but whose ancestors had been grand boyars.411 Depending on whether they were boyars active in 
the administration or descendants of grand boyars, these individuals received tax exemptions for 
the tenants on their land estates, privileges and priority in the purchase of tax-farms.412  
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However, these distinctions did not hinder the mobility from the lower to the higher 
ranks. As revealed in previous chapters, being a boyar under the Phanariot rules was not an 
exclusively social or political category but referred to participating in the multi-faceted relations 
of power that connected individuals to the ruler appointed by the sultan, and which underlay the 
collection and re-distribution of public resources. Thus, the boyars made a composite group of 
relatives of the hospodar, creditors, landowners and individuals who claimed prestigious 
ancestry and whose retinues413 overlapped with the extensive networks of the Phanariot 
hospodars spreading between Constantinople, Bucharest and Iassy.414 As the hospodars were 
successively changed, the political factions that supported one or another also rotated in power 
even though some boyars were skillful to remain in power under different hospodars. 
 But the removal of the Phanariot hospodars in 1821 and the appointment of the rulers 
from among the boyars ended the rotation to power of the boyars’ cliques and introduced 
tensions not only between cliques but also between the boyars’ ranks. The wealthiest or most 
influential boyars believed that the moment had come to promote their own ambitions of 
becoming rulers (Chapter 3). The multiplication of the number of lower rank boyars, promoted 
by the temporary administrators before the appointment of Ghica, could assist their projects but 
also caused political problems. For one, the allegiance of lower-ranking boyars could not be 
controlled: they offered their political support to different aspirants to the office of hospodar. 
Aware of their political clout, the lower-ranking boyars also lobbied for an increase of their 
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prerogatives, privileges and political influence, concessions that aroused the opposition of the 
major boyars.  
Ghica’s mandate as hospodar intensified the traditional factionalism of local politics, as 
he now faced the competition of the other boyars for the rule.415 To counter the political 
opposition of these individuals, each of whom had the means and the ambition to become ruler, 
Ghica created a retinue that comprised several prominent boyars in the province, among whom 
the Filipescu, Creţulescu, Băleanu and the Bălăceanu, who had been acquaintances of the old 
Constantin Samurcas (see Chapter 2), as well as lower rank boyars and individuals. The support 
of the high boyars to Ghica was short lived and they soon began to scheme the removal of the 
hospodar.416 To eliminate the possibility that he could rely on the boyars of lower ranks, they 
also began to denounce the ascent of these individuals to higher positions and their political 
participation.417 
Another division between the elites that perspired in 1821 when the boyars petitioned the 
sultan for a hospodar selected from Wallachia was that between the boyars “from the land” and 
“Greeks.” Ever since the 1760s the boyars claimed that the sultan should acknowledge their 
authority and name “local” hospodars. These requests were picked by Russia, which arrogated 
the position of intercessor for Wallachia and Moldavia, to amend the way in which the Ottomans 
ruled this borderland and to request that “locals” should have been preferred for office in the 
provinces to the “Greeks” who should have received appointments depending only on their 
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expertise.418 The provisions were not applied systematically but offered a potential instrument 
that Russia could use, depending on its interests, to intervene in the Ottoman rule over Orthodox 
Christian subjects.419 In 1821 the boyars of Wallachia repeated the demands for the removal of 
the “Greeks” from rule. However, by this means, they pursued their own projects at becoming 
hospodars and tried to distance themselves from the Hellenized Christian bureaucrats whom the 
sultan eliminated from imperial rule as collaborators of the insurgents for Greek emancipation.  
The boyars continued to use the division “from the land”-“Greeks” as a political 
instrument, depending on circumstances. Similarly to the period before 1821, it separated the 
individuals who had built power and prestige in Wallachia and Moldavia from the new-comers 
who accompanied the hospodar from Constantinople and who yet needed to acquire political 
credit in the provinces. Language and birth place stressed divisions between those who spoke the 
vernacular or the vernacular and Greek and those who spoke only Greek, and between those who 
were born and bred in Wallachia and those who had been educated in the Hellenized culture of 
the Orthodox Christian circles in Constantinople, tightly associated with the Patriarchate. But 
language and family connections also allowed the amalgamation between “locals” and “Greeks,” 
as many of those who were identified in one category or the other spoke each other’s languages 
and had relatives in both groups. When the difference between boyars from the land and “Greek” 
boyars were reiterated after 1821, it was intended for less discriminatory effect than before. The 
tensions between political factions and between ranks were more influential in polarizing politics 
in Wallachia than the division “Greeks”-“boyars from the land.” 
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It can be argued that the complaints of the high boyars against the lower ranks might have 
targeted in fact the “Greeks,” especially those who tried to escape to the province in 1821 and 
took subordinate offices. But Samurcas’ biography in the 1820s suggests that the “Greek”-
“locals” division was not the main source for tensions in the province. When Alexandru 
Samurcas returned to the province, he was not marginalized on account of the fact that his family 
arrived from Constantinople to Wallachia two generations before, but was offered the customary 
awards due to children of boyars. Samurcas encountered major obstacles as a young boyar 
deprived of wealth and support, whose position at the bottom of the first rank category did not 
allow a promising career unless he associated to one of the prominent boyars.  
It was under such circumstances that Samurcas tightened his relations with the 
representative of Little Wallachia and chancellor Alexandru Filipescu. This boyar had been an 
acquaintance of the vornic Constantin Samurcas with whom he served as delegate of the boyars 
to the leader of the peasant rebellion in Wallachia in 1821.420 Again like Samurcas, Filipescu had 
been an exile in Transylvania since the time of the rebellion through most of the rule of Ghica, 
having returned only in 1826.421 However, unlike Samurcas, Filipescu had preserved his power, 
especially since his extended family continued to have a grip on high offices. Although Ghica 
recruited in his retinue not only lower-rank boyars, who owed their office to the hospodar, but 
also high boyars such as the Filipescu and the Bălăceanu, these power holders soon began to 
openly oppose the ruler.422 Alexandru Samurcas was not necessarily adverse to Ghica, but the 
connections with Filipescu placed him in the faction that opposed the hospodar. In the long term, 
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Alexandru’s association with Filipescu was a wise decision. Filipescu served as an official in the 
administration under Russian occupation after 1829 and in all likeness helped Samurcas receive 
a new appointment. 
 
Government under Russian “protection” and Ottoman “suzerainty” 
These elites fighting for ranks and for the position of hospodar were called in 1829 to 
implement an unprecedented Ottoman-Russian imperial condominium over an Ottoman 
borderland. Ever since Russia, at war with the Ottoman Empire, dispatched its troops in 
Wallachia and Moldavia, the Russian authorities oversaw the drafting by the boyars of a program 
for the re-organization of the provinces that was subsequently approved in 1829 in the peace 
Treaty of Adrianople between the two powers. The Porte’s agreement to sharing prerogatives of 
rule with Russia on their borderland in the Balkans marked the beginning of two decades of 
Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. It provided that the Porte accepted an institutional 
reform in Wallachia and Moldavia for their “independent internal administration,” designated as 
“government,”423 but one which was implemented under the supervision of the Russian 
authorities present in the provinces after the war. It also stipulated a territorial delimitation for 
Wallachia and Moldavia, removing the last Ottoman fortresses from the Wallachian shore of the 
Danube,424 according to the findings of a mixed Russian-Ottoman commission, but restoring 
these occupied provinces to the sultan.425  
By specifying that the Ottoman Porte approved the administrative reform in Wallachia 
and Moldavia, which Russia implemented as a guarantor of their prosperity, the treaty also 
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created the notion that the Ottomans’ power in these borderland provinces was translatable as 
“suzerainty.” The Porte was entitled to collect the tribute in the provinces within the territorial 
delimitation of 1829, a provision that formalized the territoriality of the sultan’s “suzerainty.” 
But at the same time, the Treaty of Adrianople inaugurated the concept that the power of the 
sultan over an imperial territory and subjects was conditional on another empire’s approval and 
that this power was effective within the perimeters defined through an international covenant. 
After the treaty, the Ottoman Porte could re-assert its power by appointing the first hospodars 
and later sending troops to pacify the provinces, but it could do so with the acknowledgment or 
at the behest of the Russian authorities.  
The government that the Russian authorities in Wallachia and Moldavia set up after 
instructions from Sankt Petersburg became the field for local power struggle and competing 
imperial and international claims. This administration reordered the existing local hierarchies, 
offering new prizes for factions but also the setting for an incipient ideological politics. At the 
level of inter-imperial relations, the local government materialized Russian control in the 
Ottoman Empire. Yet, local elites also elicited the attention of Western European powers that 
endeavored to end Russian hegemony by manipulating the difficulties that local politics were 
causing to Russian control in the Balkans (see Chapter 3).  
After 1830 Alexandru Samurcas made his way in the administration under Russian 
supervision. Given that this administration was stuffed with the opponents of the hospodar Ghica 
who was deposed at the beginning of the occupation, I suggest that Samurcas owed his position 
during Russian occupation to Alexandru Filipescu. Ever since 1828, Alexandru Filipescu and 
other opponents of Ghica took offices in the judicial and administrative councils created by the 
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Russian authorities.426 They also served as members in the commissions that drafted the Organic 
Statutes, the local administrative regulations after Russian guidelines, which were remitted to the 
Porte and the Russian authorities in 1831.427 It was during this period that Alexandru Samurcas 
was assigned to act as interpreter of Greek and French in the consultative commission for the 
revision of the regulations.428 He was also included as a secretary in the Commission for the 
delimitation of the border on the Danube,429 which was composed of a Russian representative, 
Raigent, the Ottoman delegate Mehmed Arif Efendi and a local official, Mihai Ghica.430  
The translation activity that Samurcas deployed for these commissions was in accordance 
to the office of second postelnic (interpreter) that he acquired in the province,431 and which was a 
position subordinate to that of postelnic held by his father in 1821. Alexandru hoped that under 
the new regulations and administration, which promoted the idea that service warranted title, his 
activity and the support of a high rank official would help him achieve higher position in the 
government and in politics. His expectations soon seemed to materialize: he was called to 
participate in the assembly that voted for the approval of the revised, Russian-sponsored Organic 
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Statutes. He was also assigned the second rank of comis and a position of prosecutor in the 
district of Ilfov near Bucharest.432  
However, Samurcas’ plans for advancement were soon stalled. During the first years after 
the implementation of the Organic Statutes, the management of Wallachia remained in the hands 
of the most powerful boyars and was a source of sinecures for their protégés. Russia did not plan 
to alter significantly the political mechanisms in Wallachia, but to manifest the power it had 
gained over the Ottoman Empire and the fact that whoever was in charge in the province had to 
gain the support of the Russian representatives (Chapter 3). At the same time, the Statutes 
reinforced the boyar hierarchies by reprising the divisions between “old” and “new” boyars and 
between “locals” and “Greeks” and by assigning many of those who had aspired at rising in rank 
to stable but also static positions in an emerging institutional bureaucracy.  
The boyars in power received the title of “nobles” that reinforced their position of 
leadership in the government and their authority in relation to the hospodar, who was selected 
from their midst, and to the boyars of inferior ranks. As “nobles,” they also participated in the 
assemblies that proposed new laws and regulations to be considered and endorsed by the 
hospodar.433 The recognition of the quality of “nobles” was dependent on land-ownership434 but, 
in the context where title had outlived the quality of being a local “lord” and had become 
connected to public service,435 land-ownership was less of a criterion to promote their 
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prominence than a criterion to contest the political voice of the lower-rank boyars. The 
incumbents of the lower-ranks could obtain titles according to the offices they exerted but, 
formally, these titles were not hereditary.436 On the other hand, since they could vote 
representatives in the legislative assembly and could play a part in the political game of the high 
nobles, the lower-rank officials could hope to gain the support of a patron and the perpetuation of 
their privileges. Thus, the new delimitations that reinforced the primacy of the high boyars did 
not eliminate factional politics. For the next few years, as new provisions regulated the steps of 
promotion for lower-rank individuals at the hospodar’s recommendation and with the high 
officials’ approval, the high boyars, or “nobles” could still help their protégés to advance in the 
administration. In return, the protégés would vote for their patron in the assemblies for the 
election of the hospodar.   
A supplement to the Organic Statutes was approved in 1837 to regulate how functions in 
the newly created military and the administration corresponded to old boyar titles and to set up a 
hierarchy that the assembly and the hospodar should follow in conferring noble titles. This new 
regulation organized the elites in three classes and stipulated which old positions corresponded to 
the newly-created offices in the administration and to noble rank.437 Many of the positions that 
used to belong to the top tier of the boyars hierarchy were now assigned to lower classes and 
ranks. Although nepotism allowed certain boyars to advance in rank and be part of the legislative 
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assemblies,438 many of them remained confined to offices in the administration, the reformed 
judiciary apparatus and the newly created military. Samurcas was one of the individuals who saw 
their chances at rising to first rank dwindle: having started his official career at the bottom of the 
first rank, his new positions and the administrative reorganization downgraded him to the third 
class.  
But whereas the Statutes reinforced divisions and hierarchies among the boyars according 
to social and political status, another provision with respect to the “Greek” and “locals” or “local 
Rumanians” provided the bases for the elimination of this division that the boyars used to control 
the rise to power of some of their peers. The new regulations stipulated that the incumbents of 
offices were to be all “locals” or “local Rumanians” a condition for which the “Greeks” could 
qualify within seven years after applying for naturalization, if they could certify relations to the 
“local” families through blood relations, marriage or adoption.439 A decade after the Hetairist 
revolt in Wallachia and the removal of the Phanariot hospodars from power, this provision 
seems to have voiced deep and old resentment against the “Greeks.” It also evoked an emerging 
self-identification of the other boyars as locals but also as “Rumanians.”   
However, by distinguishing between “Greeks” and “locals” the statutes did not solidify 
old divisions but rather paved the way for this distinction to disappear in time. The naturalization 
as “locals” concerned specifically those who aspired to rank and position and it was a 
requirement that could have been fulfilled rather easily. It also provided a formal 
acknowledgment to the connections that continued between boyars in Wallachia and the Greek 
Orthodox officials who survived in the Ottoman administration at the Porte after the 
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dismantlement of the Phanariots. Several such officials had served as boyars in Wallachia and 
Moldavia and now became representatives of the new hospodars, continuing to strike family 
relations with the “local” boyar families (Chapter 3).  
But despite the fact that this provision did not aim to purge the “Greeks” from politics, its 
conditions combined with the reorganization of the “noble” titles to disadvantage Alexandru 
Samurcas. Thus, according to the new regulations, Alexandru was considered “Greek” and 
needed to apply for naturalization, a situation that delayed his plans to accede to higher noble 
title. Indeed, Samurcas’ family qualified only partially for naturalization. They had been owners 
of land estates in the provinces, were related to “local” families but had been in office for less 
than the term of residence and service that the Statutes requested of those who wanted to be 
considered as “local.” Had his father or uncle been alive and in office, the provision might not 
have been applied so rigorously, but without consistent support Alexandru had to follow the 
procedure for naturalization in addition to cultivating his political connections and building his 
record of service. After 1834 he would take office in the judicial apparatus under the 
administration of the hospodar Alexandru Ghica, brother of the previous ruler Grigore Ghica, 
whom the Porte and the Russian authorities appointed to rule as a one-time exception from the 
text of the Organic Statutes.440   
 
2. The multiplication of political sites and imperial condominium at an age of 
revolution, 1834-1848 
The application of the Organic Statutes under the auspices of Ottoman-Russian 
condominium in Wallachia reproduced the old political factionalism in the province. Whereas 
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many of the low-rank boyars were assigned to bureaucratic tasks and their access to the 
institutions of decision-making was regulated, they continued to participate in the factions of the 
high-boyars who attempted to replace the hospodar. But other sites for political action, aside 
from the competition for rule, took shape during this period, some within the framework of the 
government set up by the Organic Statutes and in compliance with Russia’s imperial mandate 
and others in manifest opposition to the arrangements that underlay Russian control in 
Wallachia.  
Following Alexandru Samurcas’ efforts to promote to high rank and the obstacles that 
compromised his endeavor, in this section I will reveal how political factionalism co-existed with 
networks of professional and political support between lower-rank officials that reproduced old 
relations between the boyars. I will also emphasize that aside from these arenas for political 
action, and at odds with them and what they represented, took shape a new type of ideological 
politics, promoted by young nobles who participated in a European-wide movement for political 
representation and civil liberties.441 The promoters of liberalism and ideological politics did not 
eliminate factionalism as political strategy, but denounced the Russian imperial control that 
supervised the factions in Wallachia and promoted a campaign of international lobby that played 
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in the plans of the other European powers with respect to Russian influence in the Ottoman 
Empire.  
 
Politics, administration, and the manifestations of Russian control in Wallachia  
As the hospodar Alexandru Ghica took the rule of Wallachia with Ottoman investiture 
and Russian agreement in 1834, the prosecutor Alexandru Samurcas was hopeful that he could 
capitalize on his service during the Russian occupation and on his family’s remaining 
connections. A first step in this endeavor was the naturalization as a “local Rumanian” for which 
he prepared by marrying Zoe Chegiul Beiazi, a woman of Wallachian-Phanariot origin but who 
was considered “Rumanian,” and whose father, Nicola Chegiul Beiazi, was related to Ioan 
Ghiulbeiazi, an old acquaintance of Alexandru’s uncle.442 The witness at the wedding was the 
great boyar Alexandru Filipescu. The Samurcas family soon grew with the birth of two 
daughters, Elisabeth and Helen and of a son, Ioan.443  
However, as in 1835 the Wallachian legislative assembly was considering the creation of 
a Table of the noble titles and ranks that corresponded to classes in the bureaucratic hierarchy,444 
Samurcas was not willing to wait long for his naturalization as “local.” Hoping to qualify sooner 
for a high placement in the bureaucratic hierarchy, Samurcas reconnected with his aunt Zoe 
Samurcas, who was considered a “Rumanian” woman,445 helping her to sort out her businesses 
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and debts. Zoe was grateful for her nephew’s attention. In 1836, shortly before she passed away, 
Zoe petitioned the ruler through the Great Chancellery of Justice to adopt her adult nephew. The 
prince approved the adoption request and confirmed that Alexandru Samurcas, a married adult 
hired in civil employment, could be considered Zoe’s “adopted son.”446 The adoption meant that 
Samurcas became Zoe’s heir and the administrator of her possessions, the several land estates in 
the proximity of Bucharest, as well as of her debts.447 The land possessions of Zoe Samurcas 
were rather small by the time’s standards. However, they were an asset that Alexandru could 
evoke to testify for his family’s nobility and to support his own claims to become a hereditary 
“noble.” 
In 1837 the legislative assembly passed the supplement to the article “About Ranks” in 
the Organic Regulations.448 According to the article, the numerous noble titles whose names 
duplicated those of the boyar offices during the Phanariot rule, were organized in a hierarchy of 
nine ranks and three classes. Alexandru, still a prosecutor, was proposed by the prince Alexandru 
Ghica for a title of serdar, which was a title of the eighth rank and third class. Being a landowner 
and also holding a noble title made Alexandru Samurcas eligible for the district elections in 1841 
as a delegate to the Legislative Assembly of Wallachia,449 but Samurcas’ result in the elections 
remains unknown. Although Samurcas succeeded to enter the hierarchy of ranks, and regardless 
of his already several-years long service in the administration, the hospodar did not offer him 
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any promotion during the following years. I suggest that accounting for this stagnation was 
Samurcas’ affiliation with the detractors of the hospodar.  
During the late 1830s the hospodar and the nobles in the assembly were in constant 
conflict. The ruler had appointed relatives in his executive council450 and strove to rally to him 
those officials who had entered the ranks of the military.451 Alexandru Ghica tried to consolidate 
his position also by maintaining good standing at the Porte through his representative there 
Nicolae Aristarki,452 the son of one of the Ottoman Christian officials who had survived the 
dismantlement of the Phanariots. This strategy did not involve the risk of antagonizing Russia. 
Aristarki was an associate of the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Ottoman 
officials who favored Russia453 and who did not dispute the recent arrangements between the two 
empires.  
In their turn, the boyars did not stop submitting complaints to the Russian representatives 
and to the consuls of the other European powers. Several members of the Băleanu family took 
over positions in the executive and so did members of the Filipescu family who took charge of 
the Supreme Court of Justice. Samurcas was a rather minor figure in the power struggle but the 
hospodar was not willing to approve promotions in office or rank to individuals who could have 
supported his political enemies. However, Samurcas’ stagnation in office only lasted until 
Alexandru Ghica was removed from power in 1842 during a political crisis that was triggered by 
Russia’s attempts to recapture its influence in the Ottoman Empire. 
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Despite the fact that Russia continued to enjoy significant control in the Ottoman lands 
on the Danube, by the late 1830s it had begun to lose its hegemonic position at Constantinople 
due to a new Ottoman crisis that prompted active European intervention in the Ottoman Muslim 
lands and paved the way to British influence in the Empire. In 1839 a conflict between the 
Ottoman sultan and his unruly governor of Egypt led to new international intervention for the 
defense of the Ottoman Empire. Britain in particular, wary of Russia’s ascendance in Ottoman 
affairs454 and of the attempts of France to extend its influence in Northern Africa, offered 
military help and became a lasting ally to the Ottoman Empire.455 The conflict ended in 1840 
after Britain had stopped the advance of the Egyptian troops and the European powers brokered a 
convention between the sultan and his governor, through which the governor conceded most of 
the imperial lands he had occupied but was recognized hereditary rule in Egypt. The European 
powers and the Ottoman Empire signed in 1841 another convention that provided for the closing 
of the Straits to the warships of any power. This convention superseded the Russian-Ottoman 
Treaty of mutual defense of 1833 that gave Russia the right to be the unique power allowed to 
send its warships through the Straits.456 Although Russia signed the new agreement of 1841, it 
did so to avert the open conflict with the other European powers and especially with Britain that 
had gained new influence at Constantinople.  
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During these events, Russia sought to assert its authority at the Porte by pressing for a 
reinforcement of imperial control in Wallachia and Moldavia that were relatively removed from 
the other powers’ involvement. In the new international context, Russia needed a guarantee that 
the terms of its condominium with the Ottoman Empire remained the same notwithstanding local 
factionalism and the local nobles’ attempts to gain the support of European diplomatic 
representatives for their schemes. For this purpose, the Russian authorities exerted pressure on 
the hospodar and the Porte to secure the addition to the Organic Statutes of an additional clause 
according to which no amendments could have been made to the Statutes without the 
authorization of the two Empires. They also intervened decidedly in local politics and withdrew 
the support that they had offered to Alexandru Ghica. 
 The additional clause had been an object of friction in Wallachia since shortly after the 
approval of the Statutes by the two courts in 1834.457 As the clause needed to be approved by the 
local assembly of boyars, in 1838 the Russian consul in Bucharest P. Rückmann asked the 
hospodar Ghica, who tried to maintain his position with Russian help, to force the boyars into 
obedience. The refusal of the boyars to approve the additional article led to the dismantlement of 
the existing assembly. The Russian authorities subsequently decided to demand an Ottoman 
imperial order that imposed the application of the additional article without the approval of the 
local assembly. They also intervened in the political conflict between the hospodar and the 
boyars that intensified after the dissolution of the assembly.  
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The new consul Iakov Dashkov withdrew the customary Russian support for the 
hospodar and manifested great deference to the boyars458 instead. The Russian Court dispatched 
Major Alexander Duhamel, ambassador in Persia, to collect and investigate the complaints of the 
officials.459 The Porte too delegated a commissioner. Although the denunciations were indicative 
not only of the hospodar’s shortcoming but also of the factional strife in Wallachia, the two 
courts decided in 1842 to end the rule of Ghica. Elections were organized according to the 
provisions of the Organic Statutes. George Bibescu, the son of one of Constantin Samurcas’ 
peers in Little Wallachia460 and a boyar who had been trained abroad, won the elections.461 
Bibescu, who had benefited from General Kiselev’s sympathy during the occupation of 1829-
1834 and from Dashkov’s support, was also well acquainted with local factionalism and intrigues 
and had participated in the opposition to Ghica. After taking power, Bibescu tried to consolidate 
his position through appointments and sinecures in the government but in his turn he became the 
target of the denunciations and schemes of his former peers. However, unlike Ghica, Bibescu did 
not wait for his opponents to consolidate their positions with the consuls or in the assembly and 
soon dissolved the assembly, ruling without check for two years before a new assembly was 
elected in 1846, consisting mostly of his supporters.462 
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Among the individuals whom Bibescu promoted in office was also Alexandru Samurcas 
who in 1842 became president of the Commercial Law Court in Craiova, the major city of Little 
Wallachia, and received the title of paharnic (cup bearer).463 While Samurcas owed his 
promotion to the change in the first ranks of the political leadership, after 1842 and until 1848 he 
concentrated on obtaining promotion through service in the judiciary in Little Wallachia. A 
potential explanation for this change of strategy is the fact that having relocated to Craiova 
Samurcas was rather detached from the political factionalism in Bucharest. Also, there is no 
evidence that he continued his relations with the Filipescu or the other prominent families in the 
assembly. On the other hand, the appointment in Craiova allowed Samurcas to tighten the 
relations with his colleagues and to connect to local merchants and prominent figures.  
During the 1840s, members of the administration set up by the Organic Statutes 
reactivated the connections that had underlain the old local networks of power and which 
political factionalism in Bucharest did not monopolize entirely. These connections became the 
substitute for the relations of collegiality and service that the Russian administration hoped to 
achieve through the institutionalization during the Organic Statutes. In Little Wallachia, the 
integration of former political, family and interest relations in the bureaucracy was facilitated by 
the fact that the old council of boyars of the region had been transformed in 1831 into a superior 
juridical instance. The divan of Craiova, which had been in charge of the administration in the 
region, provided after 1831 the instances of appeal for civil and criminal justice and commercial 
affairs.464 Its old members became the personnel in the new justice courts.465 Alexandru 
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Samurcas was a perfect match for the office: not only had his family been involved in the 
workings of the Council of Craiova before and had relations with the local boyar families, but he 
also had law training, which he had acquired during his years in Braşov, to act in an instance.  
The appointment to the commercial court in Little Wallachia helped Samurcas revive his 
family’s old connections and gain prestige locally, assets that were of significant help during the 
coming political crisis, but did not satisfy his ambition at advancing in service rank and gaining 
higher noble title. In this respect, his assignment to Little Wallachia could have been a 
professional cul-de-sac and Samurcas renewed his efforts to obtain a promotion from the 
hospodar, most likely with recommendations from his peers in Craiova. In 1845, Bibescu 
fulfilled his plea partially and offered him a title as clucer, which was a title superior to the one 
he held previously, but within the same rank. The rise in the noble hierarchy was not 
accompanied by a promotion in the justice system and relocation to Bucharest, as Samurcas 
hoped based on his service record and his title. Nevertheless, Samurcas continued to act within 
the norms of the government ruled by the Organic Statutes. 
  
Ideological politics in Wallachia and the Russian-sponsored government  
Only a few years later, in 1848, Wallachia went through a political crisis that endangered 
the career plans of Samurcas and others like him. This crisis, which was the result of new 
political dynamics in Wallachia in tune with the ideological trends in Europe, also resonated at 
the level of the rivalry between the Western European imperial agendas and Russia. Young 
descendants of boyar families that held an intermediary position in the noble hierarchy and who 
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had been educated in France became imbued with the idea of belonging to the European 
civilization, versus Russia,466 and brought in local politics an ideology that combined liberalism 
with romantic nationalism.467  
In 1848, these boyars began an uprising that led to the creation of a short-lived 
“revolutionary” government. They expressively denounced the corruption in the administration 
regulated through the Organic Statutes, but adopted different attitudes towards Russia and the 
Porte, the imperial powers that supervised these regulations. Whereas the revolutionaries rejected 
Russian involvement in Wallachia, they did not challenge Ottoman authority. In fact, they hoped 
to obtain Ottoman approval for their liberal program, which they depicted as corresponding to 
the broader reforms in the Ottoman Empire and as an efficient instrument for the Porte to 
counterbalance the influence of Russia.468 In this respect, they made manifest to the Ottoman 
authorities in Constantinople that their action did not aim to overturn Ottoman authority but to 
restore the province’s “old privileges” harmed through the intervention of Russia,469 the very 
empire that in fact had validated the fictional “privileges” in the relations between the Porte and 
Wallachia and Moldavia.  
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In the spring of 1848 these individuals’ action took by surprise the hospodar George 
Bibescu who soon abandoned his office and escaped to Transylvania.470 Samurcas too fled 
Wallachia for this Habsburg province. Soon after, despite initial hesitations, the Porte dispatched 
the military to Wallachia. George Duhamel, whom the tsar Nicholas I appointed to inspect the 
situation in the principalities and to call for military assistance, if necessary, opted for 
intervention and the General Alexander Lüders drove the Russian troops to Wallachia.471 
As Lüders took control of the province and of the administration, Alexandru Samurcas 
decided to return to the province where he had been removed from office on account of his 
participation in the revolution. In October 1848 Samurcas asked several of his peers at the Law 
Court in Craiova and local merchants who had benefitted from his service as president of the 
Commercial Court to write a recommendation letter in his favor to someone in a decision-
making position in the Russian military, possibly the general Lüders. He estimated that a letter 
depicting him as a loyal servant of the Organic Statutes and thus, of the Russian authority in 
Wallachia, would eliminate any suspicion of the Russian authorities.  
His associates heeded the plea and explained to the Russian authorities that Samurcas 
never supported the revolution and that the recent events had in fact forced him to take refuge in 
Habsburg Transylvania at his own expense.472 The signatories emphasized that the “inhabitants 
and owners” of Craiova who benefitted from Samurcas’ judicial activity evaluated his service in 
the most positive terms. Allegedly, Samurcas fulfilled his official duties impeccably and with 
great attention while also being a pleasant member of the local “society.”473 By presenting a 
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positive evaluation of Samurcas’ bureaucratic service jointly with an assessment of his public 
persona, the signatories strove to show that the president of the Commercial Court corresponded 
entirely to the model of behavior that the Russian authorities promoted through the Organic 
Statutes.  In addition to manipulating a discourse that would have appealed to the Russian 
authorities, the letter was also the product of a local network of officials for mutual support that 
the Organic Statutes had engendered during the last decade. Several signatories were officials 
from Little Wallachia, whose ancestors had competed and collaborated with Alexandru 
Samurcas’ uncle and father, and colleagues in the judicial courts that the Organic Statutes 
instituted there.474 Thus, Alexandru Samurcas and the signatories of the petition were supportive 
of each other as “nobles” of similar rank as well as servants in the judicial-bureaucratic corps.  
Samurcas was reinstated but he also planned to advance in the judicial hierarchy, now 
that the Russian authorities were in command of the administration and he did not have to predict 
which political faction was in power. Thus, in winter 1848 the clucer Samurcas wrote a letter to 
the General, in which he summarized his official activity and noble titles to request the 
nomination as judge in the court of appeal in Bucharest or in the corresponding court in Craiova. 
Samurcas also hinted that he hoped for a higher title and made several references about the future 
alliances of his family and land estates, assets that only increased one’s prestige as a noble.475 
This biography was meant to reveal Samurcas’ complete dedication to the good working of the 
reforms implemented through the Organic Statutes and to set him apart from the boyars who had 
openly contested Russian authority as well as from those who plagued the administration with 
their ineptitude and corruption.  
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The direct intervention near a Russian official, the references to family responsibilities 
together with mentions of his service are evocative of the fact that the discursive tropes promoted 
by the Russian authorities had been adopted by the participants in the administration and 
manipulated in the networks that endured from the time of the Phanariots. But while officials 
extolled Russian intervention in the administration, they preferred to obscure the way in which 
they used political assets, such as connections, which had been developed before 1830. To show 
his compliance with the mechanisms that the Organic Regulations introduced to control 
governmental activities and leadership, Alexandru counted scrupulously his appointments, the 
years of service in each of them and the individuals, all in positions of leadership, who placed 
him in office and rank. In addition, he emphasized that he accomplished each of the assignments 
with diligence and efficiency, conditions that would have warranted a promotion in office.   
Emphasizing that he owed his political career exclusively to Russian “protection,” 
Samurcas went as far as to obscure that his family had served Ottoman rule or that they were 
new-comers from Constantinople. This might have be the reason why he did not mention his 
recent naturalization as a “local Rumanian” through adoption and marriage. It is equally possible 
that Samurcas did not refer to his Constantinopolitan origins because the Statutes’ provisions 
about naturalization had been successful in bridging the division between the “Greek” boyars 
and the boyars “from the land.”  
Samurcas’ strategy in 1848 suggests that he attempted to re-insert himself in the local 
administration through what had become a common method to pursue advancement in politics 
and bureaucracy: by trying to connect with the Russian authorities. In addition, he also appealed 
to the networks of support that functioned within bureaucratic hierarchies based on old 
associations between the boyars. These networks survived during the Organic Statutes regime 
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and offered a setting for political action that complemented factionalism for the title of hospodar 
and the highest noble ranks and positions in the government. But by 1848 a new site for political 
competition also began to take shape in Wallachia, part of a trend throughout Europe: liberal 
ideology provided political actors with new principles for political association and incentives to 
pursue power. A small group, the liberal nobles in Wallachia, promoted a new legitimizing 
principle for political action, the “nation.” Although the principle lacked conceptual precision, it 
was nonetheless evoked to contest vehemently Russian imperial control.476 Despite their 
commitment to “national freedom,” the relations between the liberals from Wallachia and 
imperial rule in general, and between them and the other elites of the Organic Statutes were more 
complex, as the creation of a new government under international supervision soon revealed.   
 
3. Imperial suzerainty, international guarantee and “national” politicians: the 
1850s 
The elites in charge of Wallachia remained virtually unchallenged during the 1850s, but 
the politics underwent unprecedented changes due to the way in which new inter-imperial rivalry 
over the survival of the Ottoman Empire catalyzed ideological mobilization and propelled the 
“nation” to becoming the main political project in the province. Wallachia became the site for 
both local “national” politics and collective international regulation of Ottoman authority in the 
principalities. 
In 1849, Alexandru Samurcas was again a magistrate in Wallachia, possibly in one of the 
instances in Bucharest, as his family’s relocation to the capital seems to indicate.477 However, 
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changing political circumstances determined him to moderate his ambitions at promotion. 
Samurcas and other participants in the governmental institutions who had received offices under 
the Ghicas or who still occupied lower posts began to adjust their political expectations. Thus, by 
the 1850s or 1860s Samurcas resigned from the justice system to dedicate himself to study.478  
But while Samurcas and others abandoned the political competition for high offices, these 
individuals hoped that their stable positions and networks with each other would help their 
offspring to accede to the first ranks of the nobility and public service. Furthermore, they still 
held voting privileges, an asset that the liberal and conservative nobles could not ignore as local 
politics became polarized along the liberal - conservative and unionist - anti-unionist divisions. 
Thus, notwithstanding his withdrawal from the administration, Samurcas and his family became 
soon involved in politics that promoted a new principle for action, the “nation.”   
This ideological mobilization of local politics in the first decade after the revolt of 1848 
was possible due to a new configuration of the rivalry between the European powers who 
disputed the control over the fragmenting Ottoman Empire. The agendas of the liberals and of 
the high boyars, who defended their prerogatives against liberal radicalism and who adopted 
particular stances to the re-assertion of Russian authority in the province, gained relevance 
among the European courts that competed for influence in the Ottoman Empire. In the 1840s, 
Britain and Russia were the main contenders for the role of “protectors” of the Ottoman Empire, 
with Russia slowly losing ground after the Convention of the Straits in 1841. France, which 
during the Egyptian crisis of 1839 had supported the Egyptian governor against the Porte, did not 
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abandon its projects for the Ottoman Middle Eastern dominions but was amenable to cooperate 
with Britain against Russian expansion in the region.479   
To reinforce the influence that it preserved at Constantinople as protector of Wallachia 
and Moldavia, in 1849 Russia pressed for a new convention with the Ottoman Empire that 
renewed their condominium in these provinces. This Russian-Ottoman agreement suspended the 
provision in the Organic Statutes that assigned the election of the hospodars to the local 
assembly and stipulated, similarly to the Convention of Akkerman of 1826, that the Porte should 
select the hospodars from among the boyars, for seven-year terms.480 The ruler appointed to 
Wallachia was the boyar Barbu Ştirbei, a sibling of the former hospodar Alexandru Ghica. At 
the same time, Russia adopted a more permissive attitude towards the local leadership, allowing 
the return of the liberal boyars from exile and approving the creation of commissions of nobles 
for the revision and improvement of the Organic Statutes.481  
During their exile, the liberal and unionist nobles deployed lobby campaigns in France 
and Britain for the removal of the Russian protectorate and the union of Wallachia and Moldavia 
under a foreign prince, which overlapped to a certain degree with these powers’ geopolitical 
interests at the expense of Russia. By the 1840s, the British and French governments began to 
feature themselves as moderate monarchies at home and abroad, especially in opposition to 
Russia. It was in this context that Russia began to be described in the West not as a conservative 
power that abhorred the overthrow of legitimate governments through violence, but as a despotic 
and expansionist state.482 While the Western powers were not particularly supportive of political 
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turbulences that could complicate their agendas for the Ottoman Empire,483 Russia’s violent 
intervention to suppress movements in the lands under its influence and in the Habsburg Empire 
confirmed the damaging portrait of oppressor of peoples that the Western governments had 
popularized. In addition, France began to ponder to what extent the union of Wallachia and 
Moldavia could help promote its own agendas in Europe. The new ruler Napoleon III, who was a 
supporter of the establishment of Polish and Italian “nations,” also endorsed the unionist project 
for Wallachia and Moldavia.484 Britain approved the anti-Russian agenda of the local liberals but 
was hesitant about whether their unionist program would help preserve the Ottoman Empire, or 
whether it would undermine its integrity.485 Nevertheless, the unionist project for Wallachia and 
Moldavia and the anti-Russian mobilization of local boyars had become known to the European 
cabinets and were later considered in calculations about the administration of these provinces.486  
In 1852, Russia claimed imperatively at the Porte the protection over the Ottoman 
Orthodox subjects in the context of a jurisdictional crisis with France for the guardianship of the 
Holy Sites, leading to a Russian-Ottoman war during which Britain and France sided with the 
Ottoman Empire. Russia lost the war and the influence that it had acquired at the Porte through 
the provisions of the Treaty of Adrianople in the Ottoman European territories and the 
condominium in Wallachia and Moldavia. In the Treaty of Paris (1856), the European powers 
requested open access on the Danube, the elimination of Russian protection over the Orthodox 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire and intervention in Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia, and re-
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affirmed Ottoman independence and territorial “integrity.”487 After the powers evaluated how a 
potential union of Wallachia and Moldavia could serve their interests, they promoted the 
principle of collective international protection of these Christian “tributaries.”488 In addition, they 
also appealed to the Porte to give guarantees for the good treatment of the Ottoman Christians. 
Although Britain might have assessed that these provisions could stimulate a new Ottoman 
reform and thus, the strengthening of the Empire,489 they also formalized the concept that the 
European powers could intervene in the relations between the sultan and the imperial Christian 
subjects.  
In consequence, in 1856, the sultan issued an edict that proclaimed religious equality in 
the Empire, in parallel with the new reforms being implemented in the administration.490 In 
Wallachia and Moldavia, the collective of European powers reiterated the Russian-originated and 
limiting concept of Ottoman “suzerainty,” also providing for the creation of a local army. But 
unlike Russia , which in 1829 sponsored an imperial-driven program of organization of these 
provinces under Ottoman “suzerainty,” Britain, France, the Habsburg Empire, Prussia and 
Sardinia did not specify the terms of their collective protection of Wallachia and Moldavia and 
of how it would manage local administration. Instead, they assigned the organization of the 
principalities to local assemblies under the supervision of an international commission.491 The 
activity of these assemblies was rife with political conflicts between the liberals who had 
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returned from exile and conservatives,492 unionists and anti-unionists493 and aspirants to the 
position of princes in the context where each power came to adopt a particular stance with 
respect to the union of the two provinces. Despite these dissensions, the assemblies spelled the 
abolition of “nobility” by cancelling privileges, regulating taxation, making administrative 
employment public and by imposing mandatory military service.494 Such a change did not, 
however, pave the way to social and political reform: wealth and property continued to be 
necessary assets for political participation in countries where most of the population was 
landless.  
Moreover, in 1859 the unionists and liberals succeeded to repute majorities for the 
election of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, an officer who had been involved in the events of 1848, as 
prince of both Wallachia and Moldavia, against the anti-unionists who tried to impose a separate 
ruler for Moldavia.495 By the end of 1859, the arrangement proposed by the powers had a 
paradoxical effect with respect to the Russian and Ottoman authority on the borderland. Russia, a 
loser in the war but trying to recover its position among the European powers as an ally of 
France, joined France in approving the union of the two provinces. The Ottoman Empire, a victor 
in the Crimean War, suffered a more severe loss of authority in Wallachia and Moldavia after the 
European powers re-affirmed its integrity as a suzerain than after the Russian invention of the 
concept of Ottoman “suzerainty” applied through the Russian-Ottoman condominium. 
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During the following decades, the government of the United and “autonomous” 
Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which continued to be divided by political rivalries 
and factions, subordinated social reforms to a nation-building project that became the source of 
self-legitimization for most of its members. This project also prompted the local elites, still 
separated by the status that came with old ranks and wealth, to reinvent themselves. The way in 
which Alexandru Samurcas and his family rebranded themselves after 1860 is telling in this 
respect. Samurcas might have withdrawn from the justice system but he was not indifferent to his 
family’s future. He groomed his son Ioan to follow a career in justice: such a career enjoyed 
prestige among people who claimed “noble” backgrounds and commoners alike, and 
Alexandru’s service and connections would have helped him to advance in the administration 
and politics. Thus, in 1862 he sent Ioan to study law at the Universities of Munich and Vienna.496 
To strengthen his family’s position in the administration, Alexandru soon married one of his 
daughters, Elena, to Toma Tzigara, an acquaintance of his from the Justice Court of Appeal in 
Bucharest.497 
In other words, Samurcas attempted to re-invent his family as servants of the new, unified 
government but for this purpose he chose to recover the prestige that had featured appointments 
since before 1821 and titles in public office during the Organic Statutes. The removal of the 
“noble” titles in 1857 did not entail the democratization of politics: property ownership, which 
was a significant component of the “nobles’” status continued to offer them social and political 
preeminence over the majority of the population. But in the context where a developing 
education system and bureaucratization threatened to create potential competitors, the elites of 
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various rank strove to resurrect the prestige that used to accompany noble title. Similarly to 1831 
when the boyars attempted to distinguish themselves from their political enemies by pointing out 
that they had been nobles across several generations, the nobles and ennobled officials deprived 
of titles in 1857 tried to construct a new past for themselves that set them aside as elites, but 
which did not remove them from the “nation.” 
This process of rebranding was not easy: it involved the re-assessment of a past that had 
strong imperial connotations and the preservation of those elements that seemed to correspond to 
the nation-building mission of the new government. The Samurcas chose to do so by reiterating 
their service in the local administration and by building a prestige of “Greek-Wallachian 
aristocracy.” Only three decades after Alexandru initiated procedures to be considered 
“Rumanian,”  his wife, Zoe, emphasized to her children who were educated in French and 
German and who spoke Romanian that they also needed to learn Greek. Zoe did not insist that 
her offspring should speak Greek in order to relocate to Greece, although Samurcas might have 
begun to embrace his ethnic affinity with the Greek nation,498 but to signal the fact that they 
belonged to a prominent Greek (as “Phanariot” held negative connotations) -Wallachian family 
of public servants.  
This concept of nobility presupposed assertions of past local prominence, activity and 
social distinction combined with a projection of Greek or Romanian identity. However, it 
obscured all connection with Ottoman or Russian service, despite the fact that “nobility” had 
received a definition through the Russian-sponsored and Ottoman-approved Organic Statutes. 
Such was the case because the political establishment in the United Principalities continued to be 
suspicious of Russia. In what concerns the service that the boyars in Wallachia or Moldavia had 
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carried for the Ottoman Empire, it did not convey significant symbolic capital in the context 
where Russian protection and European collective guarantee successively diluted Ottoman 
authority in the principalities and created the notion that the boyars had always enjoyed 
privileges and autonomy in relation to the Porte.  
Alexandru and Zoe were successful at carving out a space for their children in the politics 
of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and of its successor, the Romanian 
Kingdom, which took shape in 1878, after the end of Ottoman suzerainty and the European 
powers’ confirmation of local sovereignty. Shortly after Alexandru’s death in 1870, the jurist 
Ioan Samurcas, his son, became a diplomat of the Principalities’ representation at Berlin, being 
considered for a ministry in the local government. A grave illness ended Ioan’s career, but 
shortly before his death he adopted Alexandru, the teenager son of his sister Elena and of Toma 
Tzigara who had deceased a decade prior.499  
Alexandru Tzigara-Samurcas did not pursue a career in the Romanian bureaucracy or 
diplomacy but in the academic world. He became an art historian and a museographer who 
invested money and effort in creating a museum of ethnographic art that was dedicated to 
gathering the evidence of a Romanian essence, as preserved in peasant culture, and which 
contributed to the ongoing project of constructing the Romanian nation. Despite the fact that his 
interest lay outside of politics, the heir of the Samurcas family married Maria Cantacuzino,500 the 
descendent of a family of Moldavian-Phanariot boyars and which at the end of the 19th century 
figured among the families that enjoyed the prestige of “Romanian” aristocrats and were in the 
entourage of the Romanian king. The Romanian aristocracy that had taken shape in the 19th 
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century to serve in the national government and deploy the nation-building program, and to 
which Alexandru Tzigara-Samurcas belonged, found its end at the middle of the 20th century.  
 
Conclusion 
The career of Alexandru Samurcas and his successors in the 19th century displays the 
continuity between the boyars of the last Phanariot rules and of the Russian-Ottoman 
condominium and the elite of the Romanian nation-state. These elites that were actively involved 
in the creation of the Romanian “nation” and the running of the Romanian state reinvented itself 
as a “Romanian” aristocracy. But in the process, they obscured the way in which they had 
preserved authority by serving under imperial mandate on a borderland, an “autonomous” 
government under international guarantee and finally a nation-state. In this chapter, I explored 
the ways in which the elites of Wallachia and Moldavia responded to and implemented the 
successive European arrangements that defined and encroached on Ottoman authority over 
territory and subjects in the Balkans during the 19th century. Following the biography of 
Alexandru Samurcas, the descendent of a Phanariot-Wallachian family of officials, I revealed the 
multiple levels of change that transformed Orthodox Christian elites on a borderland and their 
authority while reshaping power in this space along concepts of imperial “suzerainty” and 
“autonomous” local government.  
In this fashion, I explained that although the dismantlement of the Orthodox Christian 
leadership in Constantinople and the Russian-sponsored government shaped these elites’ career 
options, they reproduced the old mechanisms of acceding of power holders in a borderland 
province under Ottoman control. But despite the continuity in the composition of the leadership, 
Russia involved this group in applying an imperial project that permanently altered Ottoman 
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control on this borderland and created a precedent for future international interventions. After 
1848, members of these elites who became adepts of liberal politics challenged Russian 
influence on this borderland simultaneously with the European empires’ attempts at devising 
forms of international agency that would have allowed them to control the survival of the 
Ottoman Empire according to their own imperial interests.  
By examining these levels of continuity and change, I emphasized that within three 
decades the elites in Wallachia and Moldavia served three different political projects: first 
Ottoman control after the destruction of a group that had been entrusted with supervising the 
application of imperial rule in the province; subsequently, an inter-imperial condominium that 
served Russia’s influence in the Ottoman Empire; finally, a government under international 
guarantee that upheld national self-rule as a legitimizing principle. While the elites’ continuous 
service might indicate opportunism, it is also reflective of the continuities between imperial rule, 
local self-rule and European imperialism. European powers on expansion tried to gain influence 
in the Ottoman European lands by co-opting the actors that had supported Ottoman rule on the 
borderland, while redefining and restricting the Ottoman rule in the area. In this manner, they 
reduced the content of Ottoman authority to privileges of “suzerainty” and created the legal 
fiction that Ottoman authority can manifest itself in Wallachia and Moldavia only indirectly, 
through an autonomous or internally independent government composed of the old agents of 
Ottoman rule. When these actors decided to adopt the “nation” as the legitimizing principle of 
the “autonomous” government, having little international support, they developed on the 
concepts of local self-rule and restricted imperial control that the powers had promoted in these 
Ottoman possessions.  
  
198 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation reconstructed the lives and political careers of four officials and power 
holders from the Ottoman tributaries Wallachia and Moldavia between the 1780s and the 1850s 
to address important issues pertaining to Ottoman history, the history of the Eastern Question 
and of modern European imperial expansion in the Ottoman Empire. How did local ambitions 
for power and imperial projects combine to transform the borderland between the Ottoman, 
Russian and Habsburg Empires into a nodal point for European expansionism in the Ottoman 
Empire? Through what kind of political arrangements did these dynamics materialize and how 
did they shape rule on the borderland? I argued that although borderland politics prevented the 
exclusive materialization of either local, imperial or inter-imperial interests, the body of 
international law that the European imperialist powers designed to regulate Ottoman rule in the 
1830s ultimately facilitated the combination of local and imperialist agendas. Following the 
activity of Iordache and Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu and of Constantin and Alexandru Samurcas, 
I identified four contexts for the interaction between local agendas and imperial projects that 
fostered European expansion in the Ottoman Empire through the Balkans. These were: the 
establishment of an inter-imperial territorial demarcation on the Ottoman Danubian borderland; 
the exposure of the Ottoman affairs to international arbitrage, which Ottoman diplomatic 
networks in Wallachia and Moldavia facilitated; the creation of an Ottoman-Russian 
condominium on the borderland as the first formal European definition of Ottoman rule over 
land and subjects and of local government; the combination of international law and local 
politics on the borderland to re-define Ottoman rule as divided in different spheres of action that 
had their own sources of legitimacy.  
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At the end of the 18th century, the ethnically and socially heterogeneous Orthodox 
Christian leadership that the Ottoman Porte mandated to rule Wallachia and Moldavia was 
deeply involved in imperial networks that sprawled across the Balkan provinces and 
Constantinople. In the context of the Ottoman-Habsburg-Russian wars in 1787-1792 and 1806-
1811, these networks in Wallachia and Moldavia became the site for local elites to enhance their 
position with Ottoman, Habsburg or Russian support, and for the three empires to assert their 
position on this borderland. The transactions with land estates, which provided the cash for venal 
politics in Moldavia, reinforced the power of Iordache Rosetti-Roznovanu and his family in the 
competition with other officials in the province, such as the ruler delegated from Constantinople. 
The transactions also served two antagonistic imperial projects: they offered a pretext to higher 
Ottoman authorities to claim authority in territory lost during the wars, and a possibility for the 
Russian Empire to effectively coopt local power holders in supporting its expansion against the 
Porte (Chapter 1).  
Wallachia and Moldavia and their elites acquired new regional importance in the context 
where Ottoman affairs became the site for the competition between European empires during the 
Napoleonic Wars and for the Habsburg Empire to maintain the continental balance after the 
establishment of the European concert of powers in 1815. Diplomacy and information networks 
provided the means through which the Porte strove to attract the support of other empires and for 
these empires to extend their influence in the Ottoman Empire at each other’s expense. The elites 
in Wallachia and Moldavia, who had been customarily carrying out diplomatic tasks for the 
Porte, became influential in trading information between the Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian 
Empires, and particularly in consolidating the Ottoman-Habsburg cooperation. This newly-
acquired relevance encouraged local power holders such as Constantin Samurcas to re-claim 
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authority after the Greek revolts in 1821 had caused purges against the Hellenized Orthodox 
servants at Constantinople and suspicion against their associates, the elites in Wallachia and 
Moldavia (Chapter 2). 
The major turning point for the leadership in Wallachia and Moldavia and for inter-
imperial rivalry on this borderland occurred after the Greek-Ottoman clashes between 1821 and 
1827 prompted the European powers to intervene in Ottoman rule and become protectors of 
independent Greece. Although the powers initially assessed that the revolts endangered the order 
established in 1815, they subsequently focused on turning the situation to their own advantage. 
The Russian Empire reputed significant strategic gains: after becoming a formal protector of 
Greece (1829), it soon pledged military defense to the Ottoman Porte (1831). The manifestation 
of this protection was joint imperial rule of Wallachia and Moldavia following the principles of 
“Ottoman suzerainty” and “Russian guarantee” of these provinces. The activity of the local 
elites, who became the actors in the administration supervised by Russia after 1829, was 
supposed to materialize these principles at the local level. It was in the context of the new 
European rivalry for the Ottoman Empire that prominent members of the local leadership, such 
as Nicolae Rosetti-Roznovanu, attempted to enhance their position by formally aligning 
themselves to different Russian projects while also entertaining connections with Russia’s rivals 
(Chapter 3).  
The effective application of the Ottoman-Russian condominium on the borderland and its 
formal terms provided the precedent for the European powers, which had joined the Porte against 
Russia in the Crimean War, to become “protectors” of Wallachia and Moldavia and to continue 
restricting Ottoman control as “suzerainty” (1856). The manifestation of European imperialism 
in the Ottoman Empire by dividing Ottoman rule in separate areas for local autonomous 
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government and imperial “suzerainty” converged with a transformation at the level of local 
elites. The multiplication of political sites in the government under Russian supervision and 
ideological mobilization assigned some elites such as Alexandru Samurcas to an emerging 
bureaucracy, while bringing to the forefront of local politics a group of less prominent 
individuals who were supporters of the “national union” of Wallachia and Moldavia. As the 
European protectors allowed the inhabitants of the borderland to decide on the creation of the 
new local government, these individuals managed to impose the principle of a unified 
Wallachian-Moldavian government in charge of constructing the “nation,” and of implementing 
the new international “protection.” The descendants of the old elites in local politics or 
bureaucracy became active upholders of the Romanian “nation” and servants of the Romanian 
nation-state (Chapter 4).   
Throughout the dissertation I also explored the connections and divisions between the 
elites in Wallachia and Moldavia, the Orthodox Christian elites in Constantinople, and the 
Ottoman Muslim elites in the region and the capital, which are relevant to studying the relations 
between this borderland and the Ottoman center. Thus, I explained that the elites in these 
provinces implemented Ottoman rule not only by symbolic mandate, but also because they 
participated in the imperial redistribution of resources and the political connections that defined 
the farming out of Wallachia and Moldavia to Constantinopolitan Christians. They also became 
involved in two activities that were essential to the Porte as the Empire became object to 
international competition and expansion: associating a particular territory with Ottoman authority 
and helping the Porte connect with potential allies. At the same time, I emphasized that the way 
in which the center controlled Wallachia and Moldavia also fueled tensions and contestations. 
Although the Hellenized Orthodox elites from Constantinople and the Orthodox elites in 
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Wallachia and Moldavia were related by numerous bonds, the competition for power 
transformed ancestry, place of birth, rank snd social status into assets evoked to dispute the 
legitimacy of officials delegated from Constantinople and even the way in which the Ottomans 
ruled the borderland. Such tensions had been reconcilable before through the factional political 
game that connected the borderland and Constantinople and the increase of the number of 
appointments. However, the tensions also offered a new pretext to the Russian Court to intervene 
in Ottoman affairs and, after the Greek revolts, stimulated re-arrangements of the elites in 
Wallachia and Moldavia under Russian supervision.  
This study could be used to pursue other directions of study pertaining to the evolution of 
international law concerning the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th century and to the 
combination of local political projects in the frame of the developing nation-state and new 
Western imperial agendas in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. One of the arguments of this 
dissertation has been that compared to other Ottoman Christian lands in the Balkans, Wallachia 
and Moldavia served as laboratories for European imperial projects concerning the Ottoman 
Empire to be formulated, challenged and implemented. However, for a more comprehensive 
understanding of how European imperial agendas and international law developed based on these 
experiments, it could be useful to explore in parallel the international arrangements for Wallachia 
and Moldavia, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria in the later decades of the 19th century.  
Furthermore, this dissertation, which detected how two generations of elites on the 
borderland implemented Ottoman imperial authority or European expansion while following 
their own agendas, ended with the death of the members of the second generation, around the 
time of the creation of the United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (1856). Thus, it did 
not approach several questions that can launch new directions for inquiry in the history of the 
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Balkans and of the relations between the politics of the Balkan nation-states and international 
dynamics. For instance, a biography of Christian officials who used to be allies or relatives in 
Wallachia, Moldavia and Constantinople but who became officials in the service of Greece, the 
reformed Ottoman Empire or the United Principalities can illuminate the nationalization of a 
once heterogeneous leadership. An inquiry into the connections between the representatives of 
the Ottoman Empire, Balkan and Western states who once were Ottoman elites could result in a 
transnational history about how local state-building, international capitalism and Western 
imperialism combined and had political repercussions in South-Eastern Europe. The relational 
approach that I proposed in this study can be adapted to analyses of modern Balkans that 
overcome the isolation of national histories and the assumption that this region was destined to 
lag behind Europe.  
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APPENDIX A: Glossary 
 
Alışveriş – Term used in Wallachia and Moldavia to refer to trade in general as well as to the 
transactions and subleases of land estates 
Arxontas (Gr.) – term used in the Phanariot-Wallachian/Moldavian circles to refer to Greek 
Orthodox incumbents of office, creditors and power holders in general in Constantinople, 
Wallachia and Moldavia 
Ayan – local grandee in the Balkans and the Middle East who enjoyed local social and political 
prestige, engaged in the extensive purchase of tax-farms and in trade and mediated between local 
communities and the imperial authorities appointed by the center 
Ban – official who traditionally ruled over administration and justice in Western Wallachia but 
who in the 18th century became associated with the collection of taxes and acted alongside the 
kaymakam  
Başdefterdar – Ottoman treasury supervisor before the 19th century  
Bey – title of the leaders who ruled Ottoman administrative units, and which in the 18th century 
was also used in reference to the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia and the Phanariot 
families 
Boyar (boier/boieri) – term used in Wallachia and Moldavia to designate individuals who owned 
land estates and, beginning in the 18th century, individuals of different social ranks who held 
offices in the retinue of the ruler and the administration of the provinces 
Căminar – official appointed in the 18th century to collect the tax charged on the sale of wine, 
brandy and tobacco. He did not participate in the Divan and did not receive salary but was 
entitled to have tax-exempt tenants on his estates and to a share from the taxes he collected. 
Honorary title after 1830  
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Clucer – official who participated in the Divan, received a salary and was entitled to tax-exempt 
tenants on his estates. Honorary title after 1830 
Comis – official who oversaw the hospodar’s stables, but who did not participate in the Divan. 
He was entitled to a share from the revenues for the upkeep of the stables and to tax-exempt 
tenants on his estates  
Divan – the council of the high boieri in Wallachia and Moldavia, called to decide on important 
administrative issues and to serve as high instance of appeal for litigations 
Domn  - formal titles used in the vernacular Wallachia and Moldavia to refer to the rulers of 
these provinces 
Dragoman, Imperial Dragoman and Dragoman of the Fleet – titles held by Phanariot officials 
who acted as interpreters and mediators of the imperial council in the encounters with foreign 
representatives. The Dragoman of the Fleet also exerted administrative tasks in the communities 
from the islands in the Aegean, Rumelia and Anatolia, which were under the authority of the 
Ottoman Admiral. Their remuneration was provided, among other sources, from revenues 
collected in Wallachia and Moldavia 
Hegemonas, authontas – formal titles in Greek used among the Phanariot officials at 
Constantinople and in Wallachia and Moldavia to refer to the rulers of these provinces 
Hatman – traditionally, a military official in Moldavia. In the 18th century Wallachia, an official 
in charge of implementing the Divan’s decisions in civil matters   
Hatt-ı şerif – imperial decree 
Kadı – judge of Islamic law and customary law 
Kapı kehaya – representative of the hospodar at the imperial palace, who had ceremonial and 
effective political duties. Selected from the close entourage of the appointed hospodar, the kapı 
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kehaya prepared his trip to the province, was part of the procession of appointment and later 
informed the hospodar about the political decisions and changes at Constantinople and 
entertained with gifts and services the favor of the sultan, the vizier and other officials for the 
hospodar. They also maintained contact with foreign representatives at the Porte  
Kaymakam  – 1. the hospodar’s representative in Western Wallachia, in charge of collecting 
taxes, the application of justice in Western Wallachia and the trade between this region of 
Wallachia, Habsburg Transylvania and the lands at the south of the Danube. The kaymakam’s 
remuneration consisted of a share from the revenues in cattle trade and from the sale of 
subordinate offices 
2. the delegates that a hospodar newly appointed to rule in Wallachia or Moldavia sent to the 
province to prepare his arrival and take over the accounts of the treasury from the officials of the 
previous hospodar  
Logofăt – chancellor, prominent official who oversaw the chancellery and its staff, and who 
participated in the Divan. He was entitled to a share from the revenues of the treasury and tax 
farms and to tax-exempt tenants on his estates 
Malikane system – the auctioning, by the Ottoman state to entrepreneurs of tax-collection rights 
over tax-yielding assets for the duration of the entrepreneur’s life 
Negoţ – Term used in Wallachia and Moldavia to refer to trade in general but also to transactions 
and subleases of land estates 
Paharnic – cup bearer, honorary official who did not participate in the Divan but who was 
entitled to a salary and to tax-exempt tenants on his estates. An honorary title after 1830  
Paşa – high title of Ottoman military and civil officials 
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Phanariots  – term used in Wallachia and Moldavia and by Balkan and Ottoman historians to 
refer to the ethnically and socially heterogeneous group of Greek-speaking Greek Orthodox 
officials involved in the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and active as dragomans at 
the Porte, hospodars and incumbents of administrative offices in these provinces 
Pitar – official who oversaw the bread supply of the court and the upkeep of the hospodar’s 
carts. He did not participate in the Divan and did not have a salary. He was entitled to a share 
from the revenues for the upkeep of the cart and to tax-exempt tenants on his estates. Honorary 
title after 1830 
Postelnic – prominent official who oversaw the hospodars relations with foreign representatives 
and his correspondence with Constantinople, and who participated in the Divan. He received a 
salary and gifts from all those appointed in office and was entitled to tax-exempt tenants on his 
estates. Honorary title after 1830 
Prince (prinţ) – formal title used increasingly frequently in the 19th century to designate the 
rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia 
Reaya – the group of Muslim and non-Muslim tax-payers in the Ottoman Empire, distinctive 
from the military. After the 18th century it became associated with the non-Muslims in the 
empire until the distinction reaya-ruling class was abolished in 1839   
Reis efendi (reisül küttab) – the chief of the scribes to the grand vizier and, in the 18th century, 
the responsible with foreign affairs.  
Spătar – sword bearer, prominent official who oversaw the local armed corps in charge of 
preserving peace, and who participated in the Divan. He was entitled to revenues from his 
subordinates and to tax-exempt tenants on his estates. Honorary title after 1830 
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Sudit – foreign or Ottoman subject involved in trade and/or crafts who, by entering the protection 
of the European empires’ consuls in Bucharest and Iassy, enjoyed low trade tariffs and immunity 
of person and domicile  
Tax-farming – a wide-spread practice in the Ottoman lands during the 18th century, which could 
refer to the collection by an entrepreneur of the taxes in particular fiscal units, the poll tax paid 
by non-Muslim communities, trade taxes, for a predetermined period of time or for life 
Vistier – Treasurer. Prominent official who oversaw the operations and the staff of the treasury. 
Although he did not receive a salary, he was entitled to a significant share from the revenues 
collected by the treasury and tax farms and to tax-exempt tenants on his estates 
Vizier – Ottoman official of the highest rank who participated in the Imperial Council 
Vornic – prominent official who collected the customs fees and participated in the Divan. He was 
entitled to a salary, tax-exempt tenants on his estates and to a share from the revenues he 
collected 
Voyvoda, hospodar  - formal titles used by the Ottoman sultan and Muslim and Phanariot 
officials to refer to the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia that the sultan selected for temporary 
mandates to administer and tax-farm these two buffer regions. Voyvoda was used in other 
regions of the empire to refer to financial agents.
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APPENDIX B: Family tree of the Rosetti-Roznovanus                                                                 
Lascar Rosetti + Bella Cantacuzino 
 (? 1580-1646) 
                                                                                           The ancestor of the family 
 
 
                             Andrei (?-1761) + Maria Sandu Sturdza 
 
                                          Neculai (1725-1806) +                      Iordache  
                                          Smaranda                                   Rosetti Baston (? – 1751) + 
                                          Hrisoscoleo                                                                                                              Catrina Costandache 
                                                                                                          
 
 
 
Ecaterina + Ileana +        Rusandra +    Balaşa +      Maria + Safta +     Nastasia + Zoiţa +   Iordache +               Lascarache + 
Ioan Sturdza    Manolache   Iancu              Manolache    Ioan           Costin      Costache     ? Razu  (1764 – 1836)           (1725 – 1775) 
                            1.Profira Balş Ileana 
                2.Anica Bogdan Dimache 
       
 
 
      Petrache                Panait                                Neculai          Alecu (1) +          Zoe                         Răducanu 
                        Cazimir                 Cazimir                           (1794 – 1868) (1) +                                   (protégée) +             (protégé) +  
      (protégé)        (protégé)                           1.Catinca Ghika       Rusandra                   Alexandru C.          1.Ileana Balş 
                                                                                                2.Maria Ghika          Kalimaki                   Moruzi                    2.Eufrosina 
                                                       (hospodar of Moldavia)         Mano 
             
 
Pulheria (1) +   Maria (1) +    Rusandra (1) +            Maria (2) +     Neculai (1842 – 1891) (2) +            Smaranda (2) + 
Baron Rosen    Neculai          1.Seburov                    Ştefan             1.Adela Cantacuzino Paşcanu          Henri de Bouille 
                         Soluhuo         2.Gral Lischvine         Rosetti            2.Lucia Conachi Vogoride     
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APPENDIX C: Family tree Samurcas 
 
Gheorghe Petropol, known as Samurcas,  
                                                 fur merchant in Constantinople, 18th century 
 
 
Dimitrie (1768 – 1846)+   Constantin (? – 1825) +                         Ioan (? – 1821) +                           Gheorghe (? – ?) + 
                                                 Zinca Brânceanu  (? – 1836)                 Caterina Rallet                               Maria Bengescu 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
Gheorghe         Ruxandra                                                       Alexandru +                                                                 Grigore Bengescu + 
(1806 – ?)                                                                               (1805 – 1870)                                                                   (1824 – 1881)  
                                                                                           Zoe Chegiul Beyazi                                                             Elena Golescu 
                                                                                                (1808-1867)                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
                                   Elisabeta +           Caterina           Elena            Maria              Ioan                                           George Bengescu 
                                 (? – 1921)                                                                             (1845-1899)                                              (1848 – 1921) 
                               Toma Tzigara             
                               (1814 – 1879) 
                                           
 
 
Toma          Zoe           Tudor          Elena          Olga          Alexandru             Annette             Maria 
                                  ( – 1872)                                        Tzigara-Samurcas     (– 1893)                       
                                                                                          (1872 – 1952 
